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ABSTRACT  
 
Patent's reputation as a constructive mechanism in the developing world was not a 
common notion. The prospect of utilising pharmaceutical patents to generate drug 
accessibility in developing countries did not seem possible. However, little credit was 
given to patents. Through motivating innovation, foreign investment, trade relations 
and industrialisation, patents can form a prowess pharmaceutical industry in the 
developing world. This thesis explores the possibility to increasing the availability of 
low cost drugs in emerging economies through patent enforcement. The analysis 
focuses on India as a case study. India has long been at the forefront of the developing 
world fight for low cost drugs markets. This stand once meant the exclusion of patent 
protection of pharmaceutical innovation and the formation of low cost copied generic 
drugs industry. However given developing countries' recent submissions to the 
international pressure to enforce patent protection on pharmaceutical innovations, it is 
time to re-examine the role patents play in developing countries, this time in the 
avenue of reducing drugs' pricing. India's current economy and the evolution of its 
pharmaceutical industry evolvement, make it as an exemplary case study to utilise 
patent to fulfil this end. Accordingly, the issue of widening the scope of patent 
protection in India to include pharmaceutical incremental innovation is examined. 
Notwithstanding the responsibility of India to endorse wider patent scope, legally and 
practically, the thesis does not ignore the moral obligation the developed world has 
towards India's poorer population to offer low cost drugs during the stages of its 
pharmaceutical industry emergence. The preliminary justification to conduct this 
observation is to show that patent is not only to answer the healthcare needs of the 
developed world population, but also the developing world. As such the thesis argues 
that India ought to stand at the forefront again, this time, demonstrating the potential 
within patent to establish low cost patented pharmaceuticals marketplace in 
developing countries.  
 
 
Statement on word length 
 The paper has approximately 49,300 words excluding cover page, table of 
contents, footnotes and bibliography.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
The Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement),1 
obliges member countries of the World Trade Organisation:2 economically developed, 
developing and least developed countries, to offer patent protection for any 
technological innovation. 3  This provision was expected to include protection of 
pharmaceutical innovations. By granting the patentee with market exclusivity over the 
invention for 20 years,4 patent avoids the risk of other firms in the protecting market, 
to copy the patented drug and compete with it5 as the generic industry exercised 
within developing countries prior to signing the TRIPS Agreement. 6  From 2005 
developing countries should have enforced patent protection for pharmaceutical 
inventions7 and once an interested party wishes to use the patented drug, a proper 
remuneration, as set by the patentee, needs to be paid. 
 
Given that the cost of putting a drug on the market shelf can reach US$1 
Billion, 8 the patented drug’s cost is respectively rated highly to enable the 
pharmaceutical firm innovator to recoup its investment in the process of research and 
development. This prospect deepens the reliance of the pharmaceutical industry on 
patent enforcement because it promises market exclusivity and hinders the risk of 
generics price reducing competition.9 However, as much as the patent mechanism is 
needed to motivate the pharmaceutical industry to innovate, it is not preferred by 
                                               
1
 Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (15 April 1994) 1869 UNTS 299 (1994) 33 
ILM 81 [TRIPS Agreement].  
2
 See "What is the WTO"? www.wto.org (accessed 17 October 2009).  
3
 See TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, art 27(1). The Article specifically determines that all fields of 
technology are patentable and restrict any discriminative action towards one field of technology or the 
other.    
4
 See TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, art 33.  
5
 See TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, art 28.  
6
 See Part IV A The Great Rise of Generics. For a definition of generic drugs see part III Patents as a 
Prime Motivator of Pharmaceutical Innovation.  
7
 See TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, art 65. Generally according to Article 65(1), all member countries 
to the World Trade Organisation [WTO] had to enforce the TRIPS Agreement within a year, that is, 
until 1996. However, as ordered by Article 65(2), developing countries enjoyed an additional four 
years until 2000. Nevertheless, according to Article 65(4), if a developing country did not offer patent 
protection in the pharmaceutical technology field specifically in 1995, it had the opportunity to apply 
for patent enforcememnt in the marketplace no later than the year 2005.  
8
 See Joseph A DiMasi, Henry G Grabowsky "The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech 
Different?" (2007) 28(4-5) Managerial and Decision Economics 469, 475. 
9
 See James Bessen, Michael J Meurer Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put 
Innovators at Risk (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008) 88-89.  
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developing countries, for it maintains the status quo of the high prices of drugs, often 
resulting in sickness and deaths from treatable disease.10 
 
Understandably, the propensity in the developing world for patent enforcement for 
pharmaceuticals is weak. However, the immense fear of high cost drugs has blinded 
the developing world from seeing the contribution of patent in boosting innovation 
and developments, which would eventually be able to offer an alternative to low cost 
drugs, other than generics. The thesis is concerned with this subject. Although generic 
production enables the poorer population of the world to enjoy low cost drugs, a 
contribution which is highly respected in the thesis, it does not answer the wider 
spectrum of healthcare in the developing world, a status which can be remedied 
through a wider enforcement of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. In other words, 
presenting the various layers of merits patent possesses, the thesis shows that 
although patent has a direct affect on the increase of the cost of drugs, it can 
encourage better healthcare in low cost drugs as well. 
 
Needless to say healthcare is a major part of the vicious cycle of poverty, for 
lacking health means lacking proper education, social infrastructure and solid 
industrialisation which can lead directly again to poverty. Patent has attracted vast 
criticism as the wrong mechanism to be implemented in the developing world's 
pharmaceutical markets. Although this criticism is somewhat legitimate, it contains 
only one aspect of patent enforcement and dismisses the various elements that exist in 
its mechanism, which can improve the easy provision of drugs in the developing 
world, by strengthening the local innovative pharmaceutical industry.  
 
The developing world has agreed to enforce patent protection on pharmaceutical 
innovations. Hence, finding a solution for the developing world's difficulty in 
accessing drugs ought to be located from within patent and not externally. As a 
property rights protector, patent is a great force of growth. Patent, as any other 
intellectual property rights, plays an important role in encouraging innovation, 
                                               
10
 See generally Kalpana Chaturvedi, Joanna Chataway and David Wield "Policy, Markets and 
Knowledge: Strategic Synergies in Indian Pharmaceutical Firms"(2007) 19(5) Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management 565,565. 
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industrial progress and technological growth.11 It also motivates investment, improves 
the quality of products, creates demand for a more skilled workforce, enables 
education opportunities and promotes economic growth. 12  Therefore, if these 
elements are to be implemented in poorer yet relatively richer and advanced 
pharmaceutical industries such as in developing countries, the local innovation would 
advance and grow to offer extensive competition levels to ultimately reduce consumer 
prices.13  
 
In this respect it is important to mention that this thesis concerns the possibilities 
promised to the developing world, in comparison to the least developed world. The 
least developed world suffers from much lower socio – economic infrastructure 
stability compared to the developing world, and thus is not ready to absorb patent and 
benefit from its various merits. With weak functioning of legal institutions, non 
validation of property rights,14 unstable national currency, low communicative routes, 
unstable banking and insurance, low economic profitability, low quality products and 
weak resources to facilitate successful business relationships, 15  least developed 
countries do not have the capacity to absorb patent protection and benefit from the 
introduction of new technologies to their marketplace. This conclusion is particularly 
true concerning the complex and costly pharmaceutical industry. For these reasons, 
least developed countries set a precondition to their joining the World Trade 
Organisation: that their enforcement of patent for pharmaceutical innovation would 
not start before the year 2016.16 
 
India, however, which is characterised as a developing country with low-middle 
income and which still suffers from high poverty rates, was not chosen randomly. The 
prime reason is the fact that India contains a high percentage of the world's poor 
population, which mostly relies on local products, and so there is a need to find a 
                                               
11
 See Michael P Todaro, Stephen C Smith Economic Development (10ed, Pearson Education Limited, 
London, 2009) 2, 7. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 See Margaret K Kyle, Anita M McGahan "Investments in Pharmaceuticals Before and After TRIPS" 
(Entrepreneurship and Innovation – Organizations, Institutions and Regions, Copenhagen, 2008) 1, 15, 
17-18.  
14
 Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 67. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (14 November 2001) 755 WT/MIN 
(01)/DEC/W/2,41 I/L/M (2002) [Doha Declaration], art 7. 
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home-based solution for drug accessibility. 17  The other reasons rely on India's 
capacity to offer a solution for a low cost drug market within the framework of patent 
enforcement. India’s exceptionally large consumer market size, 18  its emerging- 
industrialised status, its domestic firms becoming multinationals, its growing 
scientific skills, its exposure to global markets and a relatively stable democracy19 
make it as an ideal platform to examine the power within patent to reduce drug 
pricing through higher rates of investment and innovation.  
 
The second reason for choosing India as a case study is the lacuna in its patent 
protection scope. Although India has constituted patent enforcement in every 
technological field since 2005, it is the only member country in the World Trade 
Organisation which excludes incremental innovation from patent protection scope by 
rigid restrictions on incremental innovation eligibility for protection. This reality not 
only attracts criticism for India's Patent Act compatibility to the TRIPS Agreement,20 
but also from the pharmaceutical industry, which sees incremental innovation as its 
core level of innovation.21  
 
India's Government, therefore, made a choice not to utilise patent mechanism to 
advance its pharmaceutical industry and its economy, but to secure the low prices of 
drugs through the enlargement of the generic drugs pool. As long as incremental 
modified drugs innovation would be off patent protection, they would be legitimate 
for generic copying. Hence, instead of choosing to progress its limited innovative 
skills and try to find a solution from within its progress, India chose regression. It 
chose market failure and free riding, mistakenly configuring the latter as the only 
option to offer affordable drugs in the marketplace. Although having the needed 
social-economic features to encourage investment into its marketplace and despite 
having the needed skills to engage somewhat in pharmaceutical innovation, India will 
                                               
17See generally Cheri Grace The Effect of Changing Intellectual Property on Pharmaceutical Industry 
Prospects in India and China: Considerations for Access to Medicines (prepared for the British 
Government's Department for International Development, 2004). 
18
 Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 15. 
19
 Ibid. See also Capgemini “Report Finds the Growth of New Multinationals from Emerging Markets 
Challenges Traditional Western Business Model” (20 June 2008) Press Release. 
20
 See Part VI B 3 Implications on the international spectrum: the compatibility with the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
21
 Ibid.  
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not benefit from high rates of innovation 22  or progression to the international 
pharmaceutical arena with all of its economic benefits.   
 
One question needs to be asked - are generics preferable? Are they enough? The 
vast economic returns India has enjoyed from generic production can, on the one 
hand, answer its economic needs and, at the same time, offer lower priced drugs to the 
local population. Moreover, as long as the generic production is being practiced at the 
end of the patent term protection, it does not hurt the pharmaceutical industry 
market’s exclusivity rights or the chances to recoup the costly invention. The answer 
however, despite the generic production benefits, is probably no for it does not answer 
wider healthcare needs as higher quality drugs as mentioned earlier.  
 
But generics by themselves are not preferable over innovation. It can be a strong 
market force to reduce drug pricing; however it will not offer the ultimate solution for 
low cost drugs in India, as recently published by All-India Drug Action Network, a 
campaign group for Rational Drug Therapy and Policy. 23  Moreover, it seems 
economically unreasonable that in a world which is dominated by intellectual 
property rights enforcement, the generic industry will be lucrative enough for the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry. Hence, as an alternative or even as an addition to 
generics’ production, patent’s encouragement of higher levels of local innovation can 
answer these aforementioned goals through the advancement of the local 
pharmaceutical productivity.   
 
A larger scope of patent protection can make the difference for the Indian 
population as it will encourage high inflows of foreign direct investment to strengthen 
and advance the Indian limited innovative pharmaceutical industry skills. However, 
without a harmonised protection of intellectual property rights, this notion will 
wane.
24
 Without promising pharmaceutical multinationals low generic exposure, firms 
will not invest in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. 25  Without proper market 
                                               
22
 See generally Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 10. 
23
 Drug Prices and Affordability www.ideas.repec.org (accessed 1 August 2009). All India Drug Action 
Network is a network of non governmental organisations aspired to increase accessesibility to essential 
drugs.   
24
 See Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 6. 
25
 See Part V B Patent as a Leading Motivator of Foreign Direct Investment. 
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exclusivity, pharmaceutical multinationals will not transfer their sophisticated 
technologies and open research facilities in India.26  
 
In this respect, without educational programmes, research, industrialisation 
development and a broader innovation system, the local industry will not be able to 
develop and take advantage of the exceptionally large sized Indian pharmaceutical 
market to reduce drug pricing through high innovation quantities.27 Under this reality, 
not only will the Indian population be denied low cost patented drugs but the other 
poor populations of the world, which rely on India’s drug production, will be 
excluded from low cost patented drugs as well. 28  
 
However, it is important to emphasise that the thesis does not aim to offer an 
overnight solution to the high cost patented drug market, or to exempt the Indian 
Government from establishing stronger healthcare infrastructure and drug price 
control orders as part of creating an affordable drug marketplace. Until the utilisation 
of the patent mechanism to the fullest as suggested, the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry is mostly recommended to use the different flexibilities to the exclusive 
patentee rights in the marketplace as offered in the TRIPS Agreement as compulsory 
licensing.29 Notwithstanding, this recommendation is not to be used as a bargaining 
tool to overpower the patentee's rights, but to use in true times of need to maintain a 
healthy and productive society during the awakening of a stronger Indian innovative 
pharmaceutical industry .        
 
On the other side still lies the responsibility of the Western advanced 
pharmaceutical industry to the developing world's population, not only through 
foreign direct investment and technology transfer, but in delivering drugs at lower 
prices in their benefit-cost frame. As long as India offers vast protection of patent, and 
promises that generics will not threaten the prospect of the industry to recoup its 
investment, the Western richer industry, as a beneficial party from the Indian industry 
                                               
26
 Ibid. 
27
 See Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 15. 
28
 See Grace, above n 17, 13.  
29
 See TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, art 31. According to the TRIPS Agreement member countries 
were allowed to implement in their legislation the mechanism of compulsory licensing as brought by 
Article 31 of the Agreement. According to the Article, generic firms can, under certain terms, to copy a 
patented drug regardless to the patentee’s approval.    
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ought to ensure that the human right for good health will not be forced aside by the 
human right of property. Only a quid pro quo relationship will elevate patent as drug 
accessibility enabler.  
 
In other words, examining the enforcement of larger patent protection 
enforcement in the Indian pharmaceutical industry will not only show how patent has 
the power to advance and strengthen a pharmaceutical industry in a developing 
country, it will also break the myth behind patent as a right whose enforcement is 
suitable only in rich countries, one which, if enforced by developing countries, would 
only increase the barriers to drug accessibility. The following chapters of the thesis 
sketch patent protection as a concrete and realistic plan to add to the wide range 
generic drug pool in India by introducing protection of pharmaceutical incremental 
innovation, as a positive prospect to reduce prices of patented drugs. Between India's 
special economic progression, its large market size and existing pharmaceutical 
innovative skills, the growing purchasing power, enforcing a wider scope of patent 
protection within the pharmaceutical industry may be a frightening decision at first; 
however it will be proven otherwise.  
 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Following the introduction chapter the 
second chapter presents the parties impacted by the prospect of pharmaceutical 
patenting, as well as the rights impacted by it, such as the right of property and health. 
Although the resulted increase in drug pricing due to patent enforcement, the chapter 
suggests that patenting pharmaceuticals in developing countries can offer low cost 
route to drug use, more than developing countries are willing to admit. This 
presumption is shown by reviewing patent's encouragement of innovation and 
investment, relying on India's emerging economy and innovative pharmaceutical 
industry. The third chapter reviews the pharmaceutical industry on its two main levels 
of innovation, with special emphasis on incremental innovations. The formation of 
India's generic pharmaceutical industry, its colossal importance to the poorer 
population healthcare and the parallel introduction of patent protection by India's 
signing the TRIPS Agreement, is reviewed in the forth chapter. After signing the 
TRIPS Agreement, the fifth chapter shows the vast investment patent has invited to 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry from Western industries, which establishes the 
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connection of patent to form a forte independent innovative pharmaceutical industry 
and generate a direct impact on the reduction of drug pricing.  
 
As a complementary analysis, the sixth chapter notes of the importance of 
patenting incremental pharmaceutical innovation in India. This suggested step is the 
final step needed to enlarge the local industry to form an enlarged patented drug 
market competition and reduce drug pricing. In this respect the chapter concludes the 
necessity to amend the Indian Patents Act to introduce the patenting of 
pharmaceutical incremental innovation. Although under the TRIPS Agreement the 
primary obligation is to enforce patent protection on pharmaceuticals, the 
pharmaceutical industry in the developed world is primarily morally obligated to offer 
a low cost drug supply to the poorer population in developing countries while the 
latter try to form a large scaled pharmaceutical marketplace as advocated in the 
seventh chapter. The eighth chapter concludes of the influential role patent has to 
form an accessible route to drugs in developing countries and break the myth behind 
patent as a barrier to low cost drugs.  
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II PATENTING PHARMACEUTICALS  – FURTHER OBSERVATIONS 
A. Does Patenting Pharmaceuticals Enable or Deter Drug Accessibility in  
 Developing Countries 
1. Characteristics of the developing world  
 
In the tenth edition of Todaro and Smith’s research “Economic Development”, 
one of the preliminary observations was the extreme contrast exists in the global 
economy of today.30 They mainly referred to the differences that exist between the 
developed and the developing world.31 The research covered the scholars' references 
to different dimensions such as market productivity, human capital supply, poverty 
rates, population growth, areas of living (rural/urban), levels of industrialisation and 
more.32 For the basic comparison, the authors found that India’s output per worker is 
10 times lower than the one in the United States.33 If the annual income per capita in 
the United States is US$41,950, the average income in India is US$3460 and US$720 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo.34  
 
The average life expectancy is 74 in the United States, 64 in India and only 44 in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.35 The authors also compared the literacy rates 
between developed and developing countries and found that in comparison to the 
United States where all women are literate, in India only 48 per cent of the women are 
literate and 54 per cent in Democratic Republic of Congo.36 Needless to say, factors 
such as education and literacy heavily impact on the quality of the available human 
capital in the marketplace and the direction it would lead a country's economy and 
health.   
 
Usually, a country’s development level is based on its per capita income.37 The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (known as the World Bank)38 
                                               
30
 Todaro, Smith, above n 11,41-42. 
31
 Ibid, 39. 
32
 Ibid, 40. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid, 41. 
38
 The World Bank www.worldbank.org (accessed 1 September 2009). 
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classifies development as follows:39  low-income countries characterised with up to 
US$875 per capita gross national income, lower-middle income countries 
characterised with US$876 - US$3465 income, upper-middle income countries 
characterised with US$3466 - US$10,725 income and high-income countries 
characterised with no less than US$10,726 income rates. Developing countries are 
characterised as low to upper –middle income countries.40 India, for example, located 
in the South-Asia region is classified as a low-middle income country.41  
 
As can be expected, low income levels lead to poor education, poor health 
conditions and weak infrastructure, which lead to low productivity rates, economic 
instability, poverty and again to low income levels.42 This vicious cycle is difficult to 
escape from. Developing countries on the lower scale, where India is located, are also 
commonly characterised with low levels of human capital which can be expected to 
be imperative to a country’s economic growth.43 With respect to the developed world, 
developing countries lag behind in health, education, nutrition and suffer from 15 
times higher death rates.44 Although the scholars acknowledged the progress that was 
achieved in countries in South-Asia such as India,45 they still stressed the high rates of 
illiteracy, poor schooling attainment and nourishment,46 which are vital parameters to 
becoming a part of the new modern international economy and being able to be active 
in an expensive and complex industry like the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
High poverty rates are another parameter which distinguishes the developing 
world from the developed,47 which needless to say hinder the engagement of the local 
industry with high quantity of pharmaceutical innovation, the same as high population 
growth48 and high death rates.49 A high percentage of people living in rural areas, who 
mostly practice agriculture, is another economic parameter in developing countries 
                                               
39
 Country Classification http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0 (accessed 1 September 2009). See 
also Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 41.  
40
 See Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 41. 
41
 Ibid, 42. See also Country Classification, above n 39. 
42
 See generally Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 56. 
43
 Ibid, 58. 
44
 Ibid, 59. 
45
 Ibid. See also Part II D 1 The socio-economic outlook.  
46
 Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 59. 
47
 Ibid, 59, 208. 
48
 Ibid, 61-62. 
49
 Ibid, 63. 
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leading to the neglecting of manufacturing or services routes,50  which are highly 
lucrative avenues in a country's economy. 51  Nevertheless, achieving the goal of 
industrialisation cannot be fulfilled in an unhealthy society with sick human capital 
and when referring to developing countries, one cannot dismiss the burden these 
countries carry with so many diseases in comparison to economically developed 
countries.52  
 
With poverty leading as a prime disease,53 tuberculosis claims two million lives 
every year in the developing world,54 hepatitis B claims one million lives each year,55 
as well as cholera, leprosy, lymphatic filariasis, 56  which constantly increase the 
number of deaths. Science is not the problem, for science can lead to a cure of these 
diseases. However, the low available capital of the developing world Governments 
is.57 Without the possibility of a financial return in its investment from the developing 
world markets, the pharmaceutical industry in Western countries will not engage in 
research and development of drugs to treat tropical diseases, fearing it will have to 
push the prices of the invented drugs down.58 For this reason, tropical diseases are 
often referred to as neglected diseases or "orphan" diseases, for the minor research 
they attract.59    
 
Even countries such as India, Brazil, South Africa, with a sizeable middle class 
like in industrialised developing countries,60 and ones which the thesis addresses its 
recommendation to, suffer from the above characteristics and struggle with high rates 
of poverty, lack of proper education, lack of basic infrastructure stability and the 
above diseases at epidemic rates. 61  Thus, their preference for the production of 
                                               
50
 Ibid, 64. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid, 400. See also WHO Report 2007 Global Tuberculosis Control: Surveillance, Planning, 
Financing  (WHO, Geneva, 2008) .See also WHO World Malaria Report 2008 (WHO, Geneva, 2008). 
53
 Todaro, Smith, above n 11, 400. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid, 401. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid, 407. 
58
 Ibid, 408. 
59
 Patrice Trouiller and others “Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a 
Public-Health Policy Failure” (2002) 359 (9324) The Lancet 2188, 2188. 
60
 Bebe Loff, Mark Heywood “Patents on Drugs: Manufacturing Scarcity of Advancing Health?" 
(2002) 30 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 621, 624-625. 
61Ibid . 
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generic drugs is no different than low-income developed countries like Afghanistan or 
the Yemen.62 
 
The constant tension between the developed countries, known as the "North", and 
the developing countries, known as the "South" concerning patent enforcement of 
pharmaceuticals is not solely involved with the right of each one to healthcare. The 
right of the pharmaceutical firm to enjoy a proper return for its investment and 
prevent the generic copying of the costly invention is an equally important factor 
which should not be overlooked. In order to fully understand whether patent 
enforcement of pharmaceuticals can be used as an alternative route to achieve low 
cost drugs market further analysis of the two parties, the developing and the 
developed worlds’ concerns, risks and needs, is essential.  In this respect and after 
reviewing the landscape of the developing world, the next section investigates the true 
meaning of patenting pharmaceuticals.  
 
2. North to south outlook 
 
Reviewing the developing world outline of diseases and high death rates, it can be 
declared that the pharmaceutical research and development activity is not complete. 
The prospect of the evolvement of new diseases and the need to develop cures for 
major existing ones like cancer, AIDS, other infectious diseases and heart diseases, 
strengthens the importance of continuing research activity by the pharmaceutical 
industry. It is also obvious that diseases have no borders and the recent case of swine 
flu highly exemplifies this assessment. The latter statement is to say that the need for 
continuous research activity of the pharmaceutical industry is a mutual need of both 
the developed as well as the developing countries.  
 
Regardless of the mutual need for drugs, only the developed world is capable of 
advanced pharmaceutical research and development to find cures for the 
aforementioned diseases, for only the developed world has the required education, 
skills and the capital to invest in the costly process of pharmaceutical innovation. In 
addition to the cost, the length and the complexity of the process and the extensive 
competition within the industry also offer further justifications for patent protection 
                                               
62
 Country Classification, above n 39.  
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enforcement in the international marketplace with no exceptions, as a way to reduce 
the industry’s risk of not being able to recoup the costly investment.  Nevertheless, 
one can ask what the benefits of introducing a new drug to the market are without the 
capacity to sell it or use it.  
 
Although the developing world has agreed to be a part of an international 
intellectual property rights regime, the cost-benefits of the drug innovation 
conundrum is not solved. On the one hand, suffering from economic instability and 
lacking sufficient technologies and innovative “knowhow” skills in the 
pharmaceutical industry, developing countries are pushed to rely on the 
technologically advanced and economically robust counterparts in the West to 
develop new drugs. On the other hand, offering property protection on invented drugs 
through patent, which denies the immediate generic copying of a drug, can result in a 
life of sickness in developing countries, a sickness which could be cured only if the 
drugs were affordable.63  
 
Opponents of international intellectual property protection enforcement have often 
argued for a differential setting of intellectual property rights regime in developing 
countries to maximise accessibility to Western technologies.64 Lacking an adequate 
purchasing power equivalent to the developed world population, patent enforcement 
was not to promise accessibility to Western pharmaceutical skills and technologies, or 
a chance to facilitate and advance the local existing pharmaceutical industries 
innovative capacity. 65  Without the needed purchasing power, intellectual property 
rights were not to foster technology transfer. Generics copying rights however, were. 
Blinded by the fear of high priced drugs, India, the country which has better chances 
to benefit from vast enforcement of intellectual property compared to other smaller 
developing industrialised countries, was the leading opponent to signing the TRIPS 
Agreement.66  
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The recent study conducted by All-India Drug Action Network, a Campaign 
Group for Rational Drug Therapy and Policy published in December 2008, revealed 
the reality of drug pricing in India.67 When a daily average salary in the labour field in 
India is 60 Rs which equals US$1.29,68 how can one recover from tuberculosis, eat, 
drink and enjoy proper housing, if the drug is equivalent to 737 days of workdays. 
Another example is a drug which treats coronary heart disease whose price is equal to 
209 days of labour work in India.69 There are many more examples published in the 
report which together with the poor healthcare infrastructure in India can demonstrate 
the difficulty in offering patent protection of pharmaceuticals to the immediate 
accessibility to drugs.70      
 
In retrospect, a fair question would be how one chooses one result over the other.  
How one chooses to omit patent protection enforcement in order to access drugs, 
when the same step can hinder the drug's innovation. According to Indira Gandhi, 
there it is not a matter of choice. Gandhi’s view as stated in the World Health 
Assembly in 1982 pointed to one result only, one which would end with full access to 
drugs by anyone in need of them and as stated:”the idea of a better –ordered world is 
one which medical discoveries will be free of patents and there will be no profiteering 
from life and death”. 71 However, Gandhi did not give any weight to the fact that 
without patent protection, the pharmaceutical industry will not engage in further drug 
discoveries.  
 
Therefore, a proper balance does not seem to be one which omits patent protection 
enforcement from the pharmaceutical technology field, rather one which is sourced 
within the patent mechanism. Although this presumption is not common, it can be 
implied in developing countries. Notwithstanding the importance of accessing drugs 
by all human beings, rich or poor, and the difficulties patent can put in the direct way 
to achieve this goal, a deeper observation of the tension existing between the 
developed and the developing countries' interests reveals additional layers. The 
avenue of the pharmaceutical firm’s right to enjoy a proper return for its investment 
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obliges an analysis of patent as a defender of the private individual human right of 
property, or if you will, the pharmaceutical firm right to enjoy exclusivity over its 
invention.  
 
The next section of the chapter which opens with the philosophical justification of 
patent protection, further lays the importance of the two human rights of property and 
health and, as they represent the right of the private and the right of the public 
respectively, a warning of market failure is given if one right is enforced without the 
other. In other words, the next part of the chapter draws additional avenues which 
exist within patent alone, as well as facing the right for health and interestingly shows 
how one is fulfilled by the other; how patent enforcement of pharmaceutical 
innovation enables a better utilisation of the right of health through drug innovation.  
 
B. The Private - Public, Property- Health paradox in Patenting Pharmaceuticals  
 
The protection patent offered to the pharmaceutical innovator shows the power 
patent has in protecting private rights and at the same time public rights by offering 
needed new products to the marketplace. However, as much as the aspect of patent 
privatisation compliments the needs of the public, if applied in developing countries 
markets, patent can discriminate the rights of the public. Notwithstanding the 
aforementioned risk, it is essential to emphasise that the right of the public could 
never be utilised without the right of the private for there could not have been any 
new product to enjoy. In other words without a patent protection for pharmaceutical 
innovation, there would not be any drugs to treat any disease. Would that be a better 
result for the world’s poor and sick? It seems that the answer to this question is no.  
 
The philosophy behind patent protection is the one behind property protection and 
can be based on both philosophies constructed by two of the leading scholars in the 
field of liberalism and the relationship between the state and the individual, John 
Locke and Georg Hegel. John Locke, the father of liberalism and modern democracy, 
had an immense affect on the establishment of the conception of private property. 
Locke defined property as a result of labour. 72 According to Locke, when God gave 
the world to the common, he commanded mankind to subdue the earth for one’s 
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benefits.73 Thus, to acquire property rights to something (which is not owned by 
others) one has to invest labour in it.74  
 
The correlation to intellectual property rights, inclusive patent protection, is 
explicit; people are entitled to their mental “work” and their creations.75 Although the 
philosopher Hegel adopted a conservative approach to liberalism, he still respected 
the creator’s autonomy and stated that the creator should have a control over the 
creation once showing close association to it.76So a pharmaceutical firm, on the basis 
of these two philosophical approaches, which has invested capital and work in drugs 
innovation, ought to enjoy its creation as its owner.   
 
In trying to analyse the conflict that exists between public goods and intellectual 
property rights which primarily protect the right of the private, Drexel's recent study 
sketched patent as a vehicle to transform products from the use of the common to a 
closed club goods.77 By club goods Drexel meant that patented drugs consumption is 
possible only following the remuneration of the patentee.78 Hence, people who are 
unwilling or unable to compensate the rights’ holder will be excluded from enjoying 
the product.79 In other words, under the patent mechanism, drugs are transformed to 
club goods and thus are not available to people living in developing countries for they 
are not capable of purchasing them.  
 
In the same avenue to prioritise the importance of the rights of the private to 
encourage technological advancement in the market, Hardin, the originator of the 
'tragedy of the commons theory, defended the importance of property protection while 
criticising wide non compensating common use of private resources.80 According to 
Hardin’s theory, without privatisation of goods, the market will suffer from 
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exhaustion through over-exploitation of resources and their value will be reduced to 
zero.81  
 
As often claimed by the pharmaceutical industry, without protecting drug 
innovation through patent, without being able to enjoy market exclusivity to hinder 
generic competition, there will be no motivation for the industry to activate in drugs 
development and, as a result, the world’s ordinary people will be primarily affected 
by higher deaths and sickness rates. The immense impact of generics on the 
pharmaceutical industry productivity should not be dismissed or treated as a minor 
factor. Statistics show that a patented original drug can be generically produced in 10 
versions,82 priced at no more than 10 per cent of its original cost.83 Needless to say, 
the low price of generics has a substantial power to reduce the patented drugs’ pricing 
and affect the pharmaceutical industry’s ability to recoup its investment.   
 
In this respect the necessary conclusion would be that without the privatisation of 
the pharmaceutical industry’s products, the generic competition will exhaust and 
diminish any incentive the pharmaceutical industry has to engage in the sacred work 
of drugs’ innovation to better humanity health care. This result, under today’s 
continued diseases, plagues and new disease formation can be devastating for the 
entire sick population from the developed as well as from the developing world. So 
that without respecting the right of the private, the public would not benefit from the 
introduction of new drugs into the marketplace and as claimed before, this result is far 
from offering the optimal solution for the world.  
 
However, and in respect to the importance of the private right to enjoy private 
control over the invention, a fair question would concerns the benefits the private 
party would gain in a non-consuming market. Despite the importance of properties 
drugs’ innovation through patent as a motivator of innovation, it can also cause an 
opposite result of the 'tragedy of the anti-commons' as Heller deterred.84 Heller and 
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Eisenberg have also designated the result of the tragedy of the anti-commons in 
respect to the pharmaceutical industry, and argued that in the biomedical research 
field patent can foil affordable products in the marketplace.85 The authors respectively 
criticised Hardin’s view that did not take under consideration that privatisation can 
cause underused market’s resources,86 which would not benefit the market's economy 
as well.   
 
Drexel's view can complete this aspect of the tension that exists between the right 
of the private opposed to the right of the public. He justified privatisation by property 
rights as long as the benefits they hold outweigh the costs of excluding a wide ranged 
common use of the patented product.87 Patent protection by its nature does not answer 
this outcome in the extensive poor populated developing world markets where in 
regards to pharmaceuticals, the majority population cannot afford the patented drugs. 
Unable to afford drugs, the poorer population of the world is doomed to suffer and die 
from treatable diseases. Obviously under this interpretation, the death of so many 
people outweighs the cost the private pharmaceutical industry may have to bear by 
offering low cost drugs or free from cost drugs to the developing world population.  
 
The value of presenting the two aspects that exist in patent enforcement is of 
immense importance to the discussion of patenting pharmaceuticals. As the private 
force encourages the introduction of new advanced needed drugs to the marketplace 
and the public demands the utilisation of the private pharmaceutical innovative 
activity, omitting one is not possible for these two parties rely on each other. This is to 
say that determining which one ought to be prioritised, the right of the private or the 
right of the public is not the right task. Rather, finding the right balance to this 
delicate conflict is. Although privatisation can solve one tragedy, it can cause 
another.88 Thus as much as it is a contradictory relationship, the private-public pair 
has a supplementary relationship, one which ought to be enforced as soon as possible 
in the notion of patenting pharmaceuticals in the developing world.  
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As a supplementary discussion to the tension existing between the right of private 
and the right of the public in the area of patenting pharmaceuticals, the human right of 
property stand in comparison to the human right of health analysis is in order.89 
However, just as the right of the private and the public ought to be accepted as 
complementary rights, so ought the rights of property and health. Given that these two 
rights were put on the same platform of importance as human rights in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,90 emphasises the fact that they should not compete with 
each other but complement each other. This premise is of special importance 
concerning the patenting of pharmaceuticals, for patent protection can encourage 
innovation of drugs, which are of benefit to humanity’s right for health.  
 
The international community acknowledges the two rights of property and health. 
As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant 1966,91 acknowledges 
the two human rights of property and health and tries to balance them.92 Nevertheless, 
in General Comment 14, it was declared that the right for health is a superior right.93 
In practice, the Covenant’s provisions state that parties ought to recognise: “the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health”. 94  In the European practice, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, 95  acknowledges the private-public rights tension, with special 
emphasise to protect intellectual property rights.96  
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Although it may appear that there is tension between property and health in the 
spectrum of patent enforcement and the need to access drugs, according to Dreyfuss, 
there should not be one. Dreyfuss does not see intellectual property rights as equally 
leveled with the human right of property. Hence Dreyfuss did not see patent as a 
threat to the superior human right of health.97  
 
Dreyfuss supported her conclusion on several levels.  She viewed patent as a right 
which lies on utilitarian justification 98 in comparison to the perception that patent is 
firstly a right which grants an exclusive market control to the patentee. Hence, there 
should not be a matter of tension between the right of the public and the right of the 
patentee, not on the spectrum of human rights. 99  From a utilitarian perspective, 
patent’s promotion of scientific developments belongs to the public. At the end of 20 
years term, the patentee loses the exclusive control over the product to the public100 
and the generic firm is allowed to copy the drug without any legal restrictions. This is 
to say that according to Dreyfuss patent is a right for the public more than it is a right 
for the preivste.  
 
Another aspect Dreyfuss referred to was the temporary and unstable aspect of 
patent exclusive right.101  The option to enforce the patentee compulsory licensing,102 
the external limitations on patent as in cases of antitrust scrutiny103 might be taken as 
meaning that the patent right does not fall in the scope of property right as the 
Declaration of Human Rights intended. Thus, one can conclude that the superiority of 
the right of health is a prior consideration.104   
 
Nevertheless, although Dreyfuss raises a legitimate aspect of patent nature, her 
analysis did not relate to a repetitive motive in the institute of patenting 
pharmaceuticals and that is the pharmaceutical industry’s reliance on patent’s 
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exclusivity nature as a motivator to innovate. 105  Discussing the private-public, 
property-health tension exists within patenting pharmaceuticals, does not seem to be 
relevant for there should not be a resolution of which right is superior to the other.  
 
There should be a balance between the two prime considerations of property and 
health. This balance can be formed through the strengthening of the developing 
world’s pharmaceutical industry. A stronger and advanced pharmaceutical industry 
would promise local innovation, participation in the global arena and the needed 
competition to influence the consumer market prices. Although patent enforcement 
can prioritise the rights of the patentee in the marketplace, it has further avenues, 
some of which would promise to build a stronger and larger pharmaceutical industry 
in the developing world, which is of prime importance in enabling easier accessibility 
to patented drugs.   
 
The next section presents two practical elements within patent enforcement which 
ought to benefit the developing world’s accessibility to patented drugs by establishing 
an advanced innovative pharmaceutical industry. The following and the final part of 
the chapter designated to India as it was chosen as a case study, emphasises its socio –
economic features followed by its relatively advanced pharmaceutical industry 
compared to other developing countries. As advocated earlier, these given 
characteristics make India potentially one of the most able countries to fulfil the 
advocated recommendation.  
 
C. Patent as a Mediation Force 
 
The question whether patenting pharmaceuticals enables or deters drug 
accessibility is not a simple question, especially asked in the background of the 
developing countries which start from less fortunate economic platforms. However, at 
the same time, it seems that the tendency is to support patent as a drug accessibility 
enabler. The prime ground which justifies this tendency is the simple fact that patent 
encourages innovation and investment by foreign multinationals, two vital factors 
which can advance a developing country’s pharmaceutical industry to a competitive 
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level. In respect to the large size of the developing world market, the reality of 
extensive competition and reduction of drug pricing is founded.  
 
Despite the challenges of globalisation, the pharmaceutical industry has grown to 
be one of the internationalising sectors in the world. The opportunity this technology 
promises to the economy of a country through open markets, has invited developing 
countries to become a part of this change. However, without intellectual property 
protection, developing countries could not have completed the transformation to 
become a part of this change.106 
 
A key factor in developing countries gaining drug accessibility is their reliance on 
the developed world’s innovation. Although the industrialised developing countries 
have achieved various innovative skills, they are still lagging behind the Western 
technological capacity and are not yet capable of engaging in the complexity the 
pharmaceutical research can often demand. The pharmaceutical industry in India has 
achieved substantial progress and even adapted innovative skills to some extent, 
however, not to the extent it can conduct large and independent pharmaceutical 
research and development.107 With the needed innovative skills, India would be able 
to improve its chances of better health care through low cost drugs supply.  
 
A large market size is potentially one which is able to offer lower consumer costs, 
for it would invite larger amount of drugs and raise the numbers of pharmaceutical 
competitors. One example of a country with large market size is China, with 1.3 
billion people.108 India with close to 1.2 billion109 and Brazil nearing one billion110 are 
examples of developing countries which would be able to enjoy from extensive price 
reducing competition in the pharmaceuticals marketplace, as long as their 
pharmaceutical industries are capable of large - scaled innovation practice. In 
comparison, there are just above 300 million people in the United States111 and 70 
                                               
106
 See Douglas Lippoldt “Intellectual Property Rights, Pharmaceuticals and Foreign Direct 
Investment" (2006) 2, 3 www.gem.sciences (accessed 11 November 2008).     
107
 See generally Joanna Chataway, Joyce Tait and David Wield "Frameworks for Pharmaceutical 
Innovation in Developing Countries - The Case of Indian Pharma" (2007) 19(5) Technology Analysis 
& Strategic Management 697, 702. See also Part II D 2 The Indian pharmaceutical Industry.   
108
 See Country Data: China provinces http://global-dem.com (accessed 19 October 2009).  
109
 See Country Data: India states http://global-dem.com (accessed 19 October 2009).  
110
 See Country Data: Central and South America http://global-dem.com (accessed 19 October 2009). 
111
 See Country Data: North America http://global-dem.com (accessed 19 October 2009).  
 29 
million in the United Kingdom,112 which would not be able to enjoy from similar 
influential price reducing market forces through competition. Nevertheless, and as 
stated earlier, the only parameter which delays the developing world from establishing 
large pharmaceutical industries, is the technological skill of innovation.    
 
Lacking proper innovative skills is especially worrying in the developing world 
due to the specific need for drugs to treat tropical diseases such as malaria, 
tuberculosis and leprosy. The designation of research on tropical diseases by the 
Western pharmaceutical industry is considerably small for the small potential return 
the industry can obtain from selling the drugs in the developing world markets.113 
Needless to say that without proper innovative skills and the continued reliance on 
Western firms, the developing world cure from these treatable diseases is not to be 
obtained. Kyle and McGahan noted that even following the introduction of an 
international intellectual property right regime, the developed world’s pharmaceutical 
industry did not engage in more research and development activity in pharmaceutical 
for tropical diseases as much as on global diseases as cancer or heart diseases.114 This 
is to say that the responsibility to allocate enough tools, technological and managerial 
skills, lies on the shoulders of the developing world’s pharmaceutical industry. This 
responsibility can be answered with patent as a contractor of research and 
development skills.  
 
Many studies have examined and proven the strong connection between wide 
patent protection enforcement to local innovative activity and the push of technology 
transfer into the developing world, 115  especially in the high-tech industry as the 
pharmaceuticals.116 As shown earlier, patent has not been perceived as stimulating 
innovation in the enforcing market not only due to the opportunity it gives for the 
patentee of higher prices levels, but for its assurance that any third party would not be 
able to copy the product and compete with it.117 Hence, as long as the local innovation 
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is protected through patent, the local industry would not fear from introducing its 
costly inventions to the local market and it will be further encouraged to conduct 
research for local needs and not only for the lucrative Western markets.  
 
As part of examining how the stronger patent enforcement impact on the local 
industry’s level of innovation in a developing country, it is noteworthy to review the 
potential power patent has in introducing to the industry the much needed technical 
tools of innovation it lacks. One prime avenue to achieve this end lies in international 
technology transfer.118  Through technology transfer, the recipient country can enjoy 
better public health through improved public availability of new technologies, 
utilising intellectual property rights, attracting new research, increasing public 
investment returns, and motivating economic and technological development.119  
 
Foreign direct investment is one of the routes of technology transfer. 120  The 
format of foreign direct investment can be divided into several levels of local – 
foreign collaboration from establishing new branches or subsidiaries, to acquiring 
controlling shares in existing firms in the host country or participating in joint 
ventures.121 Through this process, pharmaceutical multinationals not only can direct 
their investment in finance, but transfer technology, business expertise and assist the 
hosting industry to access the global market.122  Investing firms can also transfer 
management skills, technological skills, training programs, contact with overseas 
banks and locating sources of supply to assist the local industry to become a better 
practitioner in international marketing practices.123 The wider result will be the reform 
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of the developing country’s market failure and becoming a part of the global 
modernised economy.124  
 
Striving for growth, the developing world needs to be part of the changing 
technology, its progress and advancement. It is essential to complete the 
transformation of the existing economy to a more advanced one. Respectively, 
improved technology practiced in the marketplace, high domestic productivity and 
innovation inflows will be introduced to contribute to the economic outline of a 
country.125  
 
The ability to practice the transferred technologies is of a prior importance for the 
development of the invested industry, which can explain why least developed 
countries are not able to benefit from patent, at least not in the stage they are today.126  
Economies with limited technological capacity are also not attractive markets for 
investment, for they would not answer the expectations of multinationals for low 
priced and quality services. 127  Moreover, recipient host countries of foreign 
investment are more likely to economically benefit from the transferred technologies 
if they hold a competitiveness platform, large market and industries which in 
developing countries are of immense importance to mend their market failure.128  
 
Benefits from patent enforcement will not appear overnight. One may hold that 
generics are still a better solution for the developing world conundrum of drugs 
accessibility. Furthermore, with the vast success of the Indian generic industry in 
Western countries, it is beneficial for the Indian pharmaceutical industry to continue 
and practice in generics production. It was recently estimated that the generic 
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pharmaceuticals represents 67.3 per cent of the industry products.129 Moreover, most 
of the largest pharmaceutical firms in India are already collaborating with Western 
generic firms.130  
 
One possible comment to this claim lies in the fact that generics are not 
necessarily to present low priced drugs as needed,131  and furthermore an intense 
generic activity in the pharmaceutical industry can isolate India from the international 
innovative pharmaceutical arena.132 As Lanjouw stated, it is not the remuneration 
Indian firms would receive from Western markets for their innovation but it is the fact 
that soon imitation will not be as lucrative and force a fuller enforcement of patent 
protection.133 In order to keep the profitability in step with international profitability, 
there is a need to become a part of the international industry and offer protection for 
pharmaceutical products as it does.134  
 
In any case, the economic benefits promised to the Indian treasury from generics 
will not be jeopardised by wider enforcement of patent protection. 135 Pharmaceutical 
multinationals have placed many subsidiaries in India for generic manufacturing and 
there is not a risk that a wider patent enforcement over pharmaceuticals will deter that 
opportunity for India.136 It would only mean that the fruits of the collaboration would 
be picked at the end of the patent protection term.137  The generic industry in India 
takes too large a position and importance for it to be hindered completely. 138  
However, a narrow patent scope can deter the growth and the advancement of the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry, which can risk the promised benefits for the 
pharmaceutical industry from wider enforcement of patent protection.  
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Following 25 years of generics production, the Indian pharmaceutical industry has 
accumulated enough resources and skills to engage in some level of innovation. If 
added to India’s market size, its potential growth and advancing economic-social 
infrastructure and the human capital it has, this low-middle income country can prove 
patent as a drug accessibility enabler through higher investment inflows and intense 
innovation and finally break the myth of patent as a drug accessibility barrier in 
developing countries.  
 
D. India as a Case Study  
1.  The socio-economic outlook  
 
According to Beinhocker and Zainulbhai, in 20 years time India’s potential 
economic growth will elevate it above poverty towards becoming the world’s fifth –
largest consumer economy.139 Bernstein particularly noted India and China, which are 
soon to leave developed countries such as United States, Europe and Japan, behind.140 
As of today, India is considered the fourth largest economy of the world by 
purchasing power parity, and still lagging behind its potential.141 It is placed in the 
leading second place of gross domestic product among developing nations, based on 
its growing market and purchasing power. 142  Additionally, India of today is the 
second most populous country in the world after China, 143  which as mentioned, 
indicates its potential to establish a large competitive pharmaceutical industry. 144 
Clearly these economic elements can explain the attraction of the West to India’s 
markets.  
 
India also enjoys a large educated workforce offered at low cost, particularly in 
the fields of engineering and science,145 which is one of the preliminary factors to 
attracting foreign direct investment. 146  Even when compared to China, India’s 
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prospect of growing workforce, investment and savings is higher.147 Statistics show 
an annual introduction of 200,000 new engineers into India’s markets,148 who are 
articulate English speakers which is another aspect of India’s better position to attract 
more foreign direct investment.149 Needless to say India’s substantially more stable 
political platform compared to other developing countries sketches India as a good 
investee,150 as Luna especially stressed in his note.151 These factors represent some of 
the main considerations for foreign direct investment.  
 
The aforementioned economic characteristics can also teach of the potential the 
Indian population to afford patented drug in the future. 152  As Beinhocker and 
Zainulbhai project, by the year 2025, private spending in India will increase to 62 per 
cent.153 Reviewing India’s past progression, since 1991, when the Indian economy 
reform was forced to attract more foreign direct investment to the local markets, there 
were 431 million people saved from poverty and entered the middle economic class, 
with substantial higher purchasing power.154 In two decades time, Beinhocker and 
Zainulbhai foresee increase in private consumption from 7 per cent to 20 per cent,155 
mostly in health and education156 and with an annual domestic product growth of 7.3 
per cent, the authors also project another 465 million people existing in poverty,157 
which would represent a 26 per cent decrease of rural poverty.158  Hence, it can be 
assumed that the future unrecognisable Indian middle class159 would be capable of 
drug purchasing in time of need, especially with the suggested wide ranged 
competitive Indian pharmaceutical marketplace.  
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In addition to the economic platform, another attractive characteristic of high 
foreign direct investment inflows is India's evolving pharmaceutical industry. Luna 
emphasised the Indian pharmaceutical industry, stressing its comparative advantage in 
basic organic chemicals and information technology.160 The unique features of the 
Indian current pharmaceutical industry is next reviewed to complete its suitability to 
enjoy high rates of foreign investment.  
 
2. The Indian pharmaceutical industry 
  
One can find a wide consensus regarding the rapid progress the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry has made in the past four decades, since it omitted patent 
protection from pharmaceutical products and encouraged larger generic production.161 
India has build up considerable sophisticated imitative capabilities through generic 
practicing 162  and as of today, India is rated fourth in sales and volume of 
pharmaceuticals and 13 in terms of value.163 The rapid growth of capabilities, both in 
technical and business skills to adapt to the United States and European markets was 
also stressed by Bower and Sulej, to show appreciation for the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry progression.164  
 
Chataway emphasised the advancement of the Indian pharmaceutical research and 
development skills, 165  stating that by the end of the 1990s leading Indian 
pharmaceutical firms had established innovative capabilities and exporting 
competitiveness.166  According to the authors, India's transformation from generics 
commodity to establishing research and development based multinational was a 
precedent of all times. 167 There was not any evidence of similar progression, not even 
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in several industrialising developing countries as China, Cuba, Brazil, South Korea, 
and South Africa which also succeeded in building vast skills in chemical and 
biological research and development.168  
 
Nevertheless, despite its progression, there is still much more “catching up” to do 
with the Western innovative pharmaceutical technologies. 169  Although there are 
Indian firms which are incorporated with innovation, their number is still small and 
cannot establish a large pharmaceutical industry. There is a need to allocate small 
firms for innovative activity as well. 170  The imperfect Indian innovative 
pharmaceutical industry is also exemplified by the poor investment it attracts, both by 
the private and the public sector.171 As of today, for every 1,000,000 people in India, 
there are only 156 available researchers172 and in comparison to China with 1.23 per 
cent investments of its gross domestic products in the pharmaceutical industry, the 
Indian Government invests only 0.8 per cent.173 The limited and skewed markets in 
India and the absence of stronger health infrastructure also contribute to the slothful 
research and development progression of the local pharmaceutical industry. 174 
Respectively under these elements and the weak private – public investment in 
research and development, as much as the Indian industry aspired to increase its 
innovative capacity, it did not as much as it could have.175 This is to be remedied by 
patent enforcement as suggested.   
 
As Chaudhuri found in his research on the Indian innovative research and 
development trends, the Indian pharmaceutical industry traditionally does not spend 
considerable expenditure on research and development.176 Nevertheless, he did find 
growing trends in investment since the early years of 2000s, especially by 28 major 
research and development firms.177 From 1.78 per cent in 1992-93, their investment 
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increased to 3.86 per cent in 2001-02, sharply increased to 7.83 per cent in 2004-05 
and further to 8.79 per cent in 2005-06.178 According to Chaudhuri, there are only 
nine firms whose investment in research and development increased over 10 per cent 
of their sales. 179  The main aspects of the Indian firms’ incompetence to invest in 
research and development has to do with lack of capital and lack of knowledge, two 
prime elements which can be answered by Western firms’ support and 
collaboration.180    
 
Western pharmaceutical firms are desperately seeking for someone to share the 
risks entwined with pharmaceutical research and development. The research and 
development process can be exhausting and mostly expensive for the pharmaceutical 
industry. 181  One way to reduce the cost of innovation is therefore through 
collaborating with Indian pharmaceutical firms which can offer low cost services of 
clinical trials the Western firms.182  
 
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical multinationals still find India a difficult location for 
investment due to local complicated regulations and logistics.183 One of the challenges 
is the lack of wider patent protection enforcement and breached data protection. In a 
study of the World Bank on India's journey towards an effective patent system, it was 
concluded that with a broader patent protection enforcement, India will be able to 
receive more investment from pharmaceutical multinationals, benefit from new 
research and development facilities and from education, training and innovation 
spillovers.184 India just needs to expand its patent protection scope; it needs to enforce 
patent protection of the core level of innovation in the pharmaceutical technology 
field;185 otherwise it will soon suffer from a plateau of low innovative levels.186  
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In this respect it is important to mention that the sensitive link between intellectual 
property and technology transfer is a stable connection which will not soon be broken. 
This reality emphasises the importance of the Indian Government’s reassessment of 
its patent mechanism to include patenting of pharmaceutical incremental 
innovation.187  Should other factors which exceed foreign direct investment as tax 
incentives, workforce cost or Government stability, diminish, India would still be able 
to rely on a wide patent protection enforcement 188  to motivate pharmaceutical 
multinationals investment.189    
 
As of today, the innovation drive Indian pharmaceutical firms find, does not result 
from the national Government. Most vastly activated pharmaceutical firms in India, 
which can be counted to 10, engage with innovation, only due to the collaboration that 
they find with Western firms. This option is not available to smaller sized Indian 
pharmaceutical firms which are lacking both the capital and the technological 
resources larger firms have which enable them to collaborate with the West. Hence, 
without regulation/government/market and health systems support, India will still 
suffer from weak competitive nature both in the local and the international market, 190 
which will push it to find a solution of low cost drugs only through generics.  
 
As much as patent protection can be blamed for high drugs pricing, it should not 
be blamed alone. India’s Government’s decreasing control over drugs pricing 
regulations and orders is another influential factor on the high price of drugs in India. 
Unfortunately although there is no limitation on price control orders in the TRIPS 
Agreement, not all drugs in the Indian market are regularised.191 Moreover most of 
the essential drugs under the World Health Organisation essential drug list are not 
protected under the drug price control in India.192 Medicine for HIV, cancer, coronary 
artery disease, vaccines for rabies, anaemia and more, are not protected by price 
control orders.193 In a country whose population is not protected by universal health 
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insurances, this status can be fatal.194 Under this reality how would the average labour 
worker in India, which makes only 60 Rs per day, purchase one course of Letrozole, a 
drug which treats cancer in the sum of 181.50 Rs?195   
 
Nevertheless the high priced patented drugs, the All-India Drug Action Network, 
a Campaign Group for Rational Drug Therapy and Policy did not support the 
exclusion of patent enforcement on pharmaceutical innovation and ended its 2008 
report by saying that "all these are not against TRIPS in anyway". 196  Instead, 
acknowledging the drug prices distortion results in the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry, the group calls for a pro-active approach by the Indian Government to 
enforce various programmes price regularity of medicines as it did with cell phones, 
insurances premium and more.197 In other words the group reached the conclusion 
that a needed balance between patent enforcement and the Indian Government drug 
price regulations is needed to offer affordable drugs to the local population, and in 
any case not by narrowing the patent protection scope.    
 
The potential of patent as a drug accessibility enabler can be supported if 
implemented in the Indian pharmaceutical industry on a wide scope platform. 
Reviewing India’s economic features, its current status in the world’s economic 
outline, its unique skilled scientific workforce, all show that India can bear the cost of 
introducing patent protection of pharmaceuticals and benefit from patent’s 
encouragement of more extensive innovative activity. However, the Government 
involvement is still much needed to offer the proper balance between patent 
enforcement and the high prices of drugs, one which will not deter the pharmaceutical 
industry from innovating and at the same time be realistic to the purchasing power of 
the average Indian. This mission would not be as difficult as one may perceive, 
especially facing the new economic dawn of the Indian market.   
 
Although the chronological process of utilising patent enforcement to enable 
better drugs routes in developing countries as presented, lays down the needed course 
of action, there is a need for a deeper observation of the different steps this course 
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includes. The preliminary avenue needed is the one which asks what the 
pharmaceutical industry is, what levels of innovation it includes and whether there is 
another way to promise drug innovation besides patent enforcement. Only after 
answering these questions in a comprehensive manner, further rationales are given to 
support patent enforcement in developing countries as an opportunity of low cost drug 
market in contrast to the common perception.  
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III PATENT AS A PRIME MOTIVATOR OF PHARMCEUTICAL  
INNOVATION 
 
In the fight against cancer, new medicines are responsible for the increase in 
longevity by 50-60 per cent.198 Statistics show that by the year 2000 the world wide 
survival rate from cancer rose to 68 per cent.199 In 2008 12 significant treatment 
advances were discovered to treat the disease, including of nine new medicines.200  
This group of 12 treatments included discoveries such as incremental innovated drugs, 
new use of an existing medicine or new benefits of a medicine or new approved 
medicines.201  
 
Since the discovery of the HIV/AIDS in 1988, 30 drugs have been approved for 
treatment by the Food and Drug Administration in the United States.202 Different 
periodicals publish discoveries of new drugs which have shown signs for optimism. In 
2007, 92 drugs were tested to prevent HIV/AIDS and other related conditions 203  and 
by the late 2008, two new pioneer drugs were approved.204 However the amount of 
the drugs still needed and the statistics of the immense death rates, testify how far we 
are from finding a cure for this fatal disease. In 2007, there were 33 million people 
living with HIV virus, inclusive of 2.7 million newly infected.205 In that year, AIDS 
caused the death of 2 million people.206 With new diseases emerging and the constant 
death from existing diseases, clearly pharmaceutical research and development is far 
from being completed.   
 
In this respect and in a try to encourage further innovation, patent market 
exclusivity mechanism hinders many risks the pharmaceutical industry is facing 
during the drug development process, risks which can paralyse the innovative activity 
of the industry and, as a result, burden us all with potentially curable diseases. 
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Following a review of the spectrum of pharmaceutical innovation, this chapter 
reviews the different factors that threaten it, starting from the cost of the research and 
development process to the intense competition which exists in the industry even 
before drugs are exposed to generic production. In other words this chapter lays the 
justifications of patent as an existential force to the pharmaceutical industry207 and 
explains why pharmaceutical firms refuse to develop new drugs without patent's 
comprehensive protection.208   
 
Based on early research in the 1980s conducted by Mansfield,209 patent can be 
declared as a prime element in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries’ innovative 
activity.210  Based on surveys and analysis of 100 United States manufacturing large 
firms, Mansfield concluded that in comparison to many other industries as metals, 
electrical, motor vehicles, rubber, and more, patent increases innovation more in the 
pharmaceutical and the chemical industries.211 To clarify the importance of patent as 
an innovative motivator, Mansfield found that even in the aforementioned industries 
which have very limited reliance on patent, the bulk patentable products were under 
patent protection.212 Examining the result in the motor vehicles industry, where patent 
is not as needed to motivate innovation as in the pharmaceutical industry, 60 per cent 
of the patentable inventions were patented.213 Hence, even in industries which do not 
need to rely on patent as a motivator, its protection is preferred and that can teach of 
its importance to encourage innovation all the more in the pharmaceutical technology 
field.  
 
Considering the complexity of drug research and development process, one cannot 
claim against the legitimacy of a pharmaceutical firm’s inclination towards patent 
protection given its prevention of free –riding. Although the industry is involved with 
life saving products, it counts as any other industry on an economical quid pro quo 
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mechanism to create an incentive for its activity. The changing environment of the 
pharmaceutical industry, the competition risk, the long and costly research and 
development process, all emphasises the importance of the market exclusivity patent 
offers to the pharmaceutical innovator and the role it plays as a catalyst to the drug 
discovery process.  
  
The pharmaceutical platform, chemical or biological, can be divided into two 
levels of innovation. One level can be based on an entirely new chemical or molecular 
entity. The Food and Drug Administration in the United States defines new molecular 
entity drug as a drug which contains an active substance which has never been 
approved in the market of the United States before.214  A new chemical entity is 
therefore a drug which is based on new chemical compound or structure. Of course 
the end of the pharmaceutical industry is to research for new chemical or molecular 
entities given that these forms hold more superior therapeutic response and thus 
potentially higher economic returns. The secondary level is incremental, which is 
based on an already existing drug and can offer better therapeutic references than the 
original. The incremental innovation, although involved with a lower bar of 
development, is the core level of the pharmaceutical technology innovation 
platform.215 Either level of innovation, pioneer or incremental, the pharmaceutical 
industry relies on patent as a prime tool to deter the copying risk involved with their 
innovation process. 
 
A new patented drug with marketing approval by the Food and Drug 
Administration introduced to the marketplace is commonly referred to as a brand 
name drug.216 A breakthrough drug is the first brand name drug to use a particular 
therapeutic mechanism of treatment of a given diseases.217 In comparison, a generic 
drug is a copy of the brand name drug which contains the same active ingredients, in 
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terms of strength, quality and therapeutic effectiveness.218 It can be concluded that 
there are two competitors who compete between themselves and against each other in 
the pharmaceutical industry: the brand name pharmaceutical innovators and the 
generic producers.219  
 
A. New Chemical Entities  
 
Synthesising a new chemical entity substance of an approved drug takes about 
12.8 years on average.220 After understanding the disease and finding the biological 
target, the drug’s molecule and testing it on animals (pre-clinical trials stage),221 the 
pharmaceutical firm conducts a three phase clinical trial on thousands of 
participants.222 Nevertheless, finding a successful drug is not enough. The next step to 
putting a drug on the market shelf is the application for the drug’s approval by the 
different regulators such as the Food and Drug Administration in the United States, 
which approves the drug’s marketing and distributing.223  
 
Studies show that the average length of processing a new drug application in the 
Food and Drug Administration is up to 10 years.224 Applying to the Food and Drug 
Administration does not mean an automatic approval of the new drug application.225 
Often the regulator over marketing drugs may need of more research and further 
testing before granting the innovator pharmaceutical firm with marketing approval.226 
There are even times when the regulator denies the application without giving the 
applicant any chance of alteration.227  
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Notwithstanding the approval of the Food and Drug Administration, the 
pharmaceutical firm is still obliged to conduct testing of the patented drug and 
continue to report to the regulator on the drug’s therapeutic efficacy and its adverse 
effects on consumers. 228  This obligation is perceived as the fourth stage the 
pharmaceutical firms have to go through before freely passing the innovated drug to 
the marketplace.229 The indefinite approval from the Food and Drug Administration 
can be much more threatening for the pharmaceutical industry. Non-approved new 
drug application by the Food and Drug Administration means the loss of millions of 
dollars the pharmaceutical firm could use for different drug research, some which 
might have resulted in the next breakthrough treatment.  
 
This reality is substantial. According to statistics taken from the pharmaceutical 
industry database in the United States, for every 5000 to 10,000 chemical compounds 
tested, only five make it to the clinical trials stage and only one drug will be approved 
by the Food and Drug Administration.230  This outcome testifies of the grave losses 
the pharmaceutical industry faces daily, losses which could have been attributed to 
different and maybe more successful research.  
 
The long time it takes to introduce a drug to the marketplace leading to the first 
risk patent can deter through market exclusivity. With so many innovative 
pharmaceutical firms in the global industry,231 the possibility that two or more brand 
name researchers firms would apply to the Food and Drug Administration in the 
United States, to approve the same chemical compound, is high.232 Even if not the 
same, firms can still develop a different chemical compound which treats the same 
health condition, 233  or uses a different process234  or even changes the compound 
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enough to make it appear to be a new form of the drug (a key level of innovation in 
the pharmaceutical industry through incremental innovation).235  
 
This competitive phenomenon is called between - patent competition.236 Tomas 
and Dai stressed the gravity of between-patent competition to the innovative returns 
expected by the pharmaceutical industry for the superior products which enter the 
marketplace. 237  The authors found that throughout the first 16 years of patent 
protection term, between-patent competition can lead to a substantial reduction in the 
returns expected from selling the patented drug in the marketplace, even more than 
the effect of within-patent competition which represents the competition between the 
pharmaceutical innovators and the generic producers which takes place at the end of 
patent term protection.238  
 
In any case the competition and the threat on a firm’s market superiority are 
substantial. Without exclusive control over the chemical compound at its early stage 
of development, the “first to innovate” firm’s investment would be wasted. Under the 
patent market exclusivity mechanism, once a pharmaceutical firm invents a new 
compound with novelty elements and usefulness application, it can ask for patent 
protection and enjoy an early market exclusivity position to deter competitors from 
using or copying its costly invention. 239  For this reason it is common in the 
pharmaceutical industry for a firm to apply for patent protection before the clinical 
trial stage begins240 to enjoy “safe ground” to examine and develop the chemical 
compound without stressful competition.  
 
The risk of losing US$1 billion investment due to the fact that another secondary 
firm invented a competitive chemical compound seems to be an extremely frightening 
image for the original pharmaceutical firm innovator. 241  Yes, the research and 
development process within the pharmaceutical industry can cost billions of dollars.  
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DiMasi and colleagues found that the pre-tax cost of research and development of 
a new chemical entity drug in dollars value in 2000 can reach to US$802 million.242 
Into this figure, DiMasi and colleagues included the success and the failure rates in 
getting the Food and Drug Administration's approval.243 However, it does not include 
the cost of marketing, distribution, sales taxes which also represent a great part of a 
drug’s cost.244 Once the marketing expenditures are added, DiMasi and colleagues 
found that the cost of research and development of a drug can reach US$900 
million. 245  In a different study DiMasi found that the process of research and 
development in the biopharmaceutical technology field, which is based on biological 
substances,246 can reach to over a US$1 billion. 247  
 
Apparently these numbers represent only the beginning. Aiming to test the drug 
on a wide range of people, the expectation to demonstrate therapeutic effectiveness248 
and the advancements in basic science often demand a longer and more expensive 
process of research and development. 249 Another factor is the fact that many viruses 
build some sort of resistance to drugs and transform to chronic diseases. Given that 
chronic diseases demand a longer term of drug use, researching the drug and applying 
it to the use of human beings will naturally require longer research process and thus 
more expenditure investment.250  
 
These economic figures only stress that without marketing exclusivity and with an 
extensive competition in the pharmaceutical industry, firms would not be able to 
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recoup their investment of the costly research and development process. In this regard 
it is worthwhile to emphasise that the process of discovering new drugs, research and 
develop them, is mostly financed by the private sector.251 Therefore, with the public’s 
expectation from the pharmaceutical industry to fund the research and development 
process, it needs to allow the industry a way to recoup its investment to continue and 
conduct further research and answer its demands.252  
 
The pharmaceutical innovative industry is also competing with the generic 
industry. In the pre-TRIPS Agreement era, hence, prior to the year 1995, developing 
countries such as India copied patented drugs and sold them cheaply. These countries 
did not offer patent protection on pharmaceutical products and once a new drug was 
introduced to the market, the generic industry could copy the drug and sell it in low 
cost. Although under the Indian legislative frame this enactment was legitimate, it was 
not in cooperation with the developed world practices offering patent protection for 
20 years. Needless to say the competition the generic industry has imposed on the 
brand –name drug markets was a growing burden on pharmaceutical firms' ability to 
recoup their costly investment in the process of research and development. 253 
However, as of today, under the TRIPS Agreement, generic firms' practices are 
delayed to the end of 20 years protection term. Nevertheless, to be mentioned is the 
fact that the competition the generic industry raises has still an immense impact on the 
pharmaceutical industry ability to recoup its investment in drug innovation given its 
low cost rates.   
 
One prime example of the grave impact generic production has on brand name 
drug costs is the case of the antiretroviral drugs combination to treat HIV/AIDS in 
Australia. According to Henry, the generic production of the drug required the brand-
name drug owner to reduce the price of the drug by 97 per cent.254 Undoubtedly, 
reduction of prices, even at the end of the patent term, due to generic competition can 
prevent the pharmaceutical firm from recouping its investment. The generic industry 
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has the ability to cause pharmaceutical firms to lose their market exclusivity 
substantially and affect the potential return of their investment.255 Often firms do not 
succeed in recouping their expenditures in the process of research and development 
during the patent protection term, 256  a problem which is deepened by a generic 
industry activity.   
 
If the impact so substantial at the end of the patent term, it is all the more 
substantial during the term of a patent protection. Hence, patent’s promise of market 
exclusivity for the term of 20 years can at least give a suitable term for the 
pharmaceutical firm innovator to try and return its expenditures invested in the 
research and development process and answer the need of the public to continue and 
research in the future for better and more suitable therapeutic drug solutions to deadly 
diseases.   
 
In other words, the long and costly research and development process, the chance 
of denial by the Food and Drug Administration or other regulator of the new drug 
application and the daily competition risks imposed on brand name drugs innovators 
can justify the pharmaceutical industry reliance on patent protection. These risks can 
show that relying on patent which offers marketing exclusivity is not a capricious 
requirement of the pharmaceutical industry, but the one promise the industry needs, to 
be able to develop life saving products and introduce them to the marketplace. 
Humanitarianism, unfortunately, is not economically sufficient to conduct research 
and development of drugs. As shown earlier, not even nations’ government can, or 
wish to, vouch for pharmaceutical research capital resources and most of it is placed 
on the private sector. Research in the chemical and the pharmaceutical industry is 
costly and thus obliges the public to pay high prices for drugs. Nevertheless what 
good is there in cheap drugs if they are not effective or if they treat the wrong 
condition?257 The pharmaceutical industry therefore needs the support and protection 
of market exclusivity, as it ultimately answers the need of the public for drugs.  
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The pharmaceutical industry’s need of market exclusivity as the only adequate 
innovative platform, raise some expressions of patent as an insufficient tool to supply 
the industry the exclusiveness it needs.258 Although patent offers 20 years of market 
exclusivity, it appears often not to be enough for pharmaceutical firms in their trials to 
recoup their expenditures.259 Although there are drugs which are sold for billions of 
dollars, there are drugs which return only US$25 million a year which often is not 
equal to the investment put into their research and development process. 260  As 
mentioned, in order to obstruct competition, it is common for a firm to apply for 
patent protection at the early stage of the pre-clinical trials.261 This means that after an 
average of 12.8 years of research and development process in addition to the time it 
gets for the drug to be approved for marketing by the Food and Drug Administration 
regulators, a pharmaceutical firm is left with no more than eight to nine years of 
marketing the drug in a try to return its investments.  
 
With a shorter exclusivity time in the marketplace for marketing, the chances of 
the pharmaceutical firm to recoup its investment become leaner. Also a firm's product 
pipeline is not as full as it was in the past.262 There is a fear that new drugs’ discovery 
will not be as fruitful as before.263 Not only does it become more difficult to discover 
new chemical entities, according to Bruce, but it is estimated that by the year 2015, 
the 'blockbuster' drugs will be off patent and thus free for copying and cheaper 
marketing by the generic industry. 264  According to Dickson unless firms are 
constantly engaged with new chemical entity based drugs, which is known as 
extremely difficult, the funds to support future research will be insufficiently small265 
and leave society with not assuring health care future.266  This scenario as Bruce 
analysed, brings pharmaceutical firms to rely more on their off-patented existing drug 
products in the sense that they will have to answer the need of a pharmaceutical firm 
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to allocate enough capital for further research.267 However, it can be presumed that 
the generic competition does not enable the fulfilment of this end.  
 
For these reasons not only did Bruce stressed  the importance of patent protection, 
she also encouraged firms to make the most out of the patent term and allow 
themselves to regain their investment as much as possible.268 Bruce suggested an 
extension of patent protection by filing secondary patents on drugs.269 In other words, 
following some adjustment and improvement of off-patent drugs pharmaceutical 
firms should be able to apply for patent protection on the original drugs’ new 
versions. 270  In other words, Bruce highly supported the patenting of incremental 
innovation. 271 Nevertheless, although incremental innovation of an original drug can 
answer a tactical need of the pharmaceutical industry to try and fully recoup capital 
for future research, it is mostly a scientific core level of innovation in the 
pharmaceutical technology field.272 The next part of this chapter analyses the platform 
of pharmaceutical incremental innovation, its therapeutic and economic importance 
and the industry equal reliance on patent to motivate pharmaceutical incremental 
innovation.  
 
B. Incremental Pharmaceutical Innovation 
  
“Nature does nothing in leaps”273  neither does the pharmaceutical industry.274 
Although the wheel can be considered as a “breakthrough” invention in the 
transportation industry as Palit and Bhattacharya noted, they also viewed that the 
industry could not have been revolutionised without the small supplementary 
inventions in the field.275 Incremental innovation is perceived in the same manner in 
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the pharmaceutical industry.276 The pharmaceutical innovation process does not get 
any faster and every small step could lead to a giant therapeutic leap. As the 
incremental innovation level relies on the same elements of research and development 
as the new chemical entity drug, and suffer from the same risks (even higher risks for 
its simpler elements, which are easily innovated), the pharmaceutical industry sees 
great importance in patent protection of incremental innovation.277 
 
Pharmacologically, incremental drugs are “new drugs in an already existing class 
which has a similar mechanism of action as the first-in-class, but differ in features 
such as, therapeutic profile, metabolism, adverse effects, dosing schedules, delivery 
systems…”278 In other words, incremental development could be a drug which can 
offer better chances of tolerability and fewer side effects, features which are often 
vital in different treatments.279  In this respect incremental innovation can offer a 
substitutive therapeutic solution to drugs which are taken off the market shelf if found 
damaging or insufficient.280  Incremental development can offer different doses of 
drugs, enable longer use of drugs by a larger variety of consumers,281 and reduce the 
social cost of use of hospitals.282  
 
With many drugs taken off the market shelves, or patients who find that they 
cannot consume the drugs due to poor bioavailability (the drug's absorption in the 
blood)283 or severe side effects, incremental development offer new possibilities.284 
Through different application to treat side effects and better and easier ways to use the 
drug, incremental drugs can be perceived as fitting the different consumer 
individuals.285 As noted by Wertheimer, Levy and O`Connor "the public benefits are 
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striking because a broad class of drugs enables physicians to treat with precision the 
individual needs of diverse patients."286 
 
Effexor, an anti-depressive drug was incrementally developed by the American 
pharmaceutical firm Wyeth.287 Due to severe side effects detected in the drug soon 
after its marketing, Wyeth incrementally improved it and made it more tolerable for 
use.288 However, Effexor is only one example of many more drugs for which only 
their incremental evolvement enabled their marketing. Out of the essential drugs list 
of the World Health Organisation, half of the drugs are based on incremental 
improvement of their original compound form.289 These findings are critical to the 
understanding that the original breakthrough drugs do not remain the most effective 
forms and often their perfection is required through different classes.  
 
Another example of the merits of pharmaceutical incremental innovation lies in 
the case of the antiretroviral drugs which treat infectious diseases, primarily 
HIV/AIDS. Due to many side effects of the antiretroviral drugs' combination and the 
intolerability consumers develop towards the drugs, pharmaceutical firms which are 
active in HIV/AIDS drug development have to constantly come up with new 
combinations to enable people to continue to fight the disease.290  In the fight of 
cancer, the situation is similar and drugs which treat cancer are constantly being 
incrementally developed.291  
 
According to a survey conducted by the United States National Institute for Health 
Care Management, between the years 1989-2000, only 17 per cent of the 
pharmaceutical patents in the United States market were based on “drastic 
innovations” and 51 per cent designated to modifications of existing drugs.292 The 
pharmaceutical industry is dominated by incremental developments and naturally the 
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propensity towards patent enforcement of this level of innovation is no different than 
the one it has in respect to new chemical entity based drugs.  
 
Nevertheless, often the smaller level of innovation, in comparison to the new 
chemical entity drug development, raises some critiques to perceive incremental drugs 
only as “me too“drugs.293 In other words, these critiques see incremental innovation 
as drugs which are a repetitive form of its original version,294 which does not consist 
of enhanced therapeutic application and can cause unnecessary confusion for the 
medical community.295 Objecting to incremental pharmaceutical innovation on the 
grounds that it causes confusion indicates a simplistic perspective towards 
incremental innovation which does not fully consider the therapeutic merits of this 
level of innovation.296 
 
As noted by Wertheimer, Levy and O`Connor "many pharmacological classes 
now contain numerous agents. Although these agents are molecularly similar, their 
therapeutic properties are often significantly different."297 Moreover, the greater the 
clinical choices are, the larger the group of patients receiving treatment is and the 
better is humanity health care.298 If the early version of a drug could not be marketed 
to the public due to severe side effects and its incremental form can, claims such as 
confusion seem to be misguided and if continued, can seriously hurt the chances of 
better health welfare future for the world’s population.299  
 
Although aspiring to develop the next "breakthrough" drug, for it has the largest 
prospectus of high sales rate, the majority of the pharmaceutical industry 
developments are still based on incremental improvements of existing drugs.300 In 
addition to the scientific justifications, the propensity of the pharmaceutical industry 
to incremental innovation lies in several economic avenues. With fewer breakthrough 
drugs introduced to the marketplace and the nearing end of patented drugs, the 
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pharmaceutical industry faces a deep capital predicament and a questionable 
innovative drud future. 301  The industry is being pushed to expand its products' 
pipeline to include several innovative product groups such as generics, medical 
devices and of course modified drugs, in order to expand its economic platform.302  
 
Needless to say, without a solid economic grounding, the industry would not be 
able to engage in further research and the global health care status would rapidly 
deteriorate.303 Patenting pharmaceutical incremental innovation can offer the industry 
a safe economic grounding as viewed by the International Chamber of Commerce.304 
Incremental innovation research and development does not oblige the use of high 
expenditures as a new chemical entity drug does. 305 It is less complex and thus has 
more chance to reach the marketplace.306 Incremental innovation is also involved with 
a shorter process of development and allows the industry to survive under the 
extensive competition in the marketplace. 307  It can be thus concluded that the 
exclusion of pharmaceutical incremental innovation from the patent protection scope 
can deter the pharmaceutical industry from engaging in necessary innovation.308 The 
industry will not be able to engage in the costly drug discovery process without stable 
economic platform.309  
 
In addition to the merits patenting incremental innovation offers to the 
pharmaceutical industry, it also offers the possibility of low cost patented drug in the 
marketplace. Encouraging incremental innovation in the pharmaceutical technology 
field can establish an extensive price reducing competition 310  and if patented, a 
market of low cost patented drugs available to the poorer population of the world in 
developing countries. However, before analysing this option and examining the 
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possibility of reducing drug prices through wide patent scope enforcement, it is of 
first importance to stress that this possibility was not always the case when India 
lacked pharmaceutical innovative skills.   
 
Not so long ago, the Indian pharmaceutical industry was lacking sufficient 
innovative pharmaceutical skills. 311  Not so long ago, the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry’s drugs products were the most expensive in the international marketplace 
for it was fully controlled by foreign control patented drugs.312 Not so long ago, the 
Indian Government had to omit patent protection from pharmaceutical products in 
order to invite more generic production as the only way to access drugs. However 
time has changed. As time passed, not only has the Indian population benefited from 
lower cost drugs, but the Indian pharmaceutical industry has also benefited, for the 
process of reverse engineering equipped it with innovative research and development 
skills.  
 
Although India's generic activity prior to signing the TRIPS Agreement tagged 
India as a pirate country, it did advance its pharmaceutical industry innovative skills. 
This is not to say that the thesis supports counterfeiting as a legitimate way to benefit 
a developing country's pharmaceutical industry innovative skills, rather to present the 
chronological background of the Indian pharmaceutical industry evolvement. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that without any innovative skills, even minor, the 
prospect of establishing low cost patented drugs market, is small. 
 
With respect to this, before examining how the new India of today can benefit 
from patent to create an affordable pharmaceutical marketplace, the next chapter 
shows the process India went through omitting patent protection from 
pharmaceuticals which advanced its generic industry and built innovative capabilities 
in the local industry. Only an innovative based pharmaceutical industry will find 
benefits from patent protection, for patents protect inventions. The next chapter 
therefore appreciates the growth of patent in India. Why did India fear patent? Were 
the benefits from generics in comparison to patent substantial? What ultimately led 
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India to enforce the TRIPS Agreement and adopt patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals? Did the TRIPS oblige protection without any leniency towards 
developing countries' need to access drugs? Trying to answer these questions is of 
great importance and reviewing India’s growth into patent, the next chapter analyses 
the preparation India has made towards embracing full patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products in the year 2005.    
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IV GROWING INTO THE TRIPS – FROM GENERICS TO INNOVATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A. The Great Rise of Generics  
 
Under the colonial regime, the Indian pharmaceutical industry in the country was 
without any innovative skills.313 The wide patent policy dictated by Great Britain in 
India made the population rely mostly on imported products.314 That situation made 
India the most expensive market for pharmaceuticals in the world.315 Without any 
innovative capacity,316 the Indian population was left with no other choice but to rely 
on drugs offered in its marketplace. However, at that time India was one of the 
poorest countries in the world,317 and there was no use for these drugs as the local 
population simply could not afford them.318 This fact increased the death and sickness 
rates in the country.319 When India declared its independence in 1947 and freed itself 
from the control of the foreign regime of Britain, not much changed regarding its 
pharmaceutical innovative capabilities.320  
 
It did not have the capital, the technologies or the knowledge to begin 
pharmaceutical innovation321 and in the meanwhile, the growing demand for low cost 
drugs increased rapidly.322 It is worth noting that India's poor economy caused the 
Government to resolve other human rights issues such as the right for housing, water 
and education as well. Of prime importance was the need for the Indian Government 
to cope with the growing rate of sickness and deaths in the country from treatable 
diseases.  
 
Under the 1911 Indian Patents and Designs Act, both pharmaceutical processes 
and products inventions were eligible for patent protection for 16 years with an option 
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to extend that term for an additional seven years.323 In comparison to pharmaceutical 
products which represent the final product of the drug, the pharmaceutical process 
was the drug's chemical course of development.324 As one would expect with a high 
percentage of poverty and minimal innovative skills, the scope of protection mainly 
serviced foreign applicants. India's local pharmaceutical industry did not have much 
need of patent protection. Patent encouragement of innovation cannot motivate an 
industry which lacks innovative orientation. On the contrary, India abolished patent 
for it hindered access to supremacy Western innovation like drugs.325  
 
It took a while before the Indian pharmaceutical industry evolved. From 1947, 
from India’s independence, until 1972 when the new Patents Act was introduced, 
there were very few Indian patents in the local market 326  and pharmaceutical 
multinationals still held 90 per cent of the Indian marketplace.327 Given the poor and 
limited Indian purchasing power, 90 per cent of these patents were not even sold in 
India.328 The Indian population could not afford the patented products and thus the 
foreign rights’ holders did not benefit from any Indian - sourced remuneration from 
sales. 
 
Studies show that in 1974, 84 per cent of the issued patents in developing 
countries were under the hold of developed countries such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France.329 Only 1 per cent of patents were held by national 
patentees.330 This data indicates the little innovative capacity existed in developing 
countries inclusive of India in the years prior to the TRIPS Agreement. This inability 
can justify to some extent the irrelevancy of patent in such countries. Patent has the 
power to build an industry, but not an industry without any innovative capabilities. 
Limiting this statement is important for the fact that after India had gained progressive 
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innovative skills, the use of patent to encourage local innovation and empower the 
local industry is irreplaceable.  
 
However, before analysing the new changed Indian pharmaceutical industry’s 
capacity to contain patent, there is a need to understand why there was a necessity to 
omit patent protection from pharmaceutical products. Apparently, excluding patent 
enforcement from pharmaceutical products not only answered the need of the poor for 
affordable drugs, but introduced the Indian pharmaceutical industry to Western 
technologies, ones which prepared India to benefit from patent's mechanism in the 
following years.   
 
Trying to answer its population growing need for affordable drugs and applying a 
reformed domestic production capacity, the Indian Government appointed two 
committees to review the local patent policy and adjust it to answer local needs and 
economy.331 The first report submitted to the Government was the report headed by 
the Justice Bakshi Tek Chand (Chand Report). 332  The Chand Report did not 
recommend abolishing patent at whole, but to extend the use of compulsory licensing 
of the patented products.333 Compulsory licensing was one of the mechanisms which 
were inserted to the TRIPS Agreement in a try to answer the need of the poorer 
population of the world of patented drugs. 334  Under the compulsory licensing 
mechanism India could generically produce patented drugs without remunerating the 
patentee as originally set.335  
 
Although the Chand report brought some amendments to the 1911 Indian Patents 
and Designs Act, the extensive opposition to the use of compulsory license process by 
foreign rights’ holders, diminished the use of this mechanism as a preliminary answer 
to the public needs.336 There was a need to find a solution from a different angle. The 
second report tried to offer that change. Headed by the Shri Justice N Rajagopala 
Ayyangar (Ayyangar Report),337 the Report offered much deeper reform.338 Firstly, it 
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was concluded that one homogenous intellectual property mechanism was not an 
option and every country should create a mechanism to be fitted to its economic 
conditions.339 Following the vast condemnation of the local patent system and its 
irrelevancy to local innovative advancement, 340  Ayyangar’s Report secondly 
recommended narrowing patent protection from pharmaceuticals, chemicals and the 
food technology fields.341 The 16,000 licenses the local industry used in 1993, were a 
clear indication that patent had to be omitted to answer the consumers' needs for low 
cost products.342  
 
Excluding patent protection from pharmaceutical products as recommended in the 
Ayyangar Report was soon perceived as the leading step to making drugs affordable 
to the poor. Under the 1970 Indian Patents Act, the patentee was only allowed to 
enjoy protection of the innovated drug's process.343 This enabled the local generic 
industry to copy the patented drug through different processes. Using a different 
process to produce the innovated drug was therefore legitimate and enabled the 
industry to mass produce the patented drugs and sell them to the public at a low cost.  
 
Given that the reverse engineering was considerably less costly than producing a 
new drug, both the private sector as well as the public laboratories focused on 
imitative research and development.344 Furthermore, with only seven years protection 
of the invented process by patent,345 the idea of patent was not as threatening as it was 
under the colonial regime.346 In reality, there was never a need to wait the entire seven 
years of the patent protection term to generically produce the drug.347 Finding an 
alternative process was rather a simple task.348  
 
India was highly determined to promise better answers to the mass demand of 
drugs, and thus it did not even join the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
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Industrial Property (Paris Convention)349 which enforced a much flexible intellectual 
property rights regime than the TRIPS Agreement does.350 Constituted as an early 
response to an internationally growing demand to enforce technology transfer and 
increase trade flows, the Paris Convention set the basis of industrialised property laws 
through minimum protection standards. 351  According to the Paris Convention, 
signatory countries were free to pass any intellectual property laws they wished, as 
long as they did not discriminate the terms of protection against foreign inventors.352 
Foreign applicants as nationals were to be treated the same.353 Under this obligation, 
signatory country to the Paris Convention which offered local inventors the 
opportunity to enjoy patent protection for a pharmaceuticals, product, process or both, 
had to offer the same protection to foreign pharmaceutical inventors.  
 
In time when the demand for cheap drugs was substantially higher than today's, 
acknowledging foreign rights in the local market would not have answered that 
demand. It would have placed the Indian population under the same reality at the time 
of the colonial regime.  
 
Therefore, many countries chose not to include patent protection over 
pharmaceutical products and some even excluded protection of pharmaceutical 
processes as well. 354  Wishing to build solid industrialised markets, economy and 
consumption capacity, India did not want to be chained to foreign control over its 
market through strict intellectual property rights and chose not to become a signatory 
member to the Paris Convention.355  
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In addition to forming several research institutes and public pharmaceutical firms 
to produce generic drugs,356 India implemented different policies to reduce drugs’ 
pricing in the market. This included the drug price control order.357 The control over 
prices of drugs was imposed through the restriction of prices, to cover only the cost of 
materials, formulation and distribution together with a limited level of profit. 358 
Nevertheless, despite the contribution of regularising drug pricing, the main cause to 
the cost reduction was the Patents Act 1970 and its abolishment of patent protection 
of pharmaceutical and chemical products.359 This abolishment enabled a wide ranged 
generic production activity which played a major role in reducing prices of drugs. A 
prime example of the generics efficacy is the effect it had on the cost of the 
antiretroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS.  
 
Although an example from a later time, in 2001, the initial cost of the brand name 
triple therapy drug for HIV/AIDS was US$931.360 At the same time, when Cipla, one 
of India's prominent pharmaceutical companies361 declared it would offer the drug’s 
generic version for US$350 to Non-Governmental Organisations per year, the brand-
name drug’s cost was reduced to US$727.362 Following Cipla’s declaration, Hetero,363 
another Indian pharmaceutical firm, declared it would sell the drug for US$347364 and 
following Hetero’s declaration, Randbaxy Laboratories, the largest pharmaceutical 
firm in India, declared it would sell the drug for US$295.365 In 2005, Hetero offered 
the drug’s generic version in US$152 against the US$562 of the brand name drug.366 
In total from 2001 to 2005, the brand-name triple therapy drug’s cost was reduced by 
83 per cent due to generic competition.367 Not only patented drugs were offered in 
low cost in their generic versions, as many generic pharmaceutical firms competed 
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with each other, the cost of the brand name drug was impacted and constantly 
reduced.368  
 
Needless to say this is only a fraction of the many examples of the influence of 
generics production on drugs’ pricing reduction. As the Indian generic industry grew 
in quality and quantity, its impact was not designated only to local markets but also to 
foreign markets.369 Excluding protection of pharmaceutical products from the Indian 
Patents Act intensified the growth of the generic Indian pharmaceutical industry and 
elevated it to become one of the leading generics producer and exporter around the 
world.370  
 
People from other developing countries and even from developed countries have 
enjoyed low cost quality drugs.371 India has become a key exporter of drugs and 
earned substantial reputation in the international market as a strong drugs’ 
manufacturer and exporter. 372  The contribution patent's abolishment from 
pharmaceutical products in the Indian Act was not concluded by the reduction of 
drugs’ pricing. The second most important result was the opportunity generic 
production gave for the local industry to advance its innovative capacity.373 Although 
the numbers were small at the beginning, by the end of 1980s, Indian firms were 
capable of producing new chemical compound based drugs374 and by the end of the 
1990s, several firms achieved innovative capacity.375 Through the process of learning 
from published data,376  trials and errors, experiments and self teaching,377 Indian 
scientists advanced their skills which resulted in more quality products in the market 
and not only quantity.378  
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However, the progress achieved in the innovative level of the industry was not 
enough. The innovative activity was considerably small and as India changed, the 
world has changed as well and the new dawn of intentional intellectual property 
regime was about to start. India needed to be a part of the international 
pharmaceutical industry arena, this time, not only through generics. India was facing 
the necessity of altering its non patent protection on pharmaceutical products in order 
to access the Western advanced technologies, in order to continue to advance its skills 
and innovative capacity. This was a leading way for India's pharmaceutical industry to 
be synchronised with the world.   
 
Additionally, although generics production has changed the local feasibility to 
access drugs, it did not change the landscape of the local healthcare status as 
needed.379 Still the majority firms in the pharmaceutical industry practiced generics 
production, neglecting the production of new chemical entity drugs.380 Consequently, 
Indian scientists started either to leave the country or stayed outside of India after 
completing their foreign training.381 There was just no reason for them to stay in India 
for it did not offer them a protection of their potential inventions. 382  
 
It is needless to mention that with the changing international intellectual property 
protection, and the Western extreme reluctance of the growing Indian generic activity, 
generic production was not to assist in establishing a stronger innovative industry or 
to improve India's economic prospects for the chance it would be excluded from the 
international community quid pro quo relationship. As much as the Indian generic 
industry relied on Western innovation, the West was not about to continue and lose 
out from the price reducing generic competition. Threatened by generics, 
pharmaceutical firms were constantly losing their investment in the costly research 
and development.383  
 
Something had to change. Wishing to be a part of the international economic 
outline, India had to become an equal party to the international market with equal 
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standards of intellectual property rights frame. 384  As stated earlier, legitimising 
generic production of pharmaceutical product in India put pharmaceutical 
multinationals in an economic swamp. The fact that generic drugs were offered at a 
lower cost and created an extensive competition with the brand name drug, the 
inventor had to reduce the drug's price for it to be still an active player in the 
marketplace.385 Not only could these firms not compete with the local generic cheaper 
versions of drugs,386 they also suffered from an extensive generic grasp in their home 
markets which did offer patent protection for their innovations.387 It was clear that the 
breached intellectual property right regime ought to be whole again.  
 
Furthermore with the price control mechanism reducing the cost of drugs in the 
Indian marketplace, Western firms were pushed to reduce their drugs prices which 
only made it more difficult for them to get returns for their costly investment.388 
Consequently, foreign pharmaceutical firms which invested in the Indian markets and 
introduced new drugs to the marketplace had to withdraw for their presence 
diminished their chance to recoup their costly investment.389  
 
Although the local industry was finally free from foreign powerful control over 
the local markets, it was left with its own limited technological and scientific 
knowledge. The advanced multinational pharmaceutical firms were not sharing 
knowledge with the local industry anymore, or introducing new research and 
development advanced technologies to be copied.390 It was soon clear that continuing 
with only generic production, was not in the best interest of India to access foreign 
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advance technologies. Becoming an equal enforcer of intellectual property rights 
was.391  
 
India understood the importance of technology transfer in its economic rise as in 
1991 it fully opened its market to foreign direct investment.392 Due to the new policy, 
foreign firms interests were treated the same as local's and as a result, India has 
experienced increasing income and improved quality of life through Western new 
technologies. 393  This new step the Indian Government took was considered the 
changing point of India's economic growth, poverty decline and the strengthening of 
its standee on the international platform.394 The new liberalisation of the early 1990s 
gave the local industry the opportunity to engage with Western technological 
advances.395 The chance to become a part of the international economy was a chance 
India was not about to dismiss. Opened up to foreign firms and with it the demand for 
improved manufacturing, the local pharmaceutical industry started to engage with 
innovative development. 396  It could than enjoy from Western support and 
collaboration.  
 
Given the reform the Indian innovative capacity was going through by embracing 
innovative skills, the next natural step which was about to deepen this opportunity 
was of course joining the World Trade Organisation and signing the TRIPS 
Agreement. India started to feel the need to move towards an international practice of 
intellectual property rights. 397  This understanding was taking place even in least 
developed countries.398 After the failed trials to adjust the Paris Convention to fit the 
interests of both the developed and the developing world interests,399 the constant cry 
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from pharmaceutical industries in the developed world pushed for an international 
honouring of patent protection and in a large scale.400   
 
Prior to examining the new regime through analysing the TRIPS Agreement 
patent enforcement, it is worthwhile reviewing in more detail the damaging effects the 
non-patent regime in the developing world imposed on pharmaceutical multinationals, 
which ultimately forced the constitution of the TRIPS Agreement. This is the only 
way to demonstrate why the enforcement of patent in Western countries was not 
enough, although the prospect of benefiting from the developing world's markets was 
not high.  
 
Following this review, the chapter next examines the TRIPS Agreement's different 
provisions, to present the new patent regime developing countries had to enforce. 
While analysing the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, the next section does not 
dismiss the flexible measures the Agreement offered to weaker economies as in the 
developing and least developed countries in time of a need to access patented high 
cost drugs. This aspect is of great importance to show that the international 
intellectual property community did not dismiss the difficulty the developing world 
faced concerning accessing patented drugs and was far from ignoring the global 
healthcare high value. No, the TRIPS Agreement did not offer an optimal settlement 
for developing and least developed countries but it did offer some relief and most of 
all it offered India a chance to better its healthcare status through more efficient ways 
than generics. 
   
B. Generics Fall and Innovation Rise   
 
With the continuing increase in the costs of pharmaceutical innovation, the return 
of expenses was essential for the continuance of the innovative activity in the 
pharmaceutical industry.401 However, the prospect was not to be fulfilled because of 
the constant expanding generic competition directed by the developing world.402 Led 
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by the goal to strengthen the domestic pharmaceutical markets through imitation, 
reduce the inflation existing in the pharmaceutical industry due to high costs of the 
patented drugs, as well as creating availability to life saving drugs, India, Mexico, 
Argentina and Singapore as well as other developing countries conducted high level 
of piracy generic sales,403 claiming intellectual property for a common heritage.404  
 
For a country like the United States, this perspective was not encouraging. The 
chances to preserve dominancy in the international arena were only possible with 
national and international enforcement of patent protection. 405  In other words, its 
market superiority was not saved with high generic activity directed from the 
developing world.  
 
According to the Global Competition – The New Reality Report, the inadequate 
international patent enforcement prior to the TRIPS Agreement settlement, almost 
paralysed the innovative activity in the United States.406 This result could have been 
dangerous for it would have put a stop to drugs' innovation. According to the United 
States International Trade Commission, in 1986 the United States lost between US$43 
to US$61 billion in the pharmaceutical industry alone.407 Although many countries 
signed the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris 
Convention), they kept breaching its provisions and due to an insufficient 
enforcement, the developed world cry to stop generics production during patent 
enforcement was not answered.  
 
Argentina for example, an upper middle developing country today, and a 
signatory member to the Paris Convention since 1967,408 denied patent protection for 
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pharmaceutical products prior to its joining to the TRIPS Agreement.409 Although it 
offered protection for pharmaceutical processes for 15 years, the Government could 
easily provoke the patentee's exclusive rights over the invention if after two years, the 
patented drug was not been worked (sold for example) in the local marketplace.410 
This enactment contradicted Argentina's obligation under the provisions of the Paris 
Convention which allowed breaching the patentee's rights only to prevent an abusive 
exploitation of the patented product by the patentee.411  
 
Moreover, although the Paris Convention had tried to answer the need for 
intellectual property rights enforcement, considering both the upper economies and 
the lower, it was irrelevant. The lack of patentability criteria, the lack of setting a 
minimum term for patent protection, the lack of exclusivity rights for the patentee, the 
inevitable compulsory licence with no compensation, 412  and the toothless dispute 
settlement the convention has offered, 413  gave the developing countries the most 
efficient tool to create a loose patent regime, and conduct "legal pirating" of the 
developed world’s expensive pharmaceutical patented products. As India's intense 
generic activity, also the loosened Argentine patent protection 414  contributed to 
foreign pharmaceutical companies losses in approximately US$250 million per 
year. 415  It was clear that without a common international patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products’ platform, substantial losses to the innovative pharmaceutical 
industries in the developed world were to increase rapidly.  
 
As can be expected, facing growing losses in the developing world and due its 
generic copying practice, pharmaceutical firms started to leave the developing world's 
markets. 416  In order to prevent the risk of using their products and technologies 
without any proper remuneration, foreign firms were left with no other choice.417 Note 
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that the risk was not directed only by India and Argentina but from other developing 
countries as Mexico, Brazil, and Africa which literally drove pharmaceutical 
multinationals away.418  
 
Japan and Europe which were also the losing party to the generic vast activity419 
joined the United States and rigorously fought for an international, one levelled 
intellectual property rights enforcement in any field of technology, especially in the 
pharmaceuticals.420 Although the developing world population could not be a good 
consumer for the patented drugs, the generic copying penetration to Western markets 
was too high and demanded a deep reform in developing countries patent enforcement 
regime.421 
 
At first there was constant pressure from the developed world to revise the Paris 
Convention. 422  After these attempts failed, 423  the United States endorsed strict 
bilateral sanctions on countries which did not comply with wide intellectual property 
rights enforcement.424 These countries were confiscated from any trade relationship, 
when at the same time it was one of the prime factors to the survival and growth of 
these countries’ economies, as today. Trading with the advanced developed world, 
accessing new technologies was a key factor in the developing world's market growth. 
Consequently Taiwan, Korea and Singapore (developing countries at that time) were 
soon to alter their patent regime and offered a wide scope of protection in the 
pharmaceutical technology field.425  
 
In addition to the pressure which was directed to the developing world, the United 
States was still aware of the importance of the generic industry apart from the 
pharmaceutical industry’s innovative activity. Therefore, the United States Congress 
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passed the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act426 to find a 
proper balance between the two ends. While simplifying the process of generic drugs 
application to the Food and Drug Administration in the United States, the Act 
introduced abbreviated approval processes for generics copies and their marketing in 
the country.  
 
It also allowed generic manufacturers to test the original patented drug before the 
end of the patent term, all in an attempt to increase generic drugs availability in the 
market as soon as the patent protection term over the original drug was over. In 
parallel and in a try to continue to motivate the pharmaceutical industry research and 
development activity, the Act approved patent term extension. Given that the count of 
the patent protection term begins prior to clinical trials, until the food and drug 
administration approves the marketing of a drug, the pharmaceutical firm is not left 
with many years of market exclusivity to return its expenditures. Addressing the two 
aspects, the United States Congress tried to assure better marketing platform for 
generics as well as assuring a safe platform for innovation, free from the threat of 
copying as long as the patent protection was in order.427 Nevertheless, the prospect to 
enter the Western markets only increased Indian generic exports to the United 
States428 and the process of copying drugs and selling them elsewhere was still in 
process.     
 
The developed world could not only relax the generic competition with local 
means. There was a need for international comprehensive reform. India was not easily 
persuaded.429 India still feared the impact patenting pharmaceutical products would 
have on drug affordability by its population. India did not want to risk the chance it 
had to offer low cost drugs to its population. Excluding patent protection was indeed 
the easiest and the cheapest way to access the advanced pharmaceutical technological 
process, offer low cost drugs and at the same time benefit from expanding the sales of 
generics to foreign richer countries. However it was not the ideal solution to all 
parties. As much as the Indian industry gained from high sales of generics in Western 
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markets, the developed countries industries were losing, considerably. If India wanted 
to be a part of the international economic community, it had to synchronise with it 
completely.  
 
Nevertheless there was still a need to find the proper balance, one which would 
protect the innovators interest of exclusivity and at the same time offer equal chances 
for all to access needed products as drugs.430 The TRIPS Agreement, concluded in 
1994, tried to achieve that balance. 431  Although both the developed and the 
developing world were involved in its drafting, one thing was not flexible and that 
was the full scope of patent protection for products and processes in every technology 
field. On the other hand, the agreement did include several exceptions to the exclusive 
right of the patentee in a try to answer poor economic countries population to access 
patented drugs with affordable prices. However the TRIPS Agreement did not oblige 
patent holders to assist or even use their sources to help poor economies to access 
drugs during the difficult timing of implementing new intellectual property rights 
regime.432 In this respect, one can say that the balance the TRIPS Agreement tried to 
achieve was still unequal. 433    
 
Although India prominently fought against an international enforcement of patent 
on pharmaceuticals, it finally understood that generics as much as their production 
contributed to the poor for it enabled low cost drugs in the marketplace, it did not 
better the country's health care or India's position in the eyes of the international 
community. Ultimately the reluctant India, alongside with other developing countries, 
joined the World Trade Organisation, signed the TRIPS Agreement434 and in 1998 
India also joined to the Paris Convention as a signatory country435 and to the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty. 436  The new era of developing countries enforcement of 
intellectual property rights was about to begin.  
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Meanwhile a vast debate began concerning the implications signing the TRIPS 
Agreement would have on the fast evolving Indian pharmaceutical industry.437 Many 
feared a direct increase of drugs' pricing.438 Reviewing the pharmaceutical industry of 
today stresses these concerns as ungrounded. As Bruce stated, in not so many years 
from today, a large volume of patented drugs would be off patent protection and the 
difficulty in allocating new chemical entity drugs, would keep high volume of 
generics production and offer low cost drugs to the local population.  
 
The Uruguay round Multilateral Trade negotiation (1986-1994) opened with the 
failure to revise the Paris Convention resulting in the institution of the World Trade 
Organization which took the responsibility of dealing with trade issues and of course 
with the constitution of the TRIPS Agreement.439  The World Trade Organization 
declared its objectives to help trade flow “smoothly, freely fairly and predictably” and 
enforce the TRIPS Agreement. 440  One of the important principles treated in the 
agreement is the contribution of intellectual property to technical innovation and the 
exchange of technology.441  
 
According to the TRIPS Agreement “patents shall be available for any inventions 
whether products or processes in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve with an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”.442 The patent 
term was also adjusted to 20 years443 which for some countries decreased the term of 
protection as the United States which enjoyed the extension under the 1984 Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. Developed countries were given 
one year to ensure that their laws conformed to the TRIPS Agreement.444 Given that 
the process participated to be more complex in developing countries which enforced 
weak or non intellectual property rights, these countries were given five years until 
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2000 to complete the implementation of the agreement's provisions.445 Developing 
countries as India which did not provide patent protection in the pharmaceutical 
technology field in 1995, were given an additional five years of preparation before 
fully enforcing patent protection of pharmaceutical process and products, until the 
year 2005.446  
 
During the years 1995-2005, India reformed its Patent Act 1970 and slowly 
adjusted its health policies to suit the new worldwide patent regime. During the 
transition period the Indian pharmaceutical industry was not about to reverse its 
progression. According to the TRIPS Agreement all drugs which were invented prior 
the year 1995, were eligible for generic copying.447 This was a term which was not 
negotiable. Respectively all inventions which were introduced during the transition 
period in the fields of pharmaceuticals, agricultural or chemical products were to put 
in what is called a mailbox.448 In 2005 the Indian Patent Controller was to open the 
application and review them. 449 In order to protect these applications from generic 
copying, the applicants were given exclusive marketing rights for a period of five 
years or until the product was granted or denied patent protection, whichever was 
sooner.450  
 
The continuance of the generic industry during the transition period allowed the 
Indian industry to constantly grow. Local firms in India maintained more than 70 per 
cent share in the marketplace, while multinationals share decreased to less than 30 per 
cent by the year 2005. Even exporting was constantly increasing. If in 1996 exports 
were capitalised in US$700 million, by the year 2006, figures increased to US$3 
billion.451 The research and development investment were also increasing given the 
new prospect of collaborating with the Western pharmaceutical industry from 2 per 
cent to 7-8 per cent in 2004-2005.452  
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In practice, member countries were allowed to implement the different provisions 
in the agreement as they saw fit.453 The agreement did not specify the context of the 
terms454 and thus member countries were free to fill the gaps to their discretion,455 
trying to answer their interests of health, nutrition and other socio-economic needs.456 
The only restriction was that all were to fit their interpretation to the obligatory 
elements in the agreement.457 As India excluded incremental innovation from patent 
scope which is the main source of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, some 
critic its conduct as breaching its obligation not to discriminate any field of 
technology from patent protection enforcement.458  
 
As mentioned earlier, the TRIPS Agreement was constructed while considering 
the need of poorer countries to access patented drugs and maintain their public 
healthcare. According to the given flexibilities, countries could revoke the rights from 
the patentees when they were misusing the patent in a way which would hurt fluent 
international technology transfer.459 Countries were also allowed to exclude patent 
protection from inventions which were considered harmful to humans, plants, 
animals, life or to the environment.460 Surgical or therapeutic methods for humans or 
animals were eligible inventions for exclusion as well.461 If the patentee's exclusive 
rights were in conflict with the utilisation of the patented product and were used in an 
arbitrary way, a member country was also allowed to revoke the patent.462 There was 
even one option to revoke the exclusive rights of the patentee if one applied to use the 
patented product for experimental purposes.463 That would enable generic firms to 
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prepare the generic version of the patented drug to be marketed as soon as the patent 
protection term ends.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement also enforced various measures to promise a platform of 
more affordable drugs. One was compulsory licensing.464 Under this mechanism the 
Indian Government, for example, can order to breach the patentee’s rights on the 
invented drug, without having the patentee's approval, if cheaper distribution is 
needed in times of emergencies and in situations of anticompetitive practices. Often 
ordering compulsory lessening is accompanied by an economic value of the license 
remuneration.465  
 
In times of emergencies as mentioned above, having the patentee's agreement is 
not necessary, however, generally, there is an obligation to set up the use of the 
patented drug with "reasonable terms and conditions". Most of the times, reaching a 
common ground is not practical.466 Moreover, the use of the drug is predominantly 
permitted to the domestic market. Nevertheless if there are countries without any 
manufacturing capacity, compulsory licensing can be authorised to a third country, to 
generically produce the drug and distribute it to the first countries.467 It seems that the 
purpose of setting the order of compulsory licensing can be concluded as a try to 
strike a balance between accessibility to drugs and at the same time still providing an 
incentive for continuing research and development in the pharmaceutical industry.468  
 
Another class of flexibilities is formed through parallel importation.469  In this 
process for example, India and China patent the same drug owned by the 
pharmaceutical firm Pfizer, however, given that the drug is sold at a high price in 
India, the country imports the drug from China, and sells it at a lower cost. Thus, the 
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cost of the same drug is being equalised among all countries470 and at the same time 
not hurting the patentee's right to compensation as fulfilled by the exporting country, 
in this example, China.471    
 
Trusting patent to be the ultimate mechanism to induce innovation, reduce 
imitation, risky competition and serve its trading interest, the United States led 
developed countries to embrace stricter bilateral free trade agreements of intellectual 
property, which known as the TRIPS-Plus Agreements. 472 Under this set of 
agreements patent protection term can be extended beyond the 20 years protection, 
some restrict the permissible terms of compulsory licensing and give the patentee with 
the right to stop parallel importation. 473  
 
Under the TRIPS-Plus frame, developed countries enforce 130 bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements. In recent years, the United States has formed TRIPS-
Plus Agreements with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco and Central 
America. 474 The same takes place in Europe which recently completed more than 30 
agreements in the Middle East and North Africa. 475 Constructing the TRIPS – Plus 
Agreements was not to say that the TRIPS Agreement is too weak. On the contrary, 
many criticised the TRIPS Agreement as being too strong and a result of grave 
bilateral sanctions directed to the developing world to convince them to sign the 
agreement.476 Understandably, with the limited capital, technologies and innovative 
skills, the advice for the developing world is to exclude the TRIPS-Plus mechanism 
and stay determent to the TRIPS Agreement flexibilities.477  
 
As Collins-Chase stated the benefits are too little in comparison to the cost, 
especially in the pharmaceutical technology field. The cost of the diseases is too much 
of a burden on a developing countries' economy. 478  Respectively Collins-Chase 
supported Thailand moving away from bilateral free trade agreements as the TRIPS-
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Plus. 479  In countries with high rates of HIV/AIDS patients, the option to access drugs 
has to be promised by using the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. Until 
developing substantial research and development platform to truly benefit from higher 
standard of intellectual property rights enforcement, developing countries should stay 
loyal as much as possible to its population health care interests. 480  Nevertheless, the 
author did not criticise developing countries’ adoption of the TRIPS Agreement and 
encouraged a wider use of the different flexibilities as compulsory licensing to enable 
a wider access to drugs at low cost.481   
 
To the pressure to enforce even stronger standard of patentability applied by the 
United States and European countries, the developing world responded with 
pressuring for forming better international healthcare elements. The resulted 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health signed in Doha (Doha 
Declaration) 482  tried to answer the latter request. As was declared the "TRIPS 
Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect 
public health".483 Although the concept was originally designated to cope with the 
AIDS epidemic and tropical diseases such as malaria,484 it promoted protection of 
public health in general and obliged reading the TRIPS Agreement in accordance to 
the needs of poorer economic countries to access needed patented drugs. 485   
 
Accordingly, the Doha Declaration supplied developing countries with an 
approval to reaffirm the TRIPS Agreement's flexibilities to the fullest. 486  That 
included the right countries had to set the grounds which legitimise compulsory 
licensing by defining their own “national emergency” or “extreme urgency”.487 India 
took this opportunity to the fullest and widened the various conditions of its local 
compulsory licensing policy to offer its population with affordable drugs at any 
time.488  
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In a later decision of the General Council of the World Trade Organisation, which 
has the power to vary the original TRIPS Agreement, 489  the problem of drugs 
accessibility in countries with no manufacturing capabilities was answered as well.490 
According to the aforementioned decision, countries which do have manufacturing 
capabilities can use the compulsory licensing route to enable them to produce a 
generic version of the patented drug in order to distribute it to a country which lacks 
manufacturing capabilities.491  
 
With three different amendments, India implemented the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement to the fullest. It implemented the extension of the patent term and the 
implementation of the two leading international intellectual property treaties 
authorisation (the Paris Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty) to its Patent 
Act.492 It amended its definition of “invention”493 and “inventive step",494 to define a 
patentable subject matter in the TRIPS Agreement. 495  India also revised its 
compulsory licensing framework496 and removed patent protection restrictions from 
pharmaceutical products.497  
 
Moreover, India has used one more key to ease its public healthcare status through 
the pre - grant and post-grant opposition procedure.498 In practice, India is the only 
country among other patent granting countries which offers both pre and post grant 
opposition platform for patent authorisation.499 Under the pre-grant opposition any 
person has the right to oppose at any time the authorisation of patent protection of an 
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invention, which entitles that person with a hearing conducted by the Patent 
Controller. In the United States for example there is not a pre-grant opposition, 
especially not one which would allow "any person" to oppose to the authorisation of 
patent.500  By allowing the participation of any person in the opposition process, 
India's Parliament has invited civil organisations to become a party to the Patent 
Controller decision in any case they would see fit, a prerogative which would make 
the process of reviewing the pharmaceutical applicant of patenting approval more 
complex. However this was a calculated step of the Indian Parliament to make sure 
that public health is the first priority of every decision of the Indian Patent Controller. 
However, on the other hand, it can be argued that the vast opportunity of opposing the 
grant of patent would increase the litigation in the Indian courts.    
 
Another step was in the Indian non-enforcement of data exclusivity. Usually 
before a drug receives marketing approval from the regulatory authority, a sample of 
the drug has to be submitted for testing of quality, safety and effectiveness. 501 
Although the TRIPS Agreement demands of data exclusivity in the fields of 
pharmaceutical agriculture and chemical from unfair commercial marketing,502  it still 
allows the use of the submitted sample to assure protection of the public.503 Only 
recently, the Indian Government has acknowledged its obligation under the TRIPS 
Agreement to enforce data exclusivity (a step which can be presumed was taken due 
to the pressure from the United States).504 However the recommendation to enforce 
this mechanism was designated to only five years, which can still promise to some 
extent, an early entrance of generic competition to the marketplace.505  Nevertheless, 
it is to be noted that generic competition is still forbidden during the term of the 20 
years patent protection which India has to ensure.     
 
However, although the Indian Patent Act focuses on the right of the public for 
better health care through wider access to patented drugs, there were still growing 
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concerns by different civil organisations, fearing the rising prices of drugs due to 
patent enforcement.506 Dean referred in his note to Dr Hamied, the chairperson of the 
Indian pharmaceutical firm Cipla, expression towards patent as a tragic case for the 
Indian population’s need to access patented drugs for HIV/AIDS.507 On the other 
hand, multinational entities argued that patent protection over pharmaceuticals will 
encourage innovation and invite new drugs into the markets in developing 
countries.508 Moreover these commentators argued that given the various flexibilities 
in the TRIPS Agreement countries should not fear accessing drugs in times of need.509  
 
It is indisputable that wealthier countries had much more to gain from the TRIPS 
Agreement implementation than other countries, specifically developing and least 
developed countries.510 The former countries have the capital needed for high cost 
investment in the pharmaceutical industry, the scientific skills and now no one could 
risk their ownership on their invented products by copying them and set forward 
aggressive competition as generics. Nevertheless, since India's obligation to offer full 
patent protection in the pharmaceutical technology field, it experienced growing 
benefits of increased collaboration with foreign pharmaceutical firms in both generics 
and innovative framework. 511  As other developing countries prior to signing the 
TRIPS Agreement, so did India decided that the benefits outweigh the costs and that 
international trade in addition to participating in the World Trade Organisation was a 
key of its economic growth.512  
 
The growth of the industry since its 1970 Patents Act is indisputable. No one can 
deny that the new industry progressed considerably with a solid prospect of becoming 
a part of the innovative research and development international pharmaceutical 
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industry.513  Nevertheless, despite the growing innovative skills and investment in the 
process of research and development, Indian firms are still weak if compared to 
pharmaceutical multinationals which imposes serious challenges to the prospect of the 
local innovative industry evolvement and the opportunity to offer low cost patented 
drugs. 514  However, with higher inflows of technology transfer into the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry, India may complete its transformation of becoming an 
innovative based pharmaceutical industry, grow and increase the local competition 
which, in turn, would lead to patented drug pricing reduction.  
 
It is noteworthy that recommending wider enforcement of patent protection in the 
pharmaceutical technology field is not to support generics abolishment. The generic 
competition has a considerable and direct impact on reducing drugs pricing in the 
marketplace. However, in a try to build a more sophisticated pharmaceutical industry, 
using only generics is not the right choice, especially due to the effect it has on the 
Western world’s willingness to keep India in the loop of the international trade. 
Undoubtedly, the Indian industry is ambivalent between the need to maintain constant 
access to drugs through high use of the TRIPS Agreement flexibilities and the wish to 
partner with pharmaceutical multinationals, which do not promote vast use of these 
flexibilities, and become a part of the international research - based pharmaceutical 
industry.   
 
Although there seems to be a conflict, there is not. India has to strengthen its 
pharmaceutical industry and build a solid innovative capacity, aside from generics. 
India can see the benefits promised by a wider enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, especially in the pharmaceutical industry. Since signing the TRIPS Agreement, 
India has succeeded in attracting technology transfer inclusive of the pharmaceutical 
industry515 in a way which clearly indicates of the potential to empower the Indian 
"pharmahouse".  
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Pharmaceutical multinationals are not as fearful of the generic industry in India as 
prior to signing the TRIPS Agreement. They are not in fear for their costly technology 
and thus they are more willing to take advantage of the Indian quality and low cost 
services and in return, teach the local pharmaceutical industry their innovative skills. 
Ultimately, the new advanced technologies’ penetration to the industry will be 
enforced by local firms. Trained scientists will wish to be a part of the growing 
industry;516 the local industry will grow, offer more drugs into the marketplace and 
naturally build such a competition that would assist to reduce the prices of drugs in 
the marketplace.517   
 
The next chapter analyses this potential. It analyses the potential patent has in 
creating a platform of affordable drugs in India through the role it plays as an 
accelerator of international technology transfer.518 Although until the 1990s, India was 
not in a position to allow it to enjoy patent enforcement as a power to industrialise its 
pharmaceutical innovative capacity, for it did not have innovative skills at all, it 
cannot be said today. It is not that India does not see the potential of patent to build a 
larger and stronger innovative pharmaceutical industry as much as it does not see it as 
a tool to reduce the price of drugs. This can be learned from India's wish to narrow its 
enforcement and exclude pharmaceutical incremental innovation from the patent 
scope. This perception needs to be corrected.  
 
First there is a need to strengthen the Indian pharmaceutical industry foundation. 
There is a need to enlarge it and invite more firms to activate in innovation. With 
patent as a motivator of technology transfer, collaboration with pharmaceutical 
multinationals, the opening of subsidiaries in India, outsourcing manufacturing to 
India, the local industry would enjoy growing knowledge and skills. Thus, with wider 
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innovative skills, not only the 10 leading firms in the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
would practice in innovation but also the entire 10,000 firms, medium to small 
sized.519 Allocating the entire industry to practice in innovation, necessarily would 
increase competition, and offer lower cost patented drugs.  
 
The following chapter sketches the process of technology transfer in the form of 
foreign direct investment, its potential to enlarge the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
and the role patent plays to promise this possibility. The chapter then concludes with 
the urgency for India to patent pharmaceutical incremental innovation in order to 
overcome the competition China imposes on its chances to attract foreign direct 
investment and delay the possibility to form extensive price reducing competition of 
patented drugs.  
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V PATENT AS DRUGS COMMODITISING STARTEGY IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
  
Extensive innovative – based drugs competition in the marketplace cannot be 
created by 10 firms, 20 or even 100. India does not have to settle for these small 
numbers also. It has 10,000 pharmaceutical firms which, if encouraged to engage in 
innovation rather generics, there is a chance that the pharmaceutical competition in 
the Indian marketplace would grow to such an extent it would influence drug pricing. 
The only question is how? How can India fulfill its potential as a growing economic 
giant? How can the sophisticated Indian pharmaceutical industry increase its potential 
without the knowledge or the capital entailed with pharmaceutical research and 
development? How could a patented - based pharmaceutical competition be formed? 
A large part of the answer lies in the help pharmaceutical multinationals can offer to 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry, however not without patent enforcement in return.  
 
The Indian pharmaceutical industry has much to gain from collaborating with 
Western firms. India's limited capital to invest in research and development can be 
assisted by Western technology and skills and in return offer quality low cost services 
of research and development and manufacturing. Furthermore, the same is relevant to 
India's attempt to expand its innovative technological capacity.520 In an attempt to 
benefit from India's low cost services, Western pharmaceutical firms open 
subsidiaries in India and research based facilities, hire Indian sophisticated low cost 
workforce and collaborate with Indian pharmaceutical firms. 521  This way, 
pharmaceutical multinationals transfer the needed technologies to the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry. This "push and pull" mechanism practiced by the local-
foreign parties, ultimately can build a stronger and empowered Indian pharmaceutical 
industry.522 Not only will the new industry be able to conduct large scale research 
activity and enlarge the competition in the marketplace, it will have the necessary 
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innovative skills to research on tropical diseases and focus on a specific need for 
drugs in India.   
Since India is obliged to offer patent protection for pharmaceutical products as 
well as processes, it is not advisable to base its production line only on generics’ 
production. In order to be a part of the global flourishing pharmaceutical industry, 
India has to engage in innovation in addition to the imitation process of drugs. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasise that generics will neither assure better 
healthcare in India nor offer the progression the local industry needs to advance its 
innovative skills or establishing low cost patented drug market.  
 
The economic turmoil the world has been through in the past two years has not 
passed the pharmaceutical industry. 523  Together with the increasing regulatory 
demands by the Food and Drug Administration in the United States, 524  the 
pharmaceutical industry suffered from a reduction of the capital available to invest in 
further complex research and development. 525  Some firms even find themselves 
threatened to pursue the approval of their researched drugs. 526  This reality can 
strengthen the propensity Western pharmaceutical firms may find in India's 
pharmaceutical industry, to reduce the costs involved in the process of research and 
development.527 In other words, Western pharmaceutical firms could find in India a 
low cost platform for both manufacturing and research activities. 528 
 
Commentators foresee that by the year 2010, the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
will be worth US$9.48 billion. 529  Moreover, given that the Indian industry is 
exceptionally large, has a skilled workforce and a low cost research and development 
production process, India can be a potential partner for the Western pharmaceutical 
industry.530  
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In their research, Maskus and Reichman stressed the importance of trading ideas 
for developing countries to form stronger economies.531 Nevertheless, without patent 
protection, the notion of trading ideas will not take place, 532  especially in the 
pharmaceutical industry which is exceptionally exposed to copying. As shown earlier, 
the lack of patent enforcement prior to the TRIPS Agreement pushed multinational 
pharmaceutical firms away from the infringing markets in developing countries.533 
The fact that India could offer low cost services was not enough for Western firms in 
the past and it will not be enough in the future. India, as well as other developing 
countries, suffered from extensive trading sanctions which distanced it from obtaining 
"new ideas" for development. This is to teach of the strong connection patent 
enforcement has in regards to advancing developing countries through new 
technologies and the possibility to enlarge the local competition, one which naturally 
can influence drug pricing.  
 
Since signing the TRIPS Agreement, the Indian pharmaceutical industry has 
enjoyed vast forms of collaboration with Western pharmaceutical firms. Firms opened 
different subsidiaries, hired local firms for manufacturing processes and open research 
and development facilities across the country. Needless to say that through a high 
volume of investment, higher education of pharmaceutical research and development 
is promised to the local industry as well as its expansion. If India did not have much 
to gain from collaborating with Western firms in the past, for it lacked even the 
minimal innovative skills, its capabilities in the innovative avenue today allow it to 
benefit from collaborating with Western firms and form a larger industry.  
 
India was not chosen randomly as a case study. As much as for India's economy, 
politics and infrastructure characteristics together with its medium advanced 
pharmaceutical industry, India has been successful in attracting collaboration with 
foreign pharmaceutical firms. However none of these aforementioned merits could 
have been practical without finally introducing patent enforcement of pharmaceutical 
products. As Hindman stated in his note 80 per cent of chemical firms would not 
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invest in India for the lack of insufficient intellectual property rights protection 
enforcement.534  
 
The first part of the chapter analyses the potential technology transfer has in 
enlarging the Indian pharmaceutical industry in the form of foreign direct investment. 
Finding that Western firms need partners to conduct research and development 
processes due to economic-regulations growing difficulties, foreign direct investment 
is found to be a constructive tool both to the Indian pharmaceutical industry interests 
as well as to the Western's. India's economic and technological characteristics offer 
the right platform for high inflows of foreign direct investment. However, as 
discussed in the second part of the chapter, attracting foreign direct investment 
requires patent enforcement, especially in the pharmaceutical industry. Lastly, as a 
complementary addition to the discussion of the importance of enforcing patent 
protection on pharmaceuticals in India, the third part of the chapter presents the 
growing competition India has with China for foreign investment, a risk India cannot 
afford if it wishes to find a solution to low cost drugs in the frame of patent.  
 
A. Commoditisation of Drugs Through International Technology Transfer: 
Application to Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Currently, in India, there are only 11 firms which are engaged with new chemical 
entity drugs research and development, which can exemplify the lack of large scale 
innovative skills in the Indian pharmaceutical industry.535 The Indian pharmaceutical 
firm Cipla, which is the fourth largest spender on research and development in India, 
does not engage in new chemical entity drugs research and development.536 Most 
research and development expenditure in the pharmaceutical industry in India is 
designated to generics and incremental modified drugs, however, not to a great 
extent.537  
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The trend of research and development of new chemical entity drugs started since 
India signed the TRIPS Agreement. 538  Since the Indian pharmaceutical firm Dr 
Reddy initiated the research followed by Ranbaxy, nine other firms have joined the 
trend and today, these 11 firms represent the highest investors in the process of 
research and development of new chemical entity drugs.539 Although their investment 
increased in 2005-06 to US$379 million together,540 this amount is hardly adequate 
for research and development in the pharmaceutical industry which often demands 
higher expenditures of US$1 billion.541 The reason for the monumental gap between 
Western firms' investment and Indian firms lies in the lack of skills and funds 
available to the Indian pharmaceutical industry,542 which can be remedied through 
collaboration with Western pharmaceutical firms.  
 
Although Chaudhuri acknowledged the small change in the innovative nature of 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry, he did appreciate the potential it has to grow.543 
With the right partnering with more advanced pharmaceutical firms, to educate the 
Indian industry, the Indian population may see a time when the competition in the 
marketplace reduces drugs pricing.  
 
1. The Indian pharmaceutical industry need of investment – further observations  
 
Access to patented drugs through generics is not an option for the Indian generic 
pharmaceutical industry anymore or to any other member country of the World Trade 
Organisation.544 Under patent protection, all generics copying were delayed to the end 
of the 20 years protection term. In other words, the TRIPS Agreement forced 
developing countries such as India to adopt an innovative orientation to their 
pharmaceutical industry.545  Although many feared  the potential increase of drug' 
pricing, the TRIPS Agreement as well as the Doha Declaration did not leave any 
developing member country of the World Trade Organisation without the possibility 
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to access drugs when needed and introduced several exceptions to the patentee's 
exclusivity rights in the marketplace like compulsory licensing.546  
 
Although the productivity of the various flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement is 
substantial in regards to making drugs affordable to the poor, often use of these 
flexibilities as a route to access drugs is not recommended. The extreme pressure 
forced on developing countries to adopt the TRIPS Agreement and patent 
pharmaceutical products by the West does encourage a wide use of the exceptions to 
patent market exclusivity nature. 547  As initially stated, establishing wide-ranging 
pharmaceutical innovative industry is not an overnight process. Respectively, and 
until one is formed in India, it is advised to use compulsory licensing, for example, to 
answer a current need for drugs by the public, as an exceptional not as a normative 
rule.  
 
Under an extensive use of "patent exceptions", the utilisation of patent cannot be 
fulfilled. If India finds itself using these flexibilities excessively, it would appear in 
the eyes of the West as an untrustworthy partner just as in the time prior to the TRIPS 
Agreement settlement.548 This would not enable the formation of a low cost patented 
drug market in India. India needs to build for itself a name as a proactive party to the 
world's pharmaceutical industry, attract more investment, offer new technologies and 
become a party to the international trading scheme,549 a scheme which can enhance 
the local industry's products outline.  
 
Following to signing the TRIPS Agreement, India's Government understood it 
would not have only to reform its laws but the entire outline of its pharmaceutical 
industry. India understood it had to enforce an innovative industry, one which would 
be able to become one with the international innovative industry. India first tried to 
seek progress through a wider endorsement of private-public collaboration.550Just as 
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Japan has successfully emerged its pharmaceutical industry through private-public 
collaboration,551  India's Government tried to encourage this level of collaboration 
through taxation exemptions as well as price control exemptions.552 One of the most 
important achievements of the Pharmaceutical Research and Development Council 
established in 1999 553  was the setting up of the Drug Development Promotion 
Foundation. 554  This foundation, managed by both the private sector and the 
Government, encouraged focus on enhancing basic research skills, new drugs delivery 
options and providing international co-operation.555  
 
The results were quickly noticeable. More firms joined the academic sector 
research, more laboratories were established, universities and colleges, all to achieve 
the goal of larger Indian pharmaceutical innovative products, aside from generics.556 
As of today, much emphasis is put on the private-public collaboration, especially 
concerned with the research on the neglected group of diseases such as tropical 
diseases.557 Two of the main success stories of these initiatives are demonstrated in 
the Medicines for Malaria Venture and the Global Alliance for Tuberculosis, both 
registered organisations by the private and the public pharmaceutical sectors. 558 
Nevertheless, these are only two researched diseases out of tens of neglected diseases 
which demand further research to improve developing countries healthcare.559   
 
In time local firms have started to see their obligation to fulfil a competitive edge 
and have started upgrading their innovative research and development activity.560 
However, they were not to fulfil this end only through local public-private 
collaboration. India's pharmaceutical industry does not have the innovative skills or 
the advanced technology needed in larger innovative activity. This reason has made 
India become more accepting of Western-Indian collaboration. Indian firms started to 
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see the potential in acquiring Western firms with existing innovative products and 
research and development based facilities to learn and influence markets 
geographically and therapeutically.561  
 
Research and development expenditures by Indian pharmaceutical firms grew 
from 2 per cent to about 7-8 per cent in recent years,562 from US$51.7 million in 1995 
to US$339.7 million in 2004.563 Since the mid 1990s Indian pharmaceutical firms 
such as Dr Reddy's564 and Nicholas Piramal India Limited (NPIL)565 invested more in 
research and development and implemented new production methods like the novel 
drug delivery system which is based on incremental modified drug innovation.566 The 
Indian pharmaceutical firm Dr Reddy's, which started as a generic producer, 567 
regularly invested 12 per cent of its profits in research and development.568 Medium 
sized Indian pharmaceutical firms such as Glenmark pharmaceuticals Ltd 569  also 
invested increasingly in research and development. 570 As of today, Glenmark is 
considered to be one of the highest investors in research and development in the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry.571 More and more firms followed these leading Indian 
pharmaceutical firms, engaging with foreign firms in manufacturing contracts.572 The 
Indian industry showed signs of becoming a part of the growing global innovative 
pharmaceutical industry.573  
 
Leading pharmaceutical firms also saw the potential of expanding their benefits 
and their innovative capacity through acquiring foreign firms based in the developed 
world. Ranbaxy, for example, purchased Ohm Laboratories in the United States,574 
giving it the opportunity to enjoy advanced sophisticated facilities and workforce. 
Obviously, the new welcoming of local-foreign pharmaceutical platform has 
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substantially improved the local firms with innovative skills. The possibility to 
compete with foreign firms only further pushed Indian firms to adopt innovative 
orientation more than imitative.575   
 
This review implies that the importance of the research and development process 
to introduce more innovative based drugs to the marketplace has been assimilated 
throughout the entire spectrum of the industry,576 however, not as much as it first 
appears and not as much as needed to treat the Indian industry as prepared to offer 
low cost patented drug market through extensive competition.  
 
The majority of Indian pharmaceutical firms still invest only 1.9 per cent in 
research and development, relative to 10.16 per cent investment in the West.577 The 
low expenditures naturally cannot offer a high volume of innovative based drugs in 
the marketplace. Statistics show that most of the Indian firms of today invest in 
generics production and not even in incremental innovation which is a prime level of 
innovation in the pharmaceutical technology field. 578 The pure reason is that they 
cannot. They do not know how. They do not have available capital to invest further in 
the low cost generic process.  
 
Clearly, the existing investment in research and development is insufficient to 
form large competition in the Indian marketplace. There is a clear need to encourage 
more investment to enlarge the number of firms which practice innovation to increase 
the quantity of local produced innovative drugs in the marketplace. As long as only 
the small number of 10 firms engage in innovative research and development as 
centrally analysed in Chaturvedi's research,579 it is not likely that the local population 
will enjoy high quantity Indian patented drugs. Without the expansion of the local 
industry, the local market will not be able to offer extensive price reducing 
competition. As time passes, there is a need to take more productive steps to enlarge 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry to achieve this end. One prime option is through 
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foreign direct investment which directly impacts on the technological capacity of the 
recipient industry and the prospect to enlarge the local marketplace.  
 
2. Foreign direct investment potential to intensify local production – towards low 
cost patented drug marketplace 
  
The previous section showed that the current structure of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry to reduce patented drugs cost is not optimal. The local 
industry does not have the capital or the knowledge to offer such a reality. Hence, if 
altered, if introduced with the needed technologies and skills, the possibility of the 
Indian industrial growth is assured. Recipient industries of foreign investment not 
only appreciate the power of the new technology, but also the education and training 
as a part of their prospective growth.580 Often commentators on technological transfer 
impact on a country's technological growth glorify the importance of training much 
more than the simple transfer of goods. 581   
 
Foreign direct investment was and still is treated as a strong tool to elevate the 
host country's economy through the advancement of its technology capacity. 582 
Foreign direct investment has long been perceived as “the most important…channel 
through which advanced technology is transferred to developing countries”.583 By 
purchasing assets, merging with local firms, forming joint ventures and investing in 
equipments,584 foreign direct investment exposes the local industry to what is called 
"productivity spillovers". 585  This phrase refers to the different benefits which are 
promised to local industries through foreign investment, 586  especially in newly 
industrialised countries, such as India.587  
 
With exposure to newly advanced products and technology the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry will have a sophisticated technology to imitate and adopt for 
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its own independent research and development.588 The industry will also benefit from 
new sophisticated managerial skills589 and a direct impact on the labour turnover.590 
The exposure to new technologies 591  will drive many scientists to take the new 
technology and open their own enterprises to participate in the growing 
competition.592 This latter avenue clearly demonstrates the potential foreign direct 
investment has in expanding the Indian pharmaceutical industry through development 
and placing the competitive platform needed to allocate a low cost patented drug 
marketplace.  
 
A sophisticated industry will also be driven to produce more quality products.593 
As foreign firms introduce quality products and technologies to the local marketplace, 
the local Indian pharmaceutical industry will wish to compare its product line to the 
foreign and not lag behind it. Thus the Indian pharmaceutical industry will be more 
motivated to invest in research and offer better and more quality drugs products than 
the foreign. 594  
 
Clearly collaborating with Western large and advanced pharmaceutical firms 
would elevate the Indian innovative pharmaceutical industry. This result is a key 
factor in offering a low cost patented drugs market. As long as the entire industry 
enjoys innovative skills it will be able, after absorbing enough technology, to 
introduce a high volume of innovative based drugs, incremental and pioneer. The 
current number of Indian firms engaging in innovation is insufficient to exercise a 
larger innovative pharmaceutical marketplace. However with further ventures with the 
West, the potential in fulfilling this end is apparent. Through larger innovative 
capacity, India will not have to wait for others to innovate before accessing a drug. 
India will not have to wait to the end of the patent protection term to access drugs. 
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India will have the necessary skills to innovate itself and given its growing economy 
and consumer market in health, the possibility to form a competitive platform of 
pharmaceuticals and offer low cost patented drug can be a possibility 
 
3. The West propensity to the Indian pharmaceutical industry  
 
India is a good example of a host country for foreign direct investment, especially 
in the pharmaceutical industry. However, before answering that aspect, there is one 
factor which demands further consideration and that is the Western pharmaceutical 
industry tendency to invest in country such as India. Despite the growing research and 
development investment by pharmaceutical multinationals, the Food and Drug 
Administration approved the small number of only 17 new chemical entity based 
drugs in 2002.595 This small amount can be partly due to economic difficulties the 
pharmaceutical industry is experiencing.  
 
At the Israel Life Science Industry – Biological and Medical Conference and 
Exhibition 2009 (ILSI-BIOMED),596 various specialists have consensually agreed that 
these days, the Western pharmaceutical industry suffers from a substantial economic 
and scientific crisis. This economic reality can encourage the industry to find partners 
to share the costly investment in research and development in developing countries 
such as India.597 India as further observed in the next section and as comprehensively 
analysed earlier,598 can offer low cost research and development (40 per cent – 60 per 
cent lower than in Western countries), 599  educated low workforce cost, 600  vital 
elements to the Western economic struggling pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Dr Lee Babiss, Head of Global Pharma Research F Hoffmann-La Roche Inc, 
home based in Switzerland, who during the ILSI-BIOMED conference gave a 
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presentation on Roche’s strategy for its pharmaceutical product pipeline, primarily 
stressed the importance of diversification innovation models around the world.601 Dr 
Babiss mentioned that by the year 2008, Roche increased its external innovation 
collaboration both with China and India from 38 contracts in 2003 to 57 in 2008.602 
He called the Western industry not to be afraid of a change and encouraged smart 
alignments and external innovation.603 He eloquently ended his presentation when he 
said "different cultures bring different cultures to science".604   
 
India can be that partner, not only for offering a high quality of scientific capacity, 
but also for offering it at such a low cost which can reduce the risks the Western 
industry faces in research and development. The change that the Indian innovative 
industry has gone through was apparent and presented a substantial motivator for 
pharmaceutical multinationals to see in India an innovative partner to reduce the cost 
of research and development.   
 
Dr Hadar Ron from Israel Healthcare Ventures Ltd, who also participated in the 
conference, addressed another avenue which hardens the platform of research and 
development for the Western pharmaceutical industry. 605  This avenue is the high 
safety level regulations recently introduced by the United States Food and Drug 
Administration. Dan Mendelson, the president and the founder of Avalere Health 
LLC,606 a firm in the United States which offers consultation services in health care 
and Government regulations, gave a presentation on the same issue, "The Face of 
Change: Regulation, Legislation and the US Markets".607  
 
Mendelson determined that the safety – benefits tension, or in other words the 
regulation-reimbursement tension has substantially increased in the last few years and 
is about to increase even more. One recent example for the changed atmosphere in the 
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United States market is the United State Congress passing in 2007, the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA). 608 Overlooking key 
pharmaceutical programs, such as the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, the Medical 
Device user Fee and the Modernisation Act, the FDAAA comprehensively changed 
the familiar set of regulations in the pharmaceutical technology field.609 The FDAAA 
also encourages private - public partnerships, enhances food and drug safety 
provisions and expands clinical trials database. 610 FDAAA allows the Food and Drug 
Administration to require post approval clinical trials sample submissions to assess 
the safety of the marketed drug. 611  FDAAA also enables the Food and Drug 
Administration to label changes to the marketed drug if it was found that new safety 
requirements are due to be introduced. 612    
 
The FDAAA obliges enlarged registry in the clinical trials databases for all 
clinical trials that are on going. 613  The FDAAA demands that data such as 
demographics be submitted, as well as primary and secondary clinical trials results. If 
these requirements are not answered, monetary penalties will be forced on civil 
organisations.614According to Messplay and Burrell, these aforementioned factors, 
which accompanied with additional factors such as paediatric research and enhanced 
drug user fees, can severely impact on the pharmaceutical industry willingness to 
engage with sophisticated pharmaceutical research and development. 615     
 
With a legal obligation to show therapeutic and economic efficacy as discussed, 
firms are going to have to use larger capital for the research and development process. 
Overall with not enough funding, high risks of failure, high competition, small 
reimbursement expectancy, small amount of drugs in the pipeline, growing demands 
for efficacy and safety, hardens the chances for pharmaceutical firms in the developed 
world to survive without sharing the research and development economic risks with 
                                               
608
 See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 Pub L No 110-85, 110 Stat 823 
(2007).   
609
 See Gary C Messplay, Sarah E Burrell "Implications of FDAAA 2007 Changes are A foot 
Following the FDA’s Reauthorization" www.fda.gov (accessed 20 September 2009). 
610
 Ibid. 
611
 Ibid. 
612
 Ibid. 
613
 Ibid. 
614
 Ibid. 
615
 Ibid. 
 100 
others. India seems to be a potential good partner.616 As firms would have to show 
efficacy using the lowest cost as possible, the tendency to make alliances with a 
capable industry such as India which offers research and manufacturing services at a 
low cost, is obvious and encouraged. Under these alliances as discussed earlier, the 
prospective benefits for the Indian pharmaceutical industry are immense.  
 
Correa however, doubts the incentive Western firms have to transfer their 
advanced technologies even indirectly to developing countries. He based his doubts 
purely on the fact that with Western support and education programs, industries in 
developing countries would be strong competitors to Western.617 One reply to this 
concern is that although the competition platform would increase, Western 
pharmaceutical firms still need to find a way to reduce the expenditure in the 
pharmaceutical research and development. The difficulties in inventing a new 
chemical entity drug or new molecular entity drug which promise the highest 
returns,618 the narrower pipelines619 and the intensive safety regulations introduced by 
the Food and Drug Administration, all force the Western industry to share the 
"spotlight" with foreign pharmaceutical industries in the developing world and take 
the chance of establishing a new strong competitor in the global marketplace. 
 
From India’s perspective, the Indian Government understood the capacity of 
foreign direct investment and the positive impact it has on the growth of its 
pharmaceutical industry. 620 This was an understanding that the Indian industry has 
implied by liberalising its policies in regards to foreign direct investment in the 1990s 
(just before signing the TRIPS Agreement).621 Without any restrictions on foreign 
direct investment in the pharmaceutical sector,622 India is to fulfil its true potential and 
enlarge its pharmaceutical industry activity. 623  However, the exceptionally small 
number of Indian firms collaborating with Western firms today, India's 
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pharmaceutical industry has not yet to achieve its potential to build an enlarged Indian 
pharmaceutical marketplace. Through Western-Indian collaboration, the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry will be supplied with the needed research skills to grow as 
suggested before and build an influential competitive platform624 to answer the public 
need for a better health care through affordable patented drugs. 
 
Technology transfer has always been perceived as a main source in developing 
countries’ industrialisation and infrastructure growth.625 However, it is noteworthy to 
mention that not all developing countries can benefit from it, as pointed out by 
Arora. 626 Transactions of technology in the pharmaceuticals technology field are 
common.627 However, without the proper abilities to absorb the learned technologies, 
Western firms will not wish to invest and the recipient industry will not be projected 
to benefit.628 Correa also supported this observation.629 A country which lacks the 
minimal technological capacity in the pharmaceutical industry will not be able to offer 
beneficial returns to foreign direct investors through low cost quality services. 
Examining this aspect indicates once more India’s substantial platform both to benefit 
from foreign direct investment and be beneficial for investors.  
 
India of today is a rising economic force. 630  With more than one billion 
population,631 the growing gross domestic products value,632 its exceptionally large 
market size, its efficient infrastructure 633  and the educated English-speakers 
workforce,634 all indicate of India’s potential to attract foreign direct investment into 
its markets and enjoy a productive collaboration with the West to enlarge its 
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innovative pharmaceutical industry. This avenue is next observed with further theory 
elaboration and empirical support. Concluding the two it is shown that India's 
characteristics can encourage foreign direct investment in a productive manner to 
fulfil the advocated alternative of a low cost patented drug market through the 
creation of vast local competition.   
 
4. India as a host country of foreign direct investment 
 
In his study Kumar Rai referred to the Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) 
theory as the basic justification of foreign direct investment. 635 According to the OLI 
theory, there are several inseparable factors to patent practice in a host country to 
attract foreign direct investment into a country. Factors, such as the size of the market 
in the host country, the local industry’s infrastructure and the stability of the economic 
environment are not less important than patent protection enforcement. 636  These 
factors were also supported by Nonnenberg and de Mendonca specifically in regards   
to developing countries’ ability to attract high inflows of foreign direct investment637 
and in Hindman’s note as well. 638  Observing India’s economic factors, its 
exceptionally large market size, its relatively capable pharmaceutical industry in 
comparison to other developing newly industrialised countries, place India as having 
the right platform to attract foreign direct investment according to the OLI theory.   
 
Correa's supported the logic behind the OLI theory while stressing that foreign 
direct investment inflows extensively depend on skills availability, technology status, 
research and development capacity, enterprise-level competence and the ability to 
complement modern technologies and institutional and technological infrastructure in 
the host country.639 Telecommunication infrastructure as well as a country’s financial 
services also has strong positive impact on high flows of foreign direct investment 
into a host country.640  Naturally, without the aforementioned aspects, without the 
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economic stability, technological capacity and communication, what will be the use of 
foreign investment to the host country?  
 
As much as protection of the foreign technology against copiers is needed, 
without a constructive partner to absorb the transferred technologies, there will not be 
any benefit for either party: the investor, or the recipient.  Without understanding the 
process of research and development, the process of acquiring and implementing 
foreign technologies, using the new technologies will cost more and may not be 
economically sufficient for the host country. Without the host country’s abilities to 
absorb the transferred technology, the investing country will have to invest more 
capital to overcome the difficulties in the host country. Foreign direct investment is 
based on mutual agendas. As the agenda of the host country is to use the advanced 
technologies to advance its industries, the agenda of the investing country is that the 
host country will be able to manufacture the advanced products for example. Without 
the capacity to understand the technology, foreign firms will not benefit and the 
process of foreign direct investment will be irrelevant to both sides.641  
 
Based on the justifications above, the Indian pharmaceutical industry seems to be 
able to fulfill the two interests, its own and the foreign. Based on India's economic 
growth, scientific skills and its well based telecommunication infrastructure, 642  the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry seems to fit the model of the OLI theory alongside 
with Correa’s standards of the optimal host country to benefit from foreign direct 
investment.  
 
Also the Indian pharmaceutical industry innovative transformation elevates it as 
an optimal investee.643 India offers advanced manufacturing process,644 a large market 
size to absorb the products645 and a low cost innovative skilled workforce.646 India 
holds the largest number of the Food and Drug Administration of the United States’ 
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approved manufacturing facilities compared to any other developing country,647 a fact 
which, of course, encourages Western pharmaceutical and medical firms' willingness 
to invest in India and collaborate with the local industry. From every angle India has 
the right characteristics needed to attract foreign direct investment to its 
pharmaceutical industry, and benefit from the investment, to fulfil the end of an 
enlarged innovative pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Another theory was also raised in Kumar Rai's note which deals with the linkage 
between foreign direct investment and a host country’s “market imperfection”.648 
According to the "market imperfection" theory, strong intellectual property rights 
alone will not attract foreign direct investment to countries which have what is called 
“healthy industries”.649 In other words, the chances that Western firms invest in an 
imperfect industries are more likely than that they will invest in stronger economically 
industries, healthy economically industries. Once implementing this theory on the 
pharmaceutical industry, the theory seems to be very logical. The weaker economic 
position the Western pharmaceutical industry is in today suggests that in order to 
survive and to reduce the capital invested in the research and development process, it 
needs to collaborate with industries which will not demand much compensation for 
various services. What place is better to reduce the research and manufacturing costs 
but in developing countries which are on their way to consolidation and which rely on 
Western investment?   
 
Reviewing the latter theory, India seems to be the right target for foreign direct 
investment from this perspective as well. India is still a developing country which is 
on its way of emergence, regardless of its newly industrialisation nature. It does not 
have the most optimal economy and gross domestic products rates and it still needs 
Western investment in its markets.  
 
Moreover, it is clear that despite the evolvement of India's pharmaceutical 
industry, it still lacks the advanced research and development skills to conduct 
pharmaceutical innovation on high quantities. If it had, it would not need to rely on 
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pharmaceutical multinationals for its evolvement. For this fact, the lagging behind 
Indian pharmaceutical industry, cannot demand the same services rates as the 
developed world does. 650 Hiring an Indian pharmaceutical firm to conduct research of 
a drug will cost substantially less than hiring a pharmaceutical firm in France for 
example.  Hence, India's imperfect market and its unhealthy pharmaceutical industry 
answer the latter theory and strengthen the linkage between India and foreign direct 
investment as a mutual source of benefits.   
  
The given examination can testify of the potential the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry has to benefit from foreign direct investment in the industry. India has 
become an attractive place for outsourcing given its quality discovery, research, 
manufacturing and marketing. 651  First to be noted is Pfizer,652  a North American 
pharmaceutical firm investment in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. Pfizer chose to 
outsource the manufacturing process of its drugs volume to 20 different Indian 
firms.653 20 different Indian firms are now exposed to Pfizer's advanced technology 
and sophisticated innovative products.654  From these 20 firms can potentially come 
20 different scientists who would wish to take a part in the new growing 
pharmaceutical industry in India, open their own firms and impact on the local market 
with larger competition. As Pfizer, Merck,655 another North American pharmaceutical 
firm, outsourced 35 per cent of its manufacturing work to the Indian industry656 and 
opened similar possibilities to the local Indian marketplace.   
 
One of the leading pharmaceutical firms in the Indian industry, Ranbaxy, 657 
changed its policy in regard to licensing, acquisitions and partnerships with 
multinational entities to a more accommodating one. Ranbaxy which mostly produces 
generics (although it has made a substantial progress in incremental innovation) is 
aware of the importance of collaborating with multinational pharmaceutical firms to 
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acquire a more sophisticated technology to expand its innovative net and enlarge its 
relatively small capital available for research and development. 658 Ranbaxy is aware 
of its limitations and at the same time of the prospect of advancement by collaborating 
with foreign pharmaceutical firms from the developed world. As Ranbaxy, Sun 
pharmaceutical industries Ltd, 659  Lupin Ltd 660  and Zyduscadila, 661  also Indian 
pharmaceutical and health care firms, expanded their marketing through partnerships, 
joint ventures and alliances with pharmaceutical multinational entities,662 to fulfill 
research and development orientation by 2020.663   
 
The collaboration between the Indian firm Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) and 
the United States firm Eli Lilly(Lilly) 664 to recruit TCS to conduct “clinical trial data 
management, statistical analysis and medical writing”665 is another example of how 
foreign-local collaboration can educate the local Indian pharmaceutical industry and 
drive it to engage more in pharmaceutical innovation and not only in generics. In a 
recent study, it was revealed that Lily has over 17 small to large clinical research 
projects Ii 40 different hospitals across India, as for GlaxoSmithKlin (GSK)666 has 
started seven clinical trials of vaccines and drugs in India.667 NPIL, another Indian 
pharmaceutical firm incorporated with Lilly to conduct Lilly's “clinical development 
program, including investigational drug applications and human clinical trials”.668 As 
the previous example of TCS, NPIL has most likely benefited from the exposure to 
Lilly's advanced technologies and developments.  
 
The Indian firm GVK Biosciences 669  contracted with the American 
pharmaceutical firm Wyeth to set up a research and development centre in Hyderabad 
(India) and work on Wyeth’s projects. This example shows how foreign investment in 
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the industry has the potential to enlarge Indian research and development innovative 
skills and capacity to be enforced in future independent researching. 670 As Wyeth, the 
American pharmaceutical firm Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS)671 has contracted with 
the Indian firm Biocon to establish new research facilities in India 672  and also 
contributed to the future success of Indian innovative pharmaceutical industry and the 
future success of better health care in India.    
 
Acquiring Western firms is another way to benefit from Western technologies and 
research and development skills as understood by the Indian pharmaceutical firms 
NPIL and Sun pharmaceutical industries Ltd.673  Licensing out Indian products to 
Western firms was another way.674 Although there is a documentation of the success 
Indian firms have achieved from licensing out their products to Western firms, they 
often suffered from a set back.675 Indian firms have come to the understanding that 
pharmaceutical multinationals do not wish to develop in-licensed products for 
commercialisation for these products competed with their own innovated product. 676  
This was one of the wakening calls of the Indian pharmaceutical industry to develop 
their own products as Torrent learned from the poor experience it had with the Swiss 
pharmaceutical firm Novartis. 677 
 
The aforementioned examples show the immense benefits promised to India's 
pharmaceutical industry from foreign direct investment. Whether it is manufacturing, 
production or research contracts the Indian pharmaceutical industry is due to learn 
directly and indirectly from Western pharmaceutical entities and walk toward a new 
independent innovative industry.678 With advanced scientific capabilities and a solid 
economic platform, local firms will be driven to improve their performances, 679 
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advance their technological products,680 skills681 and knowhow technologies682 and in 
time the Indian pharmaceutical industry will be able to offer better health care to the 
local and foreign poorer population of the world through patent enforcement.   
 
Although India has to clarify the vagueness and multiplicity of its foreign direct 
investment methods concerning the approval stages, as well as the uncertainty in its 
regulation requirements, 683  it is likely to attract foreign direct investment to the 
pharmaceutical industry. However, the right economic-industry features alone, will 
not promise enough technology transfer without the promise of patent protection 
enforcement. Without property protection enforcement it seems that the alteration of 
the regulation of foreign direct investment will not benefit India with high 
technological inflows. Without assuring Western pharmaceutical multinationals that 
their products will not be threatened by extensive generic activity while collaborating 
with the local industry, they will not see India as the right investee.  
 
Reviewing the potential of the Indian pharmaceutical industry to attract foreign 
direct investment inflows, and the direct potential to establish large competitive 
industry, leads to a discussion of the prime role patent plays to fulfil this end. In other 
words, the following part of the chapter reviews patent as a leading motivator of 
foreign direct investment in the pharmaceutical technology sector. 
 
B. Patent as a Leading Motivator of Foreign Direct Investment 
  
Patent enforcement can fulfil the end to intensify technology transfer to 
developing countries. Although India offers various benefits for pharmaceutical 
multinationals, without the promise of patent to their costly innovation, the prospect 
of local-foreign collaboration would not take place to the extent needed to enlarge the 
local industry innovative activity. 684 Past experience already showed the direct link 
between knowledge inflows to patent protection in the host country.685 Since signing 
the TRIPS Agreement, India has enjoyed from growing partnering with 
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pharmaceutical multinationals entities, licensing and joint ventures. 686  The proper 
conclusion need to be taken is therefore of the strong connection between a host 
country's treatment towards patent protection of pharmaceuticals and the technology 
inflows it will benefit from.  
 
Designating the pharmaceutical industry in this regard from any other industry is 
crucial. Not all foreign direct investment is automatically related to strong 
enforcement of intellectual property right regimes.687 As shown, the immense reliance 
of the pharmaceutical industry on patent protection derives from the rather simple 
process of copying the invented products. Given India's boosting generic 
pharmaceuticals, copying drug is not much of a difficult task. Hence, it would be 
correct to conclude that without the alteration India has made to its Patent Act and the 
introduction of patent enforcement on pharmaceutical products, India would not have 
succeeded in enlarging its collaboration scope with pharmaceutical multinationals as 
it did.688  
 
Statistics show that from the outset of India’s adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, 
there was a growing increase of mergers and acquisitions between multinationals 
entities and Indian firms.689Another supportive element to the direct relation between 
foreign direct investment and patent protection is the fact that there has been a 
significant increase of investment after 1999, when India first amended its 1970 
Patent Act, towards a full compliancy with the TRIPS Agreement's provisions.690 
When India was one year away from fully implementing the TRIPS Agreement's 
provision and introducing pharmaceutical product protection in 2004, it enjoyed an 
exceptionally high increase of foreign direct investment which shows the connection 
between patent and foreign direct investment specifically to the pharmaceutical 
industry. 691  
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Lippoldt and Park concluded decisively of the connection between foreign direct 
investment and intellectual property rights enforcement in the host country, as well as 
to the positive effect foreign direct investment has on the host country’s growth. 692 
They especially stressed this outcome in regards to the pharmaceutical industry,693 
which as explained, is highly exposed to copying and thus patent is as a compass to 
the multinationals entities investment direction. 694  Merck for example, constantly 
justifies its decisions to collaborate with Indian firms, due to the new Indian patent 
regime. 695  With intellectual property assets accounting for 40 per cent of the 
corporations in the United States and 33 per cent in Europe, there is no room for error. 
Intellectual property is one of a leading factor in multinationals entities’ decisions 
where to invest,696 especially concerning the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Maskus, Saggi and Puttitanun determined similarly to Lippoldt that there is a 
strong patent – foreign direct investment link.697 They stressed that this truth is most 
relevant in the pharmaceutical industry. 698  Smarzynska reached the same 
conclusion699as well as Lai.700 In two additional studies, one by Mensfield and one by 
Lee and Mensfield,701 the scholars found that intellectual property rights are most 
significant in attracting investment and in specific, in establishing more research and 
development facilities in the host country.702 Needless to say enlarging the research 
and development capacity in India would have a direct impact on the increased 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry, and thus on their prices and availability to 
the poorer population in the country. Hindman joins these findings with specific 
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reference to India.703 In practice, in the post TRIPS Agreement settlement era, foreign 
pharmaceutical companies have returned to India, and until these days are forming 
research and developing facilities all across the country.704  
 
Addressing the issue of the connection between the two factors of patent and 
foreign direct investment specifically in the Indian pharmaceutical industry, Kumar 
Rai detailed his supportive findings. Based on a survey answered by multinationals 
entities subsidiaries in the Indian pharmaceutical industry, large scale Indian firms, 
medium and small sized firms, Kumar Rai found a direct connection between the two 
factors.705 Although India does answer the OLI theory as Kumar Rai stated, 706 he also 
stressed that without patent protection the Indian pharmaceutical industry would not 
have been succeeding in attracting foreign direct investment at all.707  
 
Of course India’s exceptionally large size places it on a more attractive platform 
of foreign direct investment; however without patent securing pharmaceutical 
multinationals highly costly innovation, firms would not wish to take India's offer of 
low cost quality services after all.708 The success of the Indian software industry due 
to enlarged foreign investment in reaction to a more solid intellectual property regime 
in India, also supports the promise patent can offer to the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry evolvement as Maskus suggested. 709   
 
The conclusion of patent as a strategy to develop the Indian innovative 
pharmaceutical industry through foreign direct investment is necessary. Thus the 
conclusion of patent enforcement as a constructive tool to enlarge the competition in 
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the marketplace is also necessary. In the short time of the Indian full patent regime 
enforcement (2005-2009), the local pharmaceutical industry benefited from 
knowledge inflows. The long term future promises even larger quantities of 
investment and higher prospects of evolvement. As long as the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry grow and develop, it would be able to practice more in innovation.  
 
An extensive introduction of new Indian drugs to the marketplace, competing with 
foreign patented drugs, would eventually be able to bring to price reduction. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned by Omer, India also needs to put more resources on 
research and development and diversify its pharmaceutical innovation programs.710 
India is now prepared more than ever to use patent as it should,711 not as a barrier to 
drugs but as a vehicle to drugs through local enlarged independent development. The 
Indian pharmaceutical industry is strong enough to rely on collaboration with 
multinational entities and to create an extensive local competition, one which would 
even penetrate to the international arena.  
 
Heading for better opportunities for the pharmaceutical industry and in time for 
the local and foreign poorer population to access patented drugs, this is not the time to 
regress from enforcing patent protection for pharmaceutical products. As experience 
taught India as well as other developing countries, patent can accelerate knowledge 
inflows from the West and thus better the healthcare status in the country through 
advanced technologies. Thus it would be expected that the Indian Government would 
enforce a fuller protection of pharmaceutical innovation, one to include the core level 
of pharmaceutical innovation as well as the incremental.  
 
The urgency in making the change is not to be dismissed, especially when other 
strong developing countries such as China, threaten the ability of India to attract high 
technology inflows to fulfil the notion of larger innovative Indian pharmaceutical 
industry.712 China's threat on the evolvement of the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
through foreign direct investment, threatens on India's ability to find a solution to the 
high priced patented drugs through patent. As the Indian pharmaceutical industry can 
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benefit from foreign direct investment, to enlarge its pharmaceutical industry activity, 
so can other newly industrialised developing countries like China, Brazil and South 
Africa.713 India should not stay behind.  
 
China for example, which has similar economic patterns and growth prospect to 
India's,714 if not larger, offers low cost services as well as more comprehensive patent 
protection over pharmaceuticals inclusive of the incremental innovation products.715 
As can be expected, without protecting the leading level of innovation in the 
pharmaceutical technology field, the very core of a complex innovation, India will not 
be as successful in attracting foreign direct investment to the local pharmaceutical 
industry. India will not be able to form a low cost drugs’ market alternative through 
patent. As patent enforcement is a key factor in attracting foreign direct investment in 
the pharmaceutical industry, denying protection from incremental modified drugs will 
not answer the needed technology inflows to enlarge the competition in the 
marketplace in India.  
 
However, before finalising the importance of pharmaceutical incremental 
innovation or the importance of its patenting to encourage innovation, invite more 
investment and form an influential price reducing competition, the next section 
reviews the risks China imposes on India to accomplish this end. Unless India would 
realise the importance of patenting pharmaceutical incremental innovation, China may 
become a more lucrative investee than India and thus risk India's ability to establish 
the large pharmaceutical industry needed to form extensive competition in the local 
pharmaceutical marketplace.  
 
C. The Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: India and China rivalry 
 
Comparing China to India and examining the impact China has on India's ability 
to attract more foreign direct investment, is an essential comparison. Often these two 
countries are referred to as Asia's non-identical twins or "Chindia" to show the similar 
economic progression these two economic giants have achieved in the last two 
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decades.716 However, the two do differ in several aspects. India has not yet softened 
its taxation laws or its strict labour laws which impact on its ability to attract foreign 
direct investment as much as needed for its technological growth.717 Nevertheless, in 
comparison to China, India has a better financial banking system, openness to foreign 
banks, higher educated workforce in science and engineering 718  with growing 
prospects.719   
 
Compared to China, India has some advantages in almost all sectors, political, 
social, property rights enforcement.720 India's legal system is much more advanced 
and more trustworthy. 721  Additionally, the restrictions China forces on foreign 
recruitment, also emphasise the advantages India has over China.722  Nevertheless, 
China has succeeded in attracting more foreign direct investment which has risked the 
potential growth of the Indian market723 and in an analogy to the pharmaceutical 
industry, can risk the growth of this sector and the indirect result of lower cost 
patented drugs as suggested.  
 
As Baker viewed, whether China's low cost power supply, higher rates of literacy 
or its manufacturing capacity, or even its third position as the largest market in the 
world, it attracts more foreign direct investment into its marketplace than India 
does.724 Maybe the willingness of the Chinese Government to offer better taxation 
conditions to foreign firms at the expense of the local firms put China in a better 
position to attract more foreign direct investment.725 In any case, the position China 
has been granted in the global market does affect India's market share in the United 
States and European markets generally,726 inclusive in respect to the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
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In the year 2004, pharmaceutical firms in China held 65 per cent of total sales in 
compared to 77 per cent in India. 727  Although the two countries' pharmaceutical 
research and development capacity is weaker if compared to pharmaceutical 
multinationals, India still holds an advantage compared to China. 728 Only a few firms 
in China are capable of research and development and as statistics show, Chinese 
pharmaceutical firms invest only 2 per cent in research and development in 
comparison to an average investment of 7.7 per cent by Indian firms. 729 If Ranbaxy 
innovated and generic products are activated in the United States and European 
markets, Hisun, a Chinese pharmaceutical firm does not, in addition to the fact that it 
is not capable of innovative activity at all. 730  Nevertheless, China does enjoy a 
comparative advantage to India in regard to biopharmaceutical which is based on 
biological substances instead of chemical, in addition to its market size, which may 
affect India's higher position.731     
 
Moreover, as Palit concerned, India's poor protection of innovative 
pharmaceutical products can add further risks to its continuing partnering with 
pharmaceutical multinationals732 and respectively its growing capacity of research and 
development. 733 Although China has altered its patent laws to answer its obligation to 
enforce the TRIPS Agreements provisions, its enforcement has been weak. 734 
However it still manages to attract more foreign direct investment than India,735 even 
in the pharmaceutical industry spectrum. 736 One explanation can be China's growing 
improvement of its intellectual property rights enforcement 737  and its 9 per cent 
annual economic growth.738   
 
The weaker enforcement of intellectual property in China can be of an advantage 
to India to attract more foreign direct investment. India which is economically 
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compared to China as a rising economic force can use its relatively stronger 
intellectual property rights enforcement, 739  its better spoken English, 740  its better 
chemistry research skills 741  to reduce the 9 per cent gap of foreign investment 
compared to China742 and in particular, in the pharmaceutical technology field. 743 
Once India will complete its patent protection transformation and enables patenting of 
pharmaceutical modified drugs, it will then be considered a much more attractive 
investee.744  
 
As a more attractive investee, the Indian pharmaceutical industry would grow, 
offer larger quantity of innovated based drugs and reduce the patented drug pricing. 
However, India's reluctance to make the needed changes and alteration to its Patent 
Act, as can be learned from the ruling in the Novartis AG v. Union of India,745 
endangers its attractiveness for foreign direct investment by Western pharmaceutical 
multinationals. Hence, this reluctance may deny India to offer the suggested solution 
to high priced patented drugs, using different measures than generics.  
 
The next chapter addresses the importance of India's alteration of its Patent Act to 
include incremental innovation in the scope of patent protection, as the final brick to 
its pharmaceutical powerhouse. In addition to the fact that offering protection of 
pharmaceutical incremental innovation will invite larger investment by 
pharmaceutical multinationals, the chapter reveals the prime role incremental drugs 
innovation has to enlarge the number of products in the marketplace and present the 
opportunity to offer high quantity Indian-innovative based drugs at a lower cost. The 
chapter also addresses the motivation patenting pharmaceutical incremental 
innovation of tropical diseases research as a complementary field to a comprehensive 
healthcare in India.  
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VI PATENTING INCREMENTAL PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION AS THE 
FINAL STEP  
 
While innovation of an entirely new chemical entity or new molecular entity drug 
is a rarity,746 incremental pharmaceutical innovation is the norm.747 It is actually the 
very core of pharmaceutical innovation. 748 Following small and incremental 
innovative steps, the leap towards the next breakthrough drug, for cancer or 
HIV/AIDS for example, could be wide.749 Hence, the pharmaceutical industry finds 
great importance in protecting incremental innovation through patent as it does with 
concerns to new chemical entity drugs.  
 
It cannot be said that this fact was not known to the Indian Parliament when it 
finalised the 2005 amendment to the Patent Act which hardens the terms of 
incremental innovation eligibility of patentability. On the contrary, the Indian 
Parliament was aware to the pharmaceutical industry reliance on incremental 
innovation. This can be learned from reviewing the Parliament discussions on the 
statutory resolution regarding passing of the Patents (Amendment) Bill 2005.750 The 
Parliament was aware that if incremental innovation substances would be eligible for 
patent protection, the local generic pharmaceuticals pool would be substantially 
narrowed as a result. The Indian Parliament tried to justify this enactment as a step 
needed to prevent the patenting of trivial modified drugs, which would have delayed 
the generic version introduction to the marketplace. This phenomenon is commonly 
known as 'evergreening' which is one of the pharmaceutical industry strategies to keep 
its superiority in local and foreign markets as long as possible.751  
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The main concern of the Indian Government was to answer the local population 
growing need of better healthcare which can be answered through better drugs 
accessibility. No one can deny that generics enable better access to drugs through low 
cost. However, and as shown before, relying solely on generics will not bring the 
answer of better healthcare to India in the long term run or allow it to offer low cost – 
patented drug market. Offering protection of pharmaceutical incremental innovation 
may be able to fulfil this end through the intensifying of Indian based product 
competition. Given that India, as Brazil and China, has reached to a point where it can 
enjoy the protection of patent and benefit from intellectual property rights,752 it needs 
to balance this interest with the interest of its growing population to access patented 
drugs. 753 As Dreyfuss stressed, this balance can be reached by promoting the local 
pharmaceutical industry to engage with its feasible level of innovation. 754 Incremental 
innovation as shown earlier in the frame of novel drug delivery system is of a feasible 
level of innovation by the local Indian pharmaceutical industry.    
 
As a key form of pharmaceutical innovation, it can be concluded that patenting 
incremental innovation will also invite more foreign investment to the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry. Western pharmaceutical firms would be more drawn to 
invest in countries which offer patent enforcement on incremental modified drugs. It 
can be further suggested that given to the lower cost entailed in incremental 
innovation research and development,755 Indian firms which are able to engage in 
pharmaceutical incremental innovation would direct their research to answer local 
needs for drugs, not only foreign's. However, without the promise of patent, the 
industry is not likely to enlarge, innovative capable Indian firms would continue their 
research on "global diseases" and the prospect of offering low cost patented drug 
market and better healthcare prospect to the Indian population would not be formed as 
possible. Without local safe ground of patent, local firms would not be engaging with 
innovation to answer local needs.  
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The support in a wider patent enforcement in India does not suggest that generics 
should be completely outlawed. Generics production at the end of the patent term 
protection is a major player in the competition arena which contributes to the 
reduction of drugs pricing. 756  However, enlarging the generic production on the 
account of innovation, can risk the Indian population healthcare for the limitation it 
would place on its enlarged innovative capacity and as suggested earlier, prevent the 
utilisation of patent to offer drugs in low cost.  
 
The first section of the chapter reviews the competitive edge pharmaceutical 
incremental innovation can introduce to the Indian marketplace, as well as the 
possibility to engage the local industry on research on tropical diseases. As shown 
earlier, pharmaceutical incremental innovation is a matter of modification of existing 
drugs.757 It can offer different therapeutic solutions to one health condition through 
different versions of safety, dosing, equivalency758 ones if patented, can enlarge the 
competition in the marketplace and potentially influence on patented drugs pricing. 
The more drugs available to treat one health condition, the lower the prices of the 
drugs would be.759 Nevertheless, the Indian Government does not seem to find any 
comfort in this prospect. It does not seem to be open to it.  
 
The second section reviews both the legislator and the judicial inflexible 
perspective of patenting pharmaceuticals as a barrier of drugs accessibility, which can 
only be resolved through generics. This untrusting preposition of patenting 
pharmaceuticals not only implies of a non compatible scheme to the TRIPS 
Agreement, it also prevents the patentability of incremental innovation and with it the 
possibility to offer low cost patented drugs aside to low cost generics. 
Notwithstanding the potential contribution of patenting incremental pharmaceuticals 
to introduce a new era of low cost patented drugs, it will not be seen, not only in the 
long term. Thus, and in a case of an immediate need to access drugs, India is 
recommended to practice the different flexibilities exists in its Patent Act to enable 
legal generic production of patented drugs. One possibility is through the use of the 
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Indian extensive mechanism of compulsory licensing as suggested in the third section 
of the chapter.  
 
A. Patenting Pharmaceutical Incremental Innovation – a Prospect of a Better 
Healthcare 
1. Price reducing competition   
 
As reviewed in details in the third chapter, incremental development can offer 
vary optional drugs to treat one health condition. It can offer better tolerability 
chances for patients and even a drug with fewer side effects compared to the original 
chemical form.760 Through multiple advanced ways to consume a drug, incremental 
drugs can be perceived as fitting to the different consumer individuals. Respectively 
with vary therapeutic options to treat one health condition, incremental innovation 
promises the establishment of larger and a competitive pharmaceutical marketplace, 
one if implemented in India would be able to offer low cost patented drugs.761 This 
truth lies on several levels.  
 
As stated by Wertheimer, Levy and O`Connor "the availability of multiple 
medications within a class can be expected to increase competition on price among 
agents within the class. This is true for almost all goods and services, not just 
pharmaceuticals".762 
 
India is no stranger to the process of incremental innovation. India's speciality in 
incremental innovation is given in the form of novel drug delivery system. 763 This 
system offers new versions of original drugs with better administration, better chances 
of tolerability of the drug, with fewer side effects and respectively a wider range of 
therapeutic solution options.764 A study of the benefits of the novel drug delivery 
system showed that in addition to the economic benefits, the variety in therapeutic 
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options to treat one health condition can reach to a large variety of patients and save 
the lives of tens of millions of people.765   
 
The Indian pharmaceutical firm Ranbaxy showed substantial success in this level 
of innovation in the export market. 766  Ranbaxy was able to improve the drug 
Ciprofloxacin, originally produced by the German pharmaceutical firm Bayer AG.767 
Instead of three dosages per day formulation, Ranbaxy succeeded in formulating once 
a day option. Bayer AG which realised the importance of the change Ranbaxy made 
to the drug, entered into a licensing contract with Ranbaxy and in addition to a US$10 
million payment, Bayer AG paid US$65 million to Ranbaxy Laboratories over a 
period of four years.768 Although the marketing rights were in the hands of Bayer AG, 
India did keep the marketing rights to distribute the drug locally and in countries of 
the former Soviet Union, where Ranbaxy Laboratories enjoyed from marketing 
rights.769   
 
The option to alter a drug's therapeutic profile in effectiveness, dosing schedules 
and delivery systems 770  has also expanded the sub-sectors in the pharmaceutical 
technology field and expended it to biotechnology drugs and generics. 771  With 
expanded therapeutic options to one disease, incremental innovation has the potential 
to offer an enlarged competitive edge in the practicing pharmaceutical industry which 
would be able to impact on drugs pricing. As Lu and Comanor found, greater volume 
of substitutive drugs of the originals, which can be the right phrase for incremental 
drug development, would stop manufacturers' tendency to increase the price of the 
original drugs and even lower them. 772  In other words, if introduced in greater 
volume, modified patented drugs can impact through competition on the setting of 
drugs pricing. The larger competition there is in the market, the lower prices of the 
drugs would be to enable the innovator with market superiority.  
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Given the growing consumer market in India as noted in the second chapter, and 
the prospect of the growing volume of Indian pharmaceutical firms, the option for 
pharmaceutical firms to compete with each other in such an expended way has the 
potential to offer the local population a better prospect of drugs accessibility through 
patent. Needless to mention that the low production cost of the novel drug delivery 
system research and development process would initially offer the drug in low cost, 
even prior to the impact of the suggested extensive competition.773    
 
However, the contemporary innovative activity in the Indian local industry, cannot 
yet promise this option. Although the Indian industry has developed during the years, 
it is still a relatively small innovative industry. The number of the Indian patented 
drugs in the United States market shows the small innovative activity, even in 
incremental innovation. In 2007 there were only 312 Indian pharmaceutical patents 
holdings in the patent office of the United States,774 which represented mostly by new 
development of generics, in compare to new chemical entity drugs or their 
incremental modification.775  
 
This is to say that even the incremental innovation practice, which is the very 
basic core of innovation in the pharmaceutical technology field, is not much practiced 
by the Indian pharmaceutical industry. The fact that Ranbaxy, one of the top 10 
pharmaceutical firms in India held the most of the aforementioned patents can imply 
of the little number of participants in the innovative activity within the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry.776 This is to show of the unprepared Indian pharmaceutical 
industry to offer low cost patented drugs through increased innovative activity, a 
status which can be remedy with growing foreign direct investment as suggested in 
the previous chapter. In this respect given the link between foreign direct investment 
and patent, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, it can be concluded therefore 
that without patenting pharmaceutical incremental innovation, such an investment 
would not be offered or such a solution of low cost patented drugs in India.    
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In the absence of patent protection of pharmaceutical incremental innovation, it is 
unlikely that the Western industry would further invest and collaborate with Indian 
pharmaceutical firms and as a result, the prospect of evolvement and enlargement of 
the local industry to establish influential competition would diminish. Consequently, 
the prospect of offering low cost patented drugs as an additional option to low cost 
generic drugs would not be consolidated.   
 
2. Tropical diseases research 
 
A second avenue to the importance of patenting incremental innovation in India 
lies in its encouragement of the local industry engagement in research of local 
diseases. The lack of incremental innovation protection in India, not surprisingly 
pushes Indian pharmaceutical firms to find a safe harbour for their innovation in 
Western markets. In other words, under a larger risk of generics copying, Indian 
pharmaceutical firms which are equipped with innovative skills, tend to engage with 
innovative activity to find cures for "global diseases" and neglect the research on 
tropical diseases.  
 
The Patent Act in the United States for example offers protection to whom that 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement substances. 777  In Pfizer v Apotex, the Court of 
Appeal held that the test of obviousness lies only on reasonable expectation of 
success in compare to guarantee778 . Hence if incremental drug for example can 
suggest of an expected healing contribution, it can be patented in the United States 
market.779 Obviously under the flexible criteria of patentability in the United States, 
incremental drugs can be commonly patented. In another case, Aventis v Lupin, the 
Court of Appeal held that the patentability criteria of obviousness in a situation 
“where the prior art gives the reason or motivation to make the claimed compositions, 
creates a prima facie case of obviousness.”780 The latter case also shows the inviting 
platform for the Indian pharmaceutical capable firms to conduct research and 
development in respect to "global diseases", for their incremental innovation would be 
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easily protected in the lucrative market of the United States. A necessary result would 
be the neglect of research on tropical diseases, a prime death cause in India.  
 
The same methodology is being practiced in Europe as under the European patent 
regime, any development of a completely new medicine to modified drugs of known 
formulations can be patented.781 With such an inviting platform, it is not surprising 
why the Indian innovative products are channelled to answer Western health needs in 
comparison to local needs. Needless to say that if this course will not change, it is 
unlikely that the spectrum of tropical diseases characterised the developing world 
would be narrowed.  
 
As stressed earlier, the neglected field of research tropical diseases by the Western 
pharmaceutical industry lives the responsibility to find cures to these diseases on 
developing countries. As long as the Indian Government would continue to exclude 
and harden the patentability criteria of pharmaceutical incremental innovation, it is 
unlikely that Western firms would see in the local industry as a potential investee. 
Accordingly, without the prospect of developing the research capacity, the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry would not have the needed tools to conduct an independent 
research and development of drugs to treat tropical diseases. The necessary 
conclusion is therefore that without enforcing wide patent protection on 
pharmaceutical innovation, the local healthcare prospectus would not improve.  
 
Chaudhuri however does not see the economic benefits of patenting 
pharmaceutical products in India. He based his conclusion mainly on the economic 
aspect. Given that the Indian firms' prospect to return their investment in the process 
of research and development is higher in Western markets,782 Chaudhuri does not see 
what economic justifications there are to enforce patent protection on pharmaceutical 
products.783 In this respect, the promise of patent protection by the West will motivate 
local Indian firms to conduct research and development in both new chemical entity 
                                               
781
 A report by the EU working Group on Pharmaceuticals and public health noted in its 28 March 2000 
report to the High-level Committee on health for policies and Actions in the framework of the EU 
treaty of Amsterdam www.ec.europa.eu/health/ph_overview/Documents/ke02_en.pdf (30 October 
2009) 
782
 See generally Chaudhuri, above n 176, 5. 
783
 Ibid.  
 125 
drugs and incremental drugs.784 In other words, under this reality, the absence of local 
patent enforcement on product in India would not have made any difference. 
Regardless to the fact that Chaudhuri seems to neglect the spectrum of healthcare, his 
conclusion is not as accurate in the economic spectrum either.  
 
India will not stay a developing country for all times. In practice India is a newly 
industrialised country nearing to a developed country.785 The Indian market is one of 
the most rapid growing markets in the world.786 Additionally as the dollar's value 
proved to be unstable, the future promised benefits may arrive from the local market 
more than the Westerns. 787  India's growing economy and strong technological 
infrastructure promise the Indian marketplace to become a more lucrative market in 
the near future,788 which would be able to answer the need of the local industry to 
return its investment in the pharmaceutical research and development.789  
 
Basheer and Reddy pointed at another explanation which can contradict the logic 
of Chaudhuri's view. According to the Indian Patent Act, incremental innovations 
have to answer additional factors so that pharmaceutical incremental innovation for 
example, can be eligible for patent protection. It can be said that the Act has enlarged 
the criteria of inventive step, much more than needed, or even allowed by the TRIPS 
Agreement.790 The main element in the Act in this respect is the enhanced efficacy 
modified incremental substances would have to show, as a prior examination of 
eligibility to patent.791 India is the only country to the World Trade Organisation 
which enforces such strict criteria of incremental innovation patentability.792  
 
As the authors pointed out, without an international harmonised patent protection 
scope, there is a possibility that countries would take the same measures towards 
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Indian pharmaceutical innovation and exclude them from patent protection.793 This 
scenario would diminish any chance for the Indian industry to recoup its investment 
in richer foreign markets. There is a chance that if India continues with this route, 
Western pharmaceutical firms would despair from its weaker pharmaceutical 
patenting regime and leave the local industry with its innovative paralysis, without 
collaborating with local pharmaceutical firms. Under this scenario, it is doubtful that 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry would advance enough to offer better prospect of 
drugs accessibility to the local and foreign population through patent enforcement.    
 
Pharmaceutical incremental innovation is of great benefit for the local population 
and the foreign poorer population. It offers vast therapeutic options to treat one 
disease. It can offer different dosing, versions with better safety merits and versions of 
drugs with fewer side effects. Clearly it enlarges the possibilities in the market and 
has the potential to increase the competition immensely. It only needs to be 
encouraged in India. However, without offering patent enforcement of pharmaceutical 
incremental innovation, generics would be the only low cost drugs available in the 
market.  
 
Without patenting pharmaceutical incremental innovation, Western 
pharmaceutical firms would not invest in the local market, the local industry would 
not progress, it would not enlarge and the concept of offering low cost patented drugs 
would stay only an unfounded notion, as well as an activated industry in research of 
tropical diseases.  
 
While the benefits of patenting incremental innovation is clear, it is still of great 
importance to question the Indian Parliament rational in placing rigid criteria of patent 
eligibility on incremental innovation. In this respect the next part of the chapter 
examines the conflict between evergreening and incremental innovation, together 
with the Indian legislator and judicator poor attempts to balance between the two 
which results with the un-patentable incremental pharmaceutical innovation. 
Respectively the implications of the compliance of the Indian Patent Act to the TRIPS 
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Agreement are another mandatory analysis the next part of the chapter reviews. Only 
after further observations of these matters, one can finalise the legitimacy and the 
necessity of the Indian patentability mechanism of incremental innovation and the 
impact it has on the emergence of low cost patented drug market in India.  
 
B. The Paralysed Indian Pharmaceutical Patent Mechanism 
1. The paralysing fear of evergreening 
 
Although incremental innovation promises extensive therapeutic advances and can 
lead to the next breakthrough drug, it is its minor form India fears from. Seeking to 
extend market exclusivity under low investment, at the end of the patent term 
protection on a drug, the pharmaceutical industry tends to ask for second and third 
patent protection on trivial modification versions of the original drug. 794  This 
phenomenon is what commonly known as "evergreening".795 Evergreening a drug can 
cover new uses of the original drug or new chemical forms derived from the original 
drug, manufacturing processes and even colour. 796 
 
Modifying or changing a drug's patterns minimally is a level of innovation India 
wishes to exclude from protection as many other countries do. India does not want to 
grant the original inventor an additional 20 years of market exclusivity on almost the 
same drug as the original and delay the entree of the generic version. In contrast to 
incremental innovation which has an important scientific and therapeutic contribution 
to the public health as detailed, the triviality of evergreening means that it does not.797 
In respect to the importance of abolishing protection from this minor level of 
innovation, the Indian Government had enforced rigorous terms of incremental 
innovation patentability in Section 3(d) to the Patent Act.798  
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According to the Act, if a new form of an existing known substance, which can be 
a derivative of an existing drug, cannot show enhanced efficacy, it will not be eligible 
for patent protection. Even new uses of a drug, according to the Act, cannot be 
patented if it cannot answer the aforementioned criterion.799 In respect to incremental 
innovation, often pharmaceutical incremental innovation cannot show an enhance 
efficacy as demanded by the Act, but still hold colossal therapeutic merits which need 
to be encourage through patent protection enforcement. However, under the Indian 
Act, the latter will not necessarily be eligible for protection and as a result, would not 
be introduced to the Indian marketplace.   
 
One cannot avoid asking whether there is a real necessity in preventing 
evergreening. Although patenting evergreened drug can delay the introduction of its 
generic form, it does not prevent the generic production of the original drug, which is 
more important for use than the secondary trivially changed drug. 800 It is worthwhile 
to stress that patenting a new form of a drug, the "second" drug, does not revive the 
patent protection of the "first" drug.801 Thus generic firms would be able to access the 
first drug, copy it and sell it in low cost. 802 However, the fear from evergreening is 
not completely baseless. Evergreening can modify a drug and introduce new form 
which is needed in low cost. It can also encourage a behaviour of misuse or 
mischievous of the exclusivity right promised to the patentee and prevents the local 
industry control over its own marketplace and the enjoyment of productive products 
in the marketplace. Clearly the latter scenario transgresses the core purpose of patent 
enforcement to encourage useful technoliges introduction to the protecting 
marketplace.   
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The essence of patent protection as part of the large scope of intellectual property 
rights is to encourage beneficial innovations for society and in regards to 
pharmaceuticals, to encourage therapeutically productive drugs innovation for the 
public domain.803 Granting pharmaceutical firms with patent protection for minimal 
developed drugs does not answer patent's enforcement agenda.804 With low standard 
of patentability, pharmaceutical firms would not have to invest much in research and 
development in order to enjoy from a promised income. In this respect pharmaceutical 
firms will not be motivated to make much effort to invent therapeutically beneficial 
drugs. They will gain their market exclusivity regardless.805  
 
However, although the prevention of evergreening is a common goal for all 
countries, only India uses extensive measures to prevent this phenomenon. Unless the 
secondary derivative drug would be significantly more efficient therapeutically, the 
drug would not be eligible for patent protection. However, in practice, pharmaceutical 
incremental innovation cannot answer the Indian Patents Act demand of therapeutic 
efficacy.806 Although under the mechanism introduced by Section 3(d) India succeeds 
in preventing the patenting of evergreened drugs, it also succeeds to prevent the 
patenting of therapeutically important incremental innovated drug which can deter the 
notion of low cost patented drugs as suggested.  
 
It can be clearly seen from the extreme measure the Indian Parliament took that 
excluding evergreening was not of a first priority to India. Firstly, evergreened drugs 
would not have caused barriers to access drugs for the possibility to generically 
produce their original forms (although it would have reduced the motivation to 
innovate more complex drugs). Secondly, Section 3(d) amendment was not really a 
case of necessity given to the enhanced economic and technological criteria terms 
exists in the Indian Patents Act to strain the eligible pharmaceutical innovation for 
patent protection. According to the Act, unless an invention shows technical 
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advancement and significant economic contribution to the market, it will not be 
considered as answering the criteria of inventive step.807 
 
Hence, through the justification of evergreening, India's Government has 
narrowed the patentability of large share of pharmaceutical innovation to enable large 
share of generic production. India's Government made its choice. However, it can be 
said that it was not an optimal choice from all angles for it excluded pharmaceutical 
incremental innovation from patent protection, together with the promise of forming 
low cost patented drug marketplace in India.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a need to differentiate between incremental developments 
which hold therapeutic promises to the sick, to an evergreened drug which does 
not. 808  However a proper differentiation would not be one which excludes the 
protection of incremental innovation for it will hinder the prospect of Indian 
innovative pharmaceutical industry evolvement. The full reliance on generics as the 
ultimate route to access drugs, nonetheless, brought the Indian Parliament to adopt 
this exact measure and the Indian courts to rely on health care considerations as prime 
considerations to allow a rights' holder to enjoy from full exclusivity position in the 
marketplace. Needless to say that India's choice to narrow the scope of patentability, 
would not sketch it as the potential investee and further attract vast economical and 
political ramifications which may not contribute to the formation of low cost patented 
drug marketplace in India.   
 
2. The un- patentable incremental pharmaceutical innovation 
(a) The legislative framework 
 
The TRIPS Agreement opens with member countries' legislative autonomy in 
implementing the various obligations under its frame,809 in accordance to their health 
and social needs.810  
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Article 7 states that the enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement provisions should be 
done "in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare…" 
Article 8 states that "members may… adopt measures necessary to protect public 
health and nutrition and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance 
to their socio-economic and technological development…" 
 
In respect to these measures, India used the freedom it had to define its own 
version of patentable subject matter as prescribed by Article 27(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement: "…patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application".811Respectively, the relevant provisions 
in the Indian Patents Act are as follows:  
 
"Pharmaceutical 
substance" 
"Any new entity involving one or more inventive steps"812 
"New 
invention" 
"Any invention or technology which has not been anticipated by 
publication in any document or used in the country or elsewhere 
in the world before the date of filing of patent application with 
complete specification"813 
"Inventive step" "A feature of an invention that involves technical advance as 
compared to the existing knowledge or having economic 
significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to 
a person skilled in the art".814 
 
Given to the high standard of novelty, it is unlikely that an evergreened drug 
would be patentable. 815  This truth is especially relevant given the lack of 
interpretation of "technical advance" and the "economic significance" criteria in the 
inventive step term. 816  Once an incremental pharmaceutical substance is involved 
with technical advancement or economic significance, which is not obvious to a 
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researcher in its field and was not used in India before the time of the patent 
application submission, it will be patentable. It seems that in accordance to the Indian 
criteria as given in the aforementioned provisions, an evergreened drug is not possible 
for patenting for it is not likely to answer either term from the aforementioned 
stated.817  
 
However, abolishing the phenomenon of evergreening was only the surface cover 
of the Indian Parliament. The prior consideration was to widen the generic production 
as much as possible by excluding the patenting of incremental pharmaceutical 
innovation. The Act achieved that exact purpose. It seems that the Indian Parliament 
did not want to leave loose ends and allow any modified drugs to enjoy exclusive 
standee in the marketplace, not for trivial modified drugs (evergreening) or for more 
sophisticated modified drug.  
 
The true intent as can be concluded from reviewing the wording of Section 3(d) 
was to narrow reduce the patentable drugs pool in the marketplace and allow high 
production of generics. According to Section 3(d) the following inventions are not 
patentable: 
  
The mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the 
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new 
property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or 
apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new 
reactant.  
Explanation - For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, 
pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other 
derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they 
differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy. 
 
In respect to pharmaceutical innovations, all new forms of a known substance, or 
a known chemical compound, which already enjoyed from patent protection, or new 
use or property of that substance will not be eligible for patent protection unless they 
show enhancement in their efficacy. The Section clearly intended to address mainly 
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pharmaceutical innovations for the specific use of chemical and bio-organisms 
substances as the basis form to examine incremental pharmaceutical innovation 
eligibility to patent protection. 818  The use of these substances teaches of the 
discriminatory attitude the Indian Parliament took in respect to the pharmaceutical 
technology field which was even ratified by the Indian Court.   
 
Another element which can prove of the Parliament discriminatory behaviour 
towards pharmaceutical innovations lies in the source the Indian Parliament used in 
the wording of Section 3(d). In the process of constructing Section 3(d), the 
Parliament used similar provisions to the European Directive dealing with a generic 
drug safety regulation, as in Article 10(2)(b): 819   
 
A medicinal product which has the same qualitative and quantitative composition in active 
substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the reference medicinal product, and whose 
bioequivalence with the reference medicinal product has been demonstrated by appropriate 
bioavailability studies. The different salts, esters, ethers, isomers, mixtures of isomers, 
complexes or derivatives of an active substance shall be considered to be the same active 
substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to safety and/or efficacy. 
In such cases, additional information providing proof of the safety and/or efficacy of the 
various salts, esters or derivatives of an authorised active substance must be supplied by the 
applicant. 
 
This way, by using the generic regulatory test to externalise patent protection 
from incremental pharmaceutical innovation, the Indian Parliament has expended the 
potential of incremental modified drugs innovation for legal generic copying. This 
truth is mostly emphasised in the context of the Madras court in the case of Novartis 
AG v Union of India ruling.820 In this case, the Madras court analysed whether Glivec, 
a drug for Leukaemia produced by the Swiss Pharmaceutical firm Novartis, answered 
the "efficacy" term worded in Section 3(d) of the Act.821  
 
                                               
818
 See Rai, above n 458, 82. 
819
 Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 amending 
Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use [2004] 
OJ L 136/ 34, 10(2)(b) emphasis added. 
820
 See Novartis AG v Union of India and Others, above n 746.   
821
 Ibid, para 13. 
 134 
According to the Madras High Court, the term efficacy has to be interpreted as 
therapeutic efficacy.822 Hence, if a derivative of a patented substance would not show 
enhanced therapeutic efficacy compare to its original form, it will not be eligible for 
patent protection. 823  Although a therapeutic analysis is due to drugs marketing 
regulatory test, as safety, the Madras court set it to be a direct part to the patentability 
criteria, sentencing many incremental chemical compounds and their derivatives to an 
automatic generic production and narrowing the scope of drugs eligibility for patent 
protection. 824  
 
Usually, in the pre-clinical trials stage, pharmaceutical firms do not have any 
statistics on the therapeutic efficacy of the chemical compound. At this stage a 
pharmaceutical firm only holds the chemical compound it assembled. 825  The 
information on a chemical compound efficacy is usually revealed in Stage III of the 
clinical trials, while testing the drug on thousands of participants in the clinical 
trials.826 The fact that the invention is incremental, only adds to the uncertainty of its 
efficacy level in the point of applying for patent protection. 827 Moreover incremental 
innovation does not always consist with significant therapeutic enhancement. It can 
offer better administrative routes, less side effects and even better bioavailability828 
and answer the criteria of new and inventive step of the Indian definition. However, it 
may not answer to the extent proof of efficacy demanded by Section 3(d). 829 
Consequently, these criteria will automatically bring to the rejection of most 
incremental drugs’ patent applications in India830  and as a result, enlarge the generic 
drugs pool and hinder patent enforcement.  
 
Respectively following to this discussion, the necessary conclusion is that under 
Section 3(d) terms, the only patentable forms of innovation are new 
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chemical/molecule entities.831 Only new chemical entities would be able to show such 
an efficacy in the time of applying for patent protection prior to the conduct of clinical 
trials. 832  The strict criteria added to the Act, does not leave room for other 
interpretations: pharmaceutical incremental innovation would not be patented in India.  
 
India is the only country to apply such strict criteria to examine an invention 
inventive step/non-obviousness to question the eligibility of incremental innovation as 
patentable. Under this reality, local Indian firms would not be motivated to innovate 
and introduce new therapeutic solutions to the population and most importantly, the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry would not invite foreign direct investment or trade, to 
establish larger innovative industry.833 Furthermore, Western firms would not wish to 
invest in the Indian pharmaceutical industry and consequently, the prospect of 
enlarging the Indian patented drugs market would only stay in theory as well as 
introducing low cost patented drugs to the poorer population.   
 
Parenthetically, even the limitation the Section 3(d) has placed in the form of new 
uses is of some illogical rational to the Indian Parliament agenda to patent entirely 
new inventions as the new chemical entity drugs. As rightly stated by Basheer, if the 
Indian Parliament intention was to heighten the standard of obviousness, to weed out 
evergreened drugs, a new use for a new form is much more innovative than showing 
an increase efficacy of a known substance.834 Thus in order to ensure that only new 
drugs would be patentable as new chemical entity drugs, India had to exclude even 
pharmaceuticals with enhanced therapeutic efficacy. Only the latter option would 
have promised the largest group of generics production.  
 
It is most important to take the needed measures to protect the local public health 
and promise better access to drugs. Health infrastructures are of a country's great 
foundation and it is one of the prime rights protected in the Indian Constitution.835 
                                               
831
 See R A Mashelkar, Chairman, Director General Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 
Report of the Technical Expert Group on Patent Law Issues (Prepared for the Indian Government, 
2009) [Mashelkar Report/Group]. For furrther review of the Mashelkar Report see part VI B 3 
Implications on the international spectrum: the compatibility with the TRIPS Agreement.   
832
 See Basheer, above n 817, 29. See also Basheer, Reddy, above n 765, 232. 
833
 See Rai, above n 458, 81. 
834
 See Basheer, above n 817, 24-25. 
835
 The Constitution of India, art 21. 
 136 
However, excluding new pharmaceutical innovation as incremental would not assist 
India to achieve this end in full. Yes generics can offer low cost drugs however, 
public health in the form of drugs accessibility, cannot be one of the patentability 
criterion as implemented indirectly by the Indian legislator and judicator. It would not 
allow the Indian Government to answer public need of better healthcare as patent 
enforcement can, through the encouragement of innovation.  
 
As noted before, the judicial tribunal applies therapeutic meaning to the term 
"efficacy" in Section 3(d),836  which substantially hardens the possibility to patent 
pharmaceutical incremental innovation now that an incremental modified drug has to 
show significant healing chances. Moreover, the prioritisation of public interest to 
access drugs has also blurred the judicial tribunal from the significance of patenting 
pharmaceutical innovation. As shown next, whether an incremental drug answers the 
criteria of patent as detailed in the Indian Patents Act, the veto power to grant a right's 
holder the standee deserved in the market is to be resolved on the grounds of the 
public convenience to access drugs. Needless to say that in respect to the general low 
purchasing power in India thus interpretation would deny pharmaceutical firms from 
enjoying the rights of a patentee in India. Instead of using patent as a tool of ample 
commoditisation of incremental drugs as a way to reduce prices, the Indian 
Parliament chose the generic production alone.  
 
The next section examines these measures as enforced by the Indian judicial 
tribunal in two leading cases, the Novartis AG v Union of India837 and Roche v Cipla 
Ltd.838  The two cases exemplify the rigid potential result of Section's 3(d) rigid 
criteria to the fulfillment of a large Indian innovative pharmaceutical industry. In both 
of the cases, the courts denied the pharmaceutical firms Novartis and Roche to enjoy 
from a rightly deserved protection of patent and its enforcement due to strict 
interpretation of Section 3(d) and the obligation to supply low cost drugs to the 
public. Criticising this reality product, the next section shows the inability of 
pharmaceutical firms to enjoy from protection of their costly inventions in India and 
thus the potential inability of the Indian pharmaceutical industry to introduce Indian 
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low cost patented drugs, market under the remaining of Section 3 (d) in the India 
Patents Act.   
 
(b) The judicial commentary  
(i) Novartis AG v Union of India  
 
In 1960 Nowel and Hungerford discovered a generic mutation of Chronic 
Myelogenaus Leukemia (CML) a form of cancer.839 A potential drug "Imatinib free 
base"840 was found in 1990.841 In 1993, Novartis a Swiss pharmaceutical firm842 filed 
a patent covering this discovery in various countries. 843  After further research, 
Imatinib free base was converted to particular salt form “Imatinib mesylate”. 844  
Eventually from the Imatinib mesylate” Novartis found a stable polymorphic 
(organism) form – “beta crystalline” which than became what is known as the 
Glivec/Gleevec drug.845 It can be understood that the Imatinib mesylate form was 
incrementally improved to “beta crystalline”, a polymorphic form, which was the 
basis of the firms’ patent application. Novartis claimed that the “beta crystalline” 
form of Imatinib mesylate is more effective than the Imatinib free base, for its better 
absorption in the blood (bioavailability).846  
 
The drug's therapeutic contribution was immense and raised some praises on 
Glivec as the "wave of the future",847 or the "magic bullet" to fight CML.848 One 
patient even said: "one minute I was looking at death. The next I was looking at my 
whole life in front of me".849  No one could dispute over the therapeutic efficacy 
Glivec offered the world. To date, Novartis enjoys from protection of Glivec in 
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almost 40 countries.850 Given to the inability to apply for patent protection before 
2005 in India, Novartis submitted its application on Glivec to the “mailbox” in 
India. 851  Although the Indian Controller General granted Novartis with exclusive 
marketing rights over Glivec, generic firms counterfeited the drug. 852  However, 
further tries by generic firms were stopped by the Madras court in the case of Novartis 
AG v Adarsh Pharma.853  
 
Nevertheless, in another petition submitted by Novartis concerning Glivec, 
Novartis's exclusive marketing rights were taken away on the grounds that the drug 
was a life saving product and that given to its being an imported drug, and its high 
price, there was a risk that potential trade disruptions would minimise the distribution 
of the essential drug in India.854 In other words, the public interest and the public 
convenience to access the drug were of the concluding considerations of the Madras 
High Court to exclude the patentee's legal rights of market exclusivity. In another 
case, Intas Labs Pvt Ltd v Novartis AG, the Madras High Court set the importance of 
the public interest as one of the main consideration in the process of granting 
exclusive marketing rights to an innovator, especially when concerning the supply of 
a medicine such as CML.855  
 
In respect to the patent application itself, in 2005, when the mailbox was opened, 
the Assistant Controller of Patents in India rejected Novartis's patent application.856 
The main ground for the dismissal was based on the drug lacking novelty and 
significant enhanced efficacy as obliged in Section 3(d).857 The Assistant Controller 
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was not convinced that Glivec's 30 per cent improvement of bioavailability showed 
any significant efficacy as demanded by the Act. 858  
 
Novartis submitted its appeal on the Assistant Controller’s decision to the Madras 
High Court.859 Novartis claimed that Section 3(d) was incompatible to the TRIPS 
Agreement and to Article 14 of the Indian Constitution which ordered of equality 
before the law. 860  In respect to the compatibility of Section 3(d) to the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Madras High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to examine the 
Section compatibility to an international treaty.861  In regards to the constitutional 
aspect of Section 3(d), Novartis claimed that the Section violated the primary right of 
equality before the law of India as deterred in Article 14 of the Indian constitution.862 
Novartis claimed that as Section 3(d) does not simplify what would be considered as 
"enhancement of known efficacy" or "differ significantly in properties with regard to 
efficacy", the Section is to be treated as unconstitutional as it is arbitrary. Further 
more, Novartis also based the latter claim on the grounds that Section 3(d) offers vast 
discretion to the patent office to decide what would be efficient or not.863  
 
The Madras High Court denied Novartis's two claims in respect to Section's 3(d) 
compatibility to the Indian Constitution. The High Court held that the mere fact that a 
provision is arbitrary or vague cannot elevate it as unconstitutional.864 A statutory has 
to be examined in full on the basis of its background, and in respect to Section 3(d), 
the fact that it was worded to try to abolish the phenomenon of evergreening, cannot 
designate it as an arbitrary provision.865  Also by examining Section 3(d) legislation 
background and the fact that its purpose was to abolish the phenomenon of 
evergreening, the High Court found that the Section cannot be considered as vague or 
arbitrary. 866 As the High Court held, the prior order of Section 3(d) was to “provide 
easy access to the citizens of this country to life saving drugs and to discharge the 
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constitutional obligation of providing good health care to its citizens”.867Clearly this 
sort of justifications of Section 3(d) cannot encourage innovation and introduce new 
technologies to the market. In other words, this sort of justifications would not allow 
an increased competition in the marketplace of patented incremental drugs.  
 
In respect to the interpretation of the term "efficacy" in Section 3(d), the High 
Court applied a therapeutic meaning. Hence, a derivative form of a drug has to show 
significant healing prospectus of a disease and positive affect on the human body.868 
The High Court did found that the Section interpretation referred to all fields of 
technology, however, it still based the right interpretation on a medical therapeutic 
contribution.869The High Court did acknowledge that the purpose of the Section's 
wording lied in respect to pharmaceutical innovation.870 In other words, the High 
Court directly forced unsupportive interpretation to the patenting of pharmaceutical 
incremental innovation. Although incremental pharmaceutical innovation can offer 
vast therapeutic opportunities to the sick population, they do not always show 
significant efficacy as demanded by the Indian Act.  
 
As shown before, in the stage of applying for patent, pharmaceutical firms do not 
hold vast information of the efficacy of a chemical compound. This information 
usually gathered at the post stage of clinical trials. Therefore, the demand from a 
pharmaceutical firm to show a chemical compound significant therapeutic efficacy as 
a preliminary term of patent eligibility cannot be answered. Consequently, lacking the 
possibility to enjoy from patent protection on their costly products, pharmaceutical 
multinationals would soon stop to perceive India as an uninviting investee of foreign 
direct investment, a reality which would directly impact on allocating a solution of 
low cost patented drug marketplace in India.  
 
In light of the court decision, Novartis's claims were transferred to the Indian 
Intellectual Property Appellant Board. This organisation was set up to decide on 
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appeals submitted on intellectual property rights authorisation ruling across India.871 
In a recent hearing in the case of Novartis v The Union of India and others held by the 
Intellectual Property Appellant Board, the tribunal found that Novartis's appeal ought 
to be denied.872 Although the Appellant Board found that Glivec answered the terms 
of "new" "inventive step" and utilisation under the Indian Patents Act, 873 it did not 
find that Glivec's increased blood absorption (bioavailability) of 30 per cent is as 
significant as demanded by Section 3(d).874 In accordance to the Intellectual Property 
Appellant Board, Novartis has brought its claims to the Supreme Court of India.875 At 
the time of submission of this thesis, there was not a decision made by the Indian 
Supreme Court.  
 
Nevertheless, although a final decision was not yet given in respect to Novartis's 
application, the aforementioned tribunals' decisions, the Intellectual Property 
Appellant Board and the court show of the general approach India takes on the issue 
of patenting incremental innovated drugs. This approach does not imply of the future 
enlargement of the patented drug marketplace in India or the option to utilise patent 
enforcement as a tool to reduce drugs pricing.  
 
Nevertheless, there is still room for a change. As India learned in the past it had to 
join the international community to enforce patent protection on pharmaceutical 
products, it may soon learn the importance of full compliancy enforcement, one which 
includes the patenting of pharmaceutical incremental innovation. India may waken to 
the possibilities patenting pharmaceutical incremental innovation as the drug Glivec, 
can offer to the public improved healthcare. India may waken to the importance of 
patenting the very core innovation in the pharmaceutical technology field as 
incremental to invite high inflows of foreign direct investment. India may waken to 
the possibility patenting incremental innovation can offer to the enlargement of the 
local competition to reduce drugs pricing. Only time will show if India will adopt the 
                                               
871
 See Indian Intellectual Property Appellant Board www.ipab.it.nic.in (accessed 13 October 2009). 
872
 See Novartis AG vUnion of India (26 June 2009) Intellectual Property Appellate Board  
 M P Nos 1 to 5/2007 in TA/1 to 5/2007/PT/CH, M P No 33/2008 IN TA/1/2007/PT/CH, TA/1 TO 
5/2007/ PT/CH, para 11.    
873
 Ibid, para 10 (ii) - (iii). 
874
 Ibid, para 10 (v). 
875
 See Novaris Challenges Gleevec Patent Rejection in the Supreme Court 
www.lawyerscollective.org/node/1042 (14 October 2009). The aforementioned article offer 
attachement to the complete text of Novartis's Special Leave Petition.  
 142 
patent mechanism to offer better healthcare future for its population. Unfortunately 
India has not yet wakened to this possibility, as demonstrated in the recent case of 
Roche v Cipla.876  
 
(ii) Roche v Cipla Ltd 
 
F Hoffman – La Roche877, submitted a claim before the Delhi High Court against 
the Indian generic pharmaceutical firm Cipla for infringing Roche’s patent on 
Erlotinib granted in 2007,878 a drug for lung cancer called Tarceva by its marketing 
name.879 As Roche claimed Tarceva as a pioneer drug (in different from incremental), 
Cipla argued that Erlotinib was a derivative form of Quinazoline compound which 
was patented in three European countries back in 1993, which did not answer the 
provision under Section 3(d). 880  Another form of arguments made by Cipla was 
related to the price of the drug.881 As Roche asked 4,800 Rs per tablet,882 which equal 
to US$103,883 Cipla asked for 1,600 Rs for its generic version884 which is equal to 
US$34.885Accepting Cipla's arguments, the interim injunction application submitted 
by Roche, was denied.886  
 
Although the High Court found Tarceva to be innovative and non-obvious,887 The 
High Court accepted Cipla's argument and found that Roche was unsuccessful to 
show an enhanced efficacy of Tarceva (Erlotinib) in compare to the Quinazoline 
compound as demanded by Section 3(d).888 Although Dr Singhvi from Behalf Roche 
showed a substantial contribution and healing efficacy of Tarceva compared to the 
former substance its chemical compound relied on,889 and also showed an increase in 
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life expectancy,890 the High Court found that Tarceva merits do not answer the criteria 
under Section 3(d). Respectively the High Court denied Roche's application.891   
 
Although the High Court found that Tarceva did not answer the criteria of Section 
3(d) as showed by Cipla, the High Court addressed another key aspect in the decision 
which as the High Court held, should lead the Indian judicator. This aspect included 
the public interest of low cost drugs and healthcare needs. As in the case of Novartis v 
Union of India, the High Court in the given case of Roche v Cipla, found that the 
aspect of patients' convenience to access a drug is of great importance, as other 
considerations as employment, public interest in the product and product quality.892 
Price differential, especially in the case of a life saving drug, or even in a life 
improving drug, is a prime factor to guide the courts. In the discussed case, Roche did 
not have manufacturing facilities in India and Cipla was the only manufacturer of 
Tarceva in third of the cost as requested by Roche. 893   
 
The High Court did acknowledge India's obligation to the TRIPS Agreement. 
However, at the same time, it was stated that “the court cannot be unmindful of the 
right of the general public to access life saving drugs which are available and for 
which such access would be denied if the injunction was granted”.894 The High Court 
held that promising drug accessibility is of a constitutional obligation which has to be 
assured. 895  Article 21 of the Indian Constitution orders that "no person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty to except according to procedure established by 
law”.896  
 
The High Court held that “if the injunction in the case of life saving drugs were to 
be granted, the High Court would in effect be stifling Article 21 so far as those would 
have or could have access to Erloticip are concerned”. 897 Under these considerations, 
the New Delhi High Court found that the public interest of accessing drugs is of much 
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more importance than the public interest of enforcing patent protection to encourage 
innovation and used this argument as an additional ground to dismiss Roche's petition 
for interim injunction against Cipla.  
 
In respect to the aforementioned decision, Roche submitted an appeal to the Delhi 
High Court, which dismissed Roche's claims, and denied its appeal. 898  As in the 
previous hearing, the New Delhi High Court in the appeal found that Roche had not 
shown Tarceva's enhanced efficacy as required by Section 3(d) and criticised the 
Controller of Patents by granting Roche's initial patent application.899  Furthermore, 
although the High Court acknowledged India's commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, 
it still found that the public interest of accessibility to drugs is a prime consideration 
in the case of interim relief.900  
 
With respect to the High Courts' decisions, accessing drugs is of a priority 
importance at all times, however, if it will come at the expense of the innovator legal 
right, new needed drugs would not be introduced to the Indian marketplace. This 
given premise was proven times and times again. If continued to treat patent 
enforcement as a non-preferable case, it will not be long before the pharmaceutical 
industry in India would stop its trading relations with the West and the first to suffer 
from these ramifications would be the sick population.901  
 
Finding a solution to the problem of high cost drugs through patent and encourage 
the innovative orientation of the Indian pharmaceutical industry cannot be achieved 
through intensified generic production. In other words, it cannot be achieved through 
the narrowing of the patent scope by excluding the very core innovative level in the 
pharmaceutical industry, the incremental innovation. Moreover, and as much as the 
importance of offering low cost drugs to the poor population is vital, this 
consideration cannot play a role in the matter of patents eligibility, as applied by the 
Indian courts in both the aforementioned cases. Not only did the courts dismiss some 
of great therapeutic importance of the two drugs, Glivec and Tarceva, it justified 
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public convenience to access the drugs as key considerations in the decision of 
granting the interim relief. Clearly under this methodology, allocating vast Indian 
patented incremental drug competition would not realise.    
 
Under the Indian Patent Act, once a pharmaceutical invention answers the criteria 
of new, inventive step and has industrialised application, it has to be protected 
through patent. However with the patent eligibility additional strainer in Section 3(d), 
a pharmaceutical incremental innovation cannot answer these terms. There were 
several aspects examined in respect to Section 3(d). It was proven that Section 3(d) is 
not necessary to prevent the phenomenon of evergreening. It was also shown that 
Section 3(d) rigid criteria can deny from the Indian pharmaceutical industry the 
progression it needs to establish low cost patented incremental drug marketplace 
through extensive competition. Nevertheless, an additional aspect to Section 3(d) is 
the matter of its compatibility to the TRIPS Agreement. The next part of the chapter 
asks of the legitimacy of Section 3(d) amendment to the TRIPS Agreement obligation 
not to discriminate against the patentability of any invention from any field of 
technology.902 Although the result has great importance to the aspect of Section 3 (d) 
legality and the Indian obligation fulfilment to the international community, the result 
does not change the fact that Section3 (d) is not compatible to the option of offering 
low cost drugs through patent enforcement.  
 
3. Implications on the international spectrum: the compatibility with the TRIPS 
Agreement 
  
The legislative framework of the TRIPS Agreement paints a very clear and 
explicit picture of the negotiators' intention. The aim was to eliminate any chance of 
"blanket exclusions" of certain technologies from patentability, especially within the 
pharmaceutical technology field, agrochemicals and food.903 In practice Article 27(1) 
introduced one main aspect that the Paris Convention dismissed: the definition of the 
eligibility of patent protection. 904  Article 27(1) required that "patents shall be 
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available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of 
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced". Clearly the terms of the Article are substantially broad and can imply of 
the initiators intention to include as many innovations in the patent scope, from any 
level and any field of technology, again if answered the given terms. 905 Nevertheless, 
the TRIPS Agreement did enable countries to define the different terms in their 
legislation as they saw fit.906   
 
Under this wide ranged definition, one can argue that the restrictions Section 3(d) 
has added to the "inventive step"/non-obviousness criteria, contradict Article 27 order 
of non-discriminatory. Given that under Section 3(d) only new chemical entity drugs 
are eligible for patent protection and the core pharmaceutical innovation is based on 
incremental, the necessary conclusion is of Section 3(d) discriminatory nature to the 
TRIPS Agreement. This can impact on the international community perspective 
towards India as a trustworthy partner and thus impact on India's capability to 
establish high patent-based drug competition in the marketplace.   
 
The World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Body's Panel ruling in the case 
of the Canadian patent protection for pharmaceutical products, dealt with the question 
whether two exception to patent exclusivity rights in the Canadian Patent Act infringe 
Article 27(1) and 28(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. 907 Under the Canadian Patent Act, 
Section 55.2(1) allowed to exclude the patentee's market exclusivity rights under the 
exception of research purposes.908 Section 55.2(2) allowed manufacture competitors 
to the patentee, to stockpile the patented products copies six months prior to the end 
of the patent term and sell it as soon as the patent term protection ends.909 Canada has 
relied on Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement to justify these two measures, given that 
the Article allows countries to exclude the patentee’s exclusive right in the 
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marketplace as long as the exclusion does not conflict with the normal utilisation of 
the patent owner.  
 
In practice, the panel did find that Article 55.2(2) contradicted the TRIPS 
Agreement. However, the main aspect in the Panel's decision which is of immense 
importance to the analysis of Section 3(d) compatibility to Article 27(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement was the interpretation of the term ‘discrimination’. The panel 
differentiated between two levels of discrimination: de jure and de facto.910 Given that 
Section 55.2(1) did not say that the exception is to be enforced in regards to 
pharmaceutical patenting in specific, it was not considered as de jure discriminating. 
The fact that the Article did not show any discriminative effect or purpose towards 
pharmaceutical patenting, brought the panel to conclude that it was not even de facto 
discriminatory to Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.911 In an analogy to Section 
3(d) however, it can be concluded that Section 3(d) answers the two levels of 
discrimination, especially the de jure discrimination. The very use of chemical 
substances as well as micro-organisms as the basis substances to examine enhanced 
efficacy, teaches of a de jure discrimination of Section 3(d) to Article 27(1).912 The 
Parliament intention was to harden the patentability of pharmaceutical innovation and 
for that reason the aforementioned substances were specifically noted in the 
Explanation clause in Section 3(d). A different conclusion cannot be reached.     
 
Another supportive fact of Section’s 3(d) de jure discriminatory nature to Article 
27(1) is that its wording is based on a generic drug safety regulatory. Another fact is 
the detailed Parliament discussions prior to the 2005 amendment which specifically 
raised concerns on the accessibility to drugs if other than new chemical entity drug 
would be patented. In other words concluding Section 3(d) as discriminatory to the 
TRIPS Agreement cannot be different as Dr R A Mashelkar found in the report on 
behalf of the Members of Technical Expert Group on Patent Law Issues submitted to 
the Indian Government.913  
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Dr R A Mashelkar the chairman of the Members of Technical Expert Group on 
Patent Law Issues (Mashelkar Report/Group), appointed by Indian Government to 
answer the discriminative aspect of Section 3(d) to the TRIPS Agreement in 2005.914 
The two aspects the group was appointed to research were as follow: the first matter 
involved with the question whether designating patent enforcement only to new 
chemical entity pharmaceuticals are TRIPS Agreement compliance; the second matter 
involved with the compatibility of the exclusion of micro-organisms from patent 
enforcement to the TRIPS Agreement.915 The following discussion is designated to 
the first issue as analysed in the revised report.  
 
Follow a comprehensive analysis, the report directed on one result only: 
designating the eligibility of pharmaceuticals only to new chemical entity 
pharmaceuticals or new chemical entity pharmaceutical with one or more inventive 
step is contradictive to the TRIPS Agreement.916  
 
As a part of its investigation, the group analysed whether the different flexibilities 
under the TRIPS Agreement can justify Section 3(d) different treatment towards 
pharmaceutical patenting. Arcuri and Castro defended Section 3(d) for its attempt to 
exclude patent protection from evergreened drugs, based on Articles 7, 8 and 27(2) to 
the TRIPS Agreement.917 Articles 7 and 8 promote member countries implementation 
of the different provisions in the TRIPS Agreement in consistency to their health and 
social-economic welfare characteristics and needs. Article 27(2) allows a member 
country to exclude patent protection to obtain public order and health. According to 
the authors, given that Section 3(d) offers large generic drug pool and thus promotes 
wider range of healthcare in India, Section 3(d) cannot be considered as 
discriminatory to the TRIPS Agreement.918  
 
The Mashelkar Group examined Articles 7 and 8 reasoning in trying to justify 
Section 3(d) wording and result. In a reference to the South Centre Report which dealt 
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with the 'special overriding situations’ in the TRIPS Agreement,919 arguments such as 
Arcuri'a and Castro's cannot support Section's 3(d) legitimacy in respect to Article 
27(1) non-discriminatory obligation. According to the South Centre Report, Articles 7 
and 8 answer situations of:920  
 
Necessity and of consistency with other obligations under the TRIPs Agreement. The 
‘’consistency” requirement may permit patentability exclusions in cases of distinct public 
health emergencies as defined by the national government, and as distinct from ordinary or 
everyday health and nutrition measures. 
 
Hence from the given view presented in the South Centre Report, ordinary 
narrowed pharmaceutical patent scope enforcement, even in a try to answer the Indian 
ordinary public health through the enlargement of the generic pool of drugs, cannot 
be a proper justification of Section 3(d) enactment. It is unrealistic to believe that 
under the history of the TRIPS Agreement formation, its initiators meant to apply 
such a narrow patent scope as enforced by Section 3(d).  
 
Moreover, as stated in the preface of the given South Centre Report, the reliance 
on Articles 7 and 8 has to be entwined with the obligation the TRIPS Agreement 
ordered. Patenting incremental pharmaceutical innovation ought to be considered as a 
part of this obligation for it represents the core of the pharmaceutical industry 
innovation. Article 8 explicitly noted that interpreting the interest of member 
countries in their domestic intellectual property laws has to be "consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement."921 In other words, promising a better health care in 
India cannot be on the account of enforcing patent protection on the larger scale of 
pharmaceutical innovation as incremental innovation.  
 
The Doha Declaration which allowed wider enforcement of compulsory licensing 
did oblige a full compliance with the TRIPS Agreement as stated in the Mashelkar 
Report. As stated in the Declaration, the TRIPS Agreement "does not and should not 
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health".922 Nevertheless and 
although health interests are of first priority, it has to be fulfilled while reiterating the 
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commitment under the TRIPS Agreement provisions and in this respect, to patent 
pharmaceutical incremental innovation.  
 
Even in relation to Articles 27(2) which ordered of the exclusion of patent rights 
to protect public order, human, animal or plant life or health cannot be a proper 
justification.923 Although enabling better access to drugs is a prior form of protection 
on public's health, the exception depends on whether the patented invention causes 
commercial exploitation. India which seeks for cheaper drugs through generics cannot 
claim that incremental pharmaceutical equals to commercial exploitation in general, 
especially given to its own extensive innovative activity of incremental 
pharmaceutical innovation in the frame of novel drug delivery system.924  
 
It is however important to stress that regardless to the result of Section 3(d) 
compatibility to the TRIPS Agreement, it still does not change the fact that it hinders 
the possibility to establish extensive patented drug market in India. Narrowing the 
protection only to the rare cases of new chemical entity drugs innovation, will 
diminish the prospectus of the Indian pharmaceutical innovative capacity growth as 
well as the option to offer a solution to drugs accessibility through wider patent 
enforcement. Several pharmaceutical firms and civil organisations expressed different 
views on Section 3(d) negative affect on the evolvement of the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry.925   
 
Ranbaxy's view as presented in the Mashelkar Report was explicit to Section's 
3(d) negative influence on its incentive to innovate.926 Until Ranbaxy expands its 
innovative capabilities to new drugs discovery routes and new chemical entity 
research, the firm relies substantially on new drug delivery system and dosages 
development products.927 Limiting patent enforcement on incremental pharmaceutical 
innovation would deter the firm to engage with research and development to answer 
India's specific public healthcare needs.  
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The Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI) supported this 
view and claimed that the exclusion of non- new chemical entity pharmaceuticals 
from patent protection would risk the prospect of the Indian scientists to engage with 
productive drugs discovery processes as needed in India. 928  As Ranbaxy and the 
OPPI, Krishna & Saurastri, Trademarks & Patent Attorneys in India see the 
importance of patenting incremental innovation. 929  Although the pharmaceutical 
multinationals are capable of new chemical/molecule entity drugs research and 
development, the Indian pharmaceutical industry is not. Excluding patent protection 
from incremental innovation, would not allow Indian holdings on pharmaceutical 
patents in the market. In other words, excluding non - new chemical entity products 
from patent protection would strengthen the competitive superiority of pharmaceutical 
multinationals in the Indian market and prevent the local industry to equalise its 
innovative capabilities and achieve better pharmaceutical research and development 
tools. 930  Needless to say, this reality will not contribute to the Indian innovative 
pharmaceutical industry evolvement.   
 
Many opponents criticised the Indian Patent Act yet did not submit any complaint 
to the World Trade Organisations.931 Nevertheless, the concerns from not being able 
to apply for patent protection to altered drugs are considerable, as claimed by 
opponents to the Indian Patent Act in the United States.932 As Dean viewed, India has 
to find a balance between providing benefits to innovators through patent enforcement 
and to the national interests.933  Excluding incremental innovation from the patent 
scope does not seem to offer that balance.  
 
No one can deny the importance of generics to public healthcare, for it does offer 
lower cost of drugs than the patented versions. Nevertheless, promoting the 
innovative pharmaceutical industry is not of less importance to the Indian health care, 
especially when it can also offer low-cost drugs market and expose the Indian 
industry to further sophisticated research skills and beneficial collaboration with 
pharmaceutical multinationals. In this respect it is also important to remind of India's 
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evolving economy, exiting from poverty and the increase of the purchasing power 
inclusive in the sector of healthcare. 934  Nevertheless, although India has made 
considerable steps to complete the transformation needed to its pharmaceutical 
industry, it is still far from achieving a wide spectrum of innovative orientation. 
Distancing investment and collaboration with advanced pharmaceutical firms, does 
not seem to answer the process.  
 
If India would offer wide patent protection scope for pharmaceutical innovation, it 
would empower the innovative pharmaceutical industry and bring to a new era of 
healthcare through patent enforcement. When that day comes, India would not have to 
wait until others will invent the drugs it needs, and be able to discover new drugs on 
its own and focus on tropical diseases research as well. However, in order to fulfil this 
notion, India has to omit Section 3(d) from its Patent Act and widen the non-
obviousness standard to include incremental pharmaceutical innovation. Through this 
suggested process and as suggested before, the Indian Government would attract more 
foreign direct investment to its pharmaceutical industry, more local incremental drugs 
would be produced and through larger competition, the industry would be able to 
offer drugs in lower cost, not much higher than generics cost.  
 
As incremental innovation is based on drugs modification, altering new 
formulations and combinations of active substances and often approved compounds, 
there should not be any reason why incremental based drugs would not create the 
extensive competition needed to reduce drugs pricing. Under patent protection, 
foreign investment as suggested would increase, the industry would therefore grow 
and thus as generics created vast competition nation and international wide, so would 
incremental drugs achieve the same result. However, this time, through patent 
protection and not through the "notorious" generic mechanism.  
 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that this avocation supports the long term 
run. This may encourage questioning India's readiness to answer an immediate 
accessibility to drugs. Compulsory licensing, in its expanded form under the Indian 
Patent Act would be able to answer that need and offer the balance between the two 
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public interests: encouraging pharmaceutical innovation and accessing to the 
innovated drugs. On the one hand this measure would allow the generic firm to copy 
drugs and market them locally. On the other hand, under the compulsory licensing 
mechanism, the patentee deserves some sort of remuneration. The full discretion 
given to the Indian Patent Controller to decide as "he deem fit"935 on the different 
applications for compulsory licensing and the vary considerations the Patent 
Controller can use to grant the application, can promise an immediate need to access 
drugs, without harming the patentee's interest for compensation. What is left however 
for the Indian Government to do is to put the compulsory licensing into use.  
 
C. Forming a  Balance: Endorsing Wider Compulsory Licensing Utilisation in 
India 
   
Policies which exclude patenting of pharmaceutical incremental innovation can 
break the delicate balance between research and reimbursement for the core place 
incremental innovation takes in the pharmaceutical technology field. Accordingly, 
they can also hamper investment to a developing country as India, investment it 
desperately needs to advance its innovative characteristics and try to offer low cost 
drugs through patent enforcement in contrast from generics. In this regard and as a 
mean to attract as much investment and collaboration with foreign pharmaceutical 
multinationals as possible, some suggest omitting other restrictions Section 3 in the 
Indian Patents Act endorses on the eligibility of innovations, as Section 3(i).936 In this 
section for example any medical process, surgical, curative, prophylactic, therapeutic 
and diagnostic inventions or other treatment of human beings (in addition to 
treatments of animals and plants) are excluded from patent protection. The logic 
behind this suggestion is very clear. Any restrictions on patent enforcement would 
mean the restriction on the evolvement and growth of the local Indian pharmaceutical 
innovative industry and a delay of the advocated possibility to create low cost 
patented drug market in India.  
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Today, following the 2005 amendment to the Act which finalised the inclusion of 
pharmaceutical product to the patent scope and under the suggestion to omit the 
restrictions under Section 3(d), it is becoming more critical for India to use the 
flexibilities exists in the Patent Act to promise that the enforcement of patent would 
not deny the need to use the patented drugs. In other words, there is a need to promise 
that the two public interests patent tries to promote would coexist.937 It is without a 
doubt that seeking domestic innovation and foreign direct investment through stronger 
patent enforcement would affect the immediate accessibility to drugs and for that 
reason, compulsory licensing seems to answer the needed relief for drugs accessibility 
under a patent protected pharmaceutical industry. As recommended by Rai, the 
flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration have introduced 
the developing world with the opportunity to omit section 3(d) and still enjoy from 
drugs accessibility.938   
 
Whereas the pharmaceutical industry in the developed world considerably 
opposes compulsory licensing, 939  developing countries rely on this mechanism to 
develop generic equivalents to the patented drugs in time of need.940 For example, 
under the epidemic features of HIV/AIDS in India, when Pfizer's Fluconazole drug 
cost US$17 per serving in India, its generic version cost is US$2. 941 Although the 
reduced price can bring to the reduction of the brand name drug price given to the 
generic competition, Harrelson points on the fact that under the compulsory licensing 
mechanism, the patentee is usually remunerated.942 The Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights instituted in the United Kingdom, was considerably supportive of the 
compulsory licensing mechanism enforcement by developing countries and 
encouraged fully exploitation of the flexibilities given by the TRIPS Agreement to 
promise a commercial use, production and exportation of generic drugs.943   
 
                                               
937
 See Mueller, above n 311, 587. 
938
 See Rai, above n 458, 84. 
939
 See generally Mueller, above n 311, 583. 
940
 See generally Harrelson, above n 319, 191.  
941
 Ibid.  
942
 Ibid, 192.  
943
 See generally United Kingdom Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Integrating Intellectual 
Property Rights and Development Policy (London, 2002). 
 155 
One can raise concerns on the potential disputes between the pharmaceutical 
innovator and the generic firm on the grounds of compulsory licensing. However in 
practice these concerns seem to be without merit. Firstly, pharmaceutical 
multinationals have much to gain from the Indian pharmaceutical industry, mostly 
under the economic difficulties the industry experiences these days. Secondly, 
although generic firms will find it easier to apply and receive approved licenses from 
the Patent Controller, they would prefer to reach to common grounds with 
pharmaceutical multinationals. 944 In this respect, if pharmaceutical multinationals will 
take their opposition beyond the Controller's tribunal to the Intellectual Property 
Appellant Board, it is most likely that generic firms would prefer to reach an 
arrangement with these firms and abandon long term disputes.945   
 
Although under the TRIPS Agreement the use of the compulsory licensing was 
designated to certain urgency and emergencies times,946 the Indian formulation of 
compulsory licensing however crossed these boundaries. Under the Indian 
interpretation of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreements the need to access drugs, under 
vary conditions, can be answered by the Patent Controller in vast situations inclusive 
times when the prices of drugs is offered in an unaffordable price.947  
 
At the preface of the section in the Patent Act which regularise compulsory 
licensing, the leading considerations the Patent Controller has to take presented. 
These considerations widespread the patent mechanism rule enforcement in India. In 
this regard patent protection will be granted to encourage inventions to benefit the 
Indian commercial scale.948 Patent is not granted to benefit the monopoly interest of 
the patentee949 and in any case, it should not impede public health but promote it as 
well as other social and welfare needs.950 Furthermore, the Act specifically notes that 
the patented inventions and to this thesis concerns, drugs, have to be offered in a 
reasonably affordable price to the public. 951  Patent has also to be enforced 
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contributively to the promotion of technological innovation in India and the transfer 
of technology to answer local, social and economic needs.952   
 
In addition to the automatic prioritisation given to generic firms which invested in 
the production and marketing of drugs covered by the "mailbox", 953  compulsory 
licensing is given on two main levels, the private and the public. Although the Act 
offers the use of compulsory licensing in any field of technology, the following 
analysis would concentrate on its implementation on pharmaceuticals. On the private 
setting, following three years from the date of granting a patent, the Act allows any 
person or organisation, private or public,954 to apply to the Patent Controller and ask 
for a license to use a patented drug for example under closed list considerations.955 If 
the public reasonable requirements from the patented drug have not been met in 
respect to the patented invention, or if the drug is not available at affordable price or if 
it is not worked (sold) in the Indian marketplace, the Patent Controller, on the basis of 
these three main conditions can grant a compulsory licensing if satisfied with the facts 
submitted to support them.956  
 
Nevertheless, the Act does specify what general considerations should lead the 
Patent Controller to the decision under the aforementioned terms. Such considerations 
include the nature of the invention as the field of its technology (pharmaceutical, 
auto), the tries of the patentee, or the licensee (if there is one) to make full use of the 
invention and the ability of the applicant to work the patented invention.957 These 
considerations join to another group of considerations as the extent of a commercial 
use of the patented invention,958 and that the interests of any person developing an 
invention in the territory of India would not be prejudiced after granting the 
compulsory licensing.959 
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Another consideration is the attempt of the applicant to reach an agreement with 
the patent holder before attaining the use of compulsory licensing.960 According to the 
Act, a reasonable term to try and achieve an agreement is six months.961 Despite the 
specification of the different considerations, the ambiguous nature of the different 
conditions laid before the Patent Controller and the large discretion to base the 
decision of granting a compulsory licensing, is clear. 962 Another aspect is the 
eligibility for any person to apply for compulsory licensing without any restriction.963 
This criterion opens the possibility for vast civil organisations to fight for an extensive 
generic production on every drug and protect the poor population through generic 
production until the strengthening of the local innovative industry.    
 
Under the first condition in the private setting, which is based on the public 
unanswered reasonable requirements in respect to the invention,964 the Act does not 
define "reasonable" and thus enlarges the ground to permit compulsory licensing of a 
patented drug. 965  The reasonable requirements can consist with unmet trading 
expectations,966 inadequate demand of the drug967 and prejudiced impact on the Indian 
market. 968  Others exceed to general unmet export goals of the Indian market,969 
difficulties the patentee has imposed on the generic firm license seeker970 and the 
affect on an Indian competition with the invention.971  
 
According to the Indian Competition Act 2002, 972 any enterprise prohibited from 
abusing its dominancy position in the Indian market through the demand of high 
prices. 973   Hence, any commercial difficulties the patented drug for example can 
impose on the Indian pharmaceutical market competition would be an eligible factor 
                                               
960
 Ibid, s 84(6). 
961
 See The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India), s 84. 
962
 See Dhar, Gopakumar, above n 179, 21. 
963
 See The Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India), s 84(1).  
964
 See The Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India), s 84(1).   
965
 It can be said that given to the flexible criteria, the affect could be increased litigation.  
966
 See The Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India), s 84(7)(a)(i).   
967
 Ibid, s 84(7)(a)(ii).   
968
 Ibid, s 84(7)(a)(iv). 
969
 Ibid, s 84(7)(a)(iii).   
970
 Ibid, s 84(7)(b). 
971
 Ibid, s 84(7)(c) . 
972
 See The Indian Competition Act 2002. 
973
 Ibid, s 3(4). See also generally Aparna Viswanathan “From Commanding Heights to Competition: A 
Comparative Analysis of India’s Competition Act 2002 with UK/EC Law” (2003) 14(7) Int’l Company 
& Com L Rev 229.  
 158 
to base an applicant for compulsory licensing. As the ground to apply for compulsory 
licensing is wide and flexible, the Indian poorer population should not fear from wider 
patent enforcement given that accessing drugs through the generic production is 
almost assured.  The following considerations which widen the eligibility to apply for 
compulsory licensing clarify this aspect even more.  
 
The second term which allows the grant of compulsory licensing under the Act, 
relates to a situation when the invention is not worked in the Indian marketplace.974 A 
non-working patent in the market can be for example, a situation when the patented 
drug is not sold ordinarily. One of the prior considerations regarding patent 
enforcement under the Indian Patent Act is the rule patent plays to benefit India's 
public needs of commercialisation in difference to the patentee's monopoly right.975 
As the term “reasonable” was not defined in the previous term, the term “worked” is 
not interpreted as well. This provision is another supportive evidentiary of the 
ambiguous nature of the Indian compulsory licensing mechanism and the full 
discretion the Act intended to leave in the hands of the Patent Controller. In this 
respect, it is noteworthy that the Patent Controller can delay the hearing of the 
application of compulsory licensing to a year later of its submission, if it was found 
that the time the patentee had to work the patented drug was insufficient976 due to 
Governmental orders or different state regulations. 977   
 
An additional provision concerning the term of working the patented invention 
relates to any person inability to work its own invention, whether as patentee or a 
licensee, without the use of the secondary patented invention which is the subject of 
the compulsory licensing. In this respect and in an analogy to the pharmaceutical 
industry, if an Indian pharmaceutical firm/generic firm wishes to use a patented 
compound to develop another drug, it can apply for the Patent Controller with an 
application for compulsory licensing.978 After the Patent Controller is satisfied that the 
applicant is willing and able of cross-licensing the new invention to the patentee 
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under reasonable terms 979  and that the new invention has made substantial 
contribution on commercial or industrial levels in India,980 the Patent Controller, on 
an independent discretion can grant the compulsory licensing.   
 
The third term to grant compulsory licensing to private applicant is in times when 
the price set on the patented invention and in respect to the thesis, the price set of the 
invented drug is beyond the reach of the local population. According to the Act, if a 
drug is offered in an unreasonably affordable cost to the market, an application for a 
license can be granted if proven to the satisfactory of the Patent Controller.981 An 
interesting aspect in this provision is that the definition of "reasonable" is not given 
and thus can allow the Patent Controller subjective grounds to decide what an 
unreasonable price is.982 In this respect, given that the larger average share of the 
Indian purchasing power is low, a reasonable price of a drug can be interpreted as low 
as well. Respectively, although incremental drugs would be patented, if they will be 
offered in a price which is not affordable in the Indian market, generic firms' 
application for compulsory licensing can be easily granted by the Patent Controller.983  
 
Under the granting of compulsory licensing, the Act allows the patentee with 
reasonable remuneration.984 Again, one can ask what reasonable remuneration is if 
compared to the costly expenditures invested in pharmaceutical research and 
development. How much would a generic firm have to pay to the right’s holder of a 
patented drug so it would not hinder the possibility to offer the generic version in low 
cost? If set high, the generic versions cost would be set high as well and the notion of 
low cost generic drugs would not be fulfilled. Dhar and Gopakumar presented a study 
which showed of an average 20 - 25 per cent proper remuneration and repeated the 
fact that higher royalties of the license would impact on the price of generics and 
harden the possibility of supplying the drug in affordable prices. 985 
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At the same time, the Patent Controller has the responsibility to ensure that the 
licensee would work the patented invention to the fullest extent986  and in affordable 
price.987 To be noted that before the granting of compulsory licensing applications, the 
Act does acknowledge the right of the patentee or "any other person" to oppose to the 
application.988 Moreover, as the Patent Controller has the right to grant a license, the 
controller also has the authorisation to terminate the license when the circumstances 
which granted the license are expired.989  
 
The next ground to allow compulsory licensing is based on the pubic level, in 
times of the public need to access a patented costly drug. National emergencies, 
extreme urgencies or in cases of public non-commercial use as set by the Central 
Government, regardless to the fact if three years has passed from the date of granting  
the patent, are additional grounds to grant compulsory licensing.990 Under these terms 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria or other epidemics are of a priority case in National 
emergencies, extreme urgencies or in cases of public non-commercial use.991 Under 
these terms and in difference from the previous circumstances, no preliminary 
negotiation with the patentee is necessary.992 Moreover, under the Patent Controller 
responsibilities, the manufactured drug by the licensee has to be offered in the lowest 
cost as possible and still enable the patentee to benefit from the rights over the 
invention in the market.993   
 
As stressed earlier, India's generic industry plays a vast role in other developing 
countries accessibility to drugs. The compulsory licensing mechanism did not ignore 
that need. The Indian compulsory licensing mechanism answers the need for 
affordable drugs distribution in countries which do not have the manufacturing 
capacity to produce generics on their own.994 According to the Act, any drug, product 
or process of any pharmaceutical sector, inclusive ingredients and diagnostic kits will 
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be open to compulsory licensing to answer third party needs.995 Under this provision, 
there is not a need to wait three years from the day of granting the patent to apply for 
a compulsory licensing and the Patent Controller does not have the prerogative to 
decline an application under this term. 996  To be noted that although this term 
specifically concerns commercialisation of inventions to other countries, it is both 
scientifically and economically beneficial for Indian firms which can advance their 
skills through the research of the patented drug and export the generic equivalent to 
tens of other developing and least developed countries.997    
   
With an extensive mechanism of compulsory licensing, such as the Indian 
mechanism, under the omission of Section 3(d), there should not be concerns in 
regards to the aspect of accessing patented drugs by the poorer population in India and 
in the world. The section of compulsory licensing as reviewed earlier, offers 
widespread options under the subjective satisfactory of the Patent Controller. This 
opportunity can enable the Indian pharmaceutical industry to offer lower cost drugs to 
the local population in addition to advance its own innovative capacity through the 
process of copying. Nevertheless, without a full operation of the compulsory licensing 
mechanism, the omission of Section 3(d) will delay accessibility to drugs by the 
poorer population.  
 
Patenting incremental pharmaceutical innovation and the minimisation of the 
generic production rate respectively, may bring to a rise in drugs pricing before the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry would be able to evolve to a large an influential 
industry. Until that day comes, India is mostly equipped to deal with the predicament 
of drugs accessibility using its influential compulsory licensing mechanism. India just 
needs to use it.  
 
Correa acknowledges the benefits compulsory licensing promise to foster efficient 
productive innovative activities by the recipient countries.998 However he does have 
some concerns.999 Some of these concerns rely on the fact that circumstances for 
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compulsory licensing may change. Prices of drugs can be normalised to fit the 
purchasing power of the Indian population and thus there would not be any 
justification to grant a compulsory license to the applicant.1000  
 
Furthermore, patent holders can place economic and political pressure on 
applicants who would drive domestic firms to withdraw their application and choose a 
different option than litigation.1001 This aspect was also reviewed by Basheer, who 
stressed that "the mere existence of such legal flexibilities does not mean that they 
will necessarily be exploited".1002 In his study Basheer noted that among 103 Indian 
firms which were asked of the economic beneficial promised by the exporting of 
generics authorised by compulsory licensing, only 25 firms answered positively. 1003 
To the economic considerations join political considerations.  
 
Basheer completed the aspect of the economic and political considerations which 
lie in the mechanism of compulsory licensing when he said that the decision is of two 
Governments, not one. 1004  Correa however, which did see the same elements as 
Basheer, encouraged countries to resist the potential economic and political pressure 
and push the patentees to reduce the patented inventions pricing through compulsory 
licensing.1005 Accordingly Correa saw in compulsory licensing as an important bridge 
between a wide enforcement of innovation protection and other given flexibilities in 
the TRIPS Agreement1006 as the Bolar exception1007 and the parallel importation, 1008 
which also implemented in the Indian Patent Act and can bring to the reduction of 
drugs pricing.    
 
It is clear that the Indian Patent Act offers various tools for the Indian Government 
to enable better accessibility to drugs, even under a larger enforcement of patent, 
inclusive incremental pharmaceutical innovation. Nevertheless, on the other hand, 
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revoking Section 3(d) and operating the mechanism of compulsory licensing without 
inhibitions is not advised as well. The Indian Government is expected to manage 
compulsory license wisely to encourage cooperative atmosphere instead of 
combative.1009 It would be most unadvised for countries to use this flexible regularly 
and exhaust the patent mechanism they are obliged to implement on pharmaceuticals. 
Although compulsory licensing is advised under a wider enforcement of patent on 
pharmaceuticals, countries need to balance its use with the protection over 
incremental pharmaceutical innovation.  
 
Time brings changes. Time has strengthened the Indian innovative pharmaceutical 
industry. India however should not fear from these changes and see that patent can 
offer low cost drugs in the marketplace as long as it is wider, especially in a growing, 
emerging country as India. However the option of patent’s offering a solution for 
drugs pricing in developing countries will not form overnight and until it does, India 
has to allocate enough elements to promise affordable drugs for the local population. 
India would just have to be prepared to use them openly and wisely for they will bring 
the needed balance between patent innovation encouragement and accessibility to the 
inventions. 
  
Nevertheless, as much as India can fulfil its part to build a low cost patented drug 
marketplace, through the enlargement of protection of pharmaceutical incremental 
innovation, it is not only up to India to complete the transformation. In this respect the 
next chapter tries to fit the pharmaceutical multinationals role in assisting India to 
evolve and establish a stronger innovative pharmaceutical industry, one which would 
answer the local need of lower cost drugs. In addition to a legal obligation, the 
economic prospectus form collaborating with the Indian pharmaceutical industry, 
pharmaceutical multinationals in developed countries carry the moral responsibility 
for philanthropy activity in developing countries. This point is the final avenue which 
ought to be closing the analysis of patent protection impact on developing countries 
accessibility to drugs and imply that the process is not one sided, but two.  
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VII IT IS NOT ONLY LOCAL OBLIGATION: MAKING DRUGS ACCESSIBLE 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES – A GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Although the TRIPS Agreement sketches various flexibilities which can be 
enforced by developing countries to access patented drugs and oblige developed 
countries to assist developing countries with technical needs and the transfer of 
technology, 1010  the Agreement does not oblige the developed world to assist the 
poorer population by offering low cost drugs. It is in this respect important to analyse 
whether this responsibility can be drawn from the moral avenue. One of the most 
significant influential forces on the developing world infrastructure reinforcement is 
the activity conducted in these countries by Non Governmental Organisations. These 
organisations assist the developing world in the different social and economic areas as 
child health, women’s’ rights, build roads, hospitals and schools.1011 Departed from 
any political constraints and the direct work with local organisations are two main 
advantages Non Governmental Organisations have which make them more 
approachable to ask for assistance from the different Governments in the developed 
world.1012 In practice these organisations have the power to affect the lives of 250 
million people in the developing world.1013  
 
However, as vast as the activity of Non Governmental Organisations activity is 
cardinal, working alone, without pharmaceutical multinationals assistance, the 
healthcare spectrum in developing countries would not change as quickly as it can.  
Nevertheless, much encouragement is still needed. As of today there is an insufficient 
assistant from the developed world. 1014  In 2003, the United States Congress 
authorised to increase the funds designated to transfer HIV/AIDS treatment to 
developing countries. 1015 Nevertheless according to Abbott, the budget is still low.1016 
According to the External Medicine Policy which formulated by the United States 
Trade Representative to answer the United States interests in the pharmaceutical 
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research field, very little consideration was left to drugs accessibility in developing 
countries.1017  
 
The 2001 report of the High Commissioner of the United Nations on the issue of 
the TRIPS Agreement and the impact it has on human rights, specifically ordered 
member states to assure that accessibility to health in developing countries would be 
wide - ranged and include the establishment of health facilities and goods (drugs for 
example) regardless to their public or private originality source.1018 Countries were 
called to assist on an international level and cooperate with each other in a way which 
would merge their innovative activity into their commitment to fulfil the predominant 
right of health in developing countries.1019  
 
The United Nations sub-Commission on the Promotion of Human Rights affirmed 
that the TRIPS Agreement did not reach a proper balance between the right of 
property and the right for health.1020 Accordingly the Commission suggested that civil 
organisations should promote an economic policy mechanism to respect their existing 
human rights obligations. 1021  The World Health Assembly Resolution on Public 
Health Innovation and Essential Health Research and Intellectual Property Rights, 
concerned the exact matter of the impact granting property rights would have on 
drugs accessibility in low-middle income countries with low purchasing power. 1022 
On the one hand the resolution did acknowledge the standee of intellectual property 
right as a human right. 1023  On the other hand, the concerns regarding to drugs 
accessibility was also noted.1024  
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Respectively, at the 61st World Assembly on 24 May 2008, countries were called 
to take pro-active measurements to fulfil their obligation to protect public's health in 
parallel to protecting the right of property for any of their scientific, literature or any 
artistic production.1025 In this respect, utilising patent enforcement to create low cost 
drugs market in a developing country such as India is a long term solution. Wide 
scope patent enforcement to include incremental pharmaceutical innovation would not 
answer the immediate need to access drugs and as Resnik said: “for better or worse, 
the people of developing nations need help from the pharmaceutical industry”.1026   
 
Although significant number of patented antiretroviral drugs are listed in the 
World Health Organisation essential drug list, which are sold in low cost, many 
people living in developing countries still cannot afford them without supplementary 
assistance from the international community.1027 HIV/AIDS is not the only disease 
characterised the developing world. Although AIDS is the number one killer in 
developing countries, developing countries are burdened with other diseases as 
cancer, ineffectual diseases, diabetes, heart diseases and other health conditions. The 
diseases spectrum thus shows that finding cures to all, independently, is beyond the 
developing world current financial reach and thus it is clear that an international 
cooperation and financial aid is essential for the survival of people living in 
developing countries.1028   
 
Lacking adequate innovative skills to fight infectious diseases, developing 
countries, as India, need the West’s assistance before becoming “therapeutic 
orphans”. 1029  This way, to the legal and political obligations the pharmaceutical 
industry has in respect to people living in developing countries, joins the moral and 
social obligation to assist developing countries to better their accessibility to 
medicine.  
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Although there are economists who do not see any moral responsibility of 
corporations to the less fortunate,1030 there is who regard these responsibilities as 
prime considerations, 1031  which partly derived from social obligations of these 
corporations to the consumers public.1032 In respect to the pharmaceutical industry, 
these responsibilities translated to offer drugs in low cost for people with low 
purchasing power.1033 Resnik sees the pharmaceutical industry obligation to offer low 
cost drugs as a way to compensate the developing countries for using their low cost 
services.1034  
 
Pharmaceutical firms which activate in the sacred work of drugs innovation, have 
responsibility to humankind and not only to the United States richer population.1035 
Nevertheless, Resnik appreciated the need of the pharmaceutical industry to return its 
investment and aspire to balance this need with the need of the sick and poor to access 
drugs. 1036 Thus as long as firms enjoy from increasing profits margin, they should use 
these profits to answer their social responsibilities and assist developing countries 
with discounts on drugs, research and development for tropical diseases and invest in 
other social health programs to enable better accessibility.1037   
 
Many pharmaceutical firms do see their responsibilities towards a better world's 
health care prospect. A prime example is the philanthropy activity conducted by the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer GlaxoSmithKline PLC.1038 GlaxoSmithKline announced 
it is willing to offer much cheaper prices for its tropical diseases drugs (for example 
Hepatitis B and malaria) to the 50 poorest countries in the world. 1039 Additionally, the 
firm announced that 20 per cent of its sales profits would be used to build health 
clinics in these countries1040 which needless to say support the prospect of innovative 
independent pharmaceutical industry in the developing world's region. Another 
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example is the establishment of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative which 
started with US$250 million by MSF and a group of developing countries to conduct 
research and development for tropical disease which their research was neglected by 
the Western pharmaceutical industry.1041   
 
Another example is of Pfizer, a North-American pharmaceutical firm engagement 
in activity to better the developing world health care through different collaborations 
and partnerships with researchers in the developing world in special attention to 
tropical diseases. Pfizer put emphasise not only on philanthropy work but training and 
educating health care workers in developing countries, building health care facilities 
and sharing its practices.1042  
 
The Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development commemorated in 2009 a 
20 years anniversary of fighting leprosy in India. 1043  Since 1989 the nonprofit 
Novartis Comprehensive Leprosy Care Association has been providing services to 
thousands of leprosy patients across India. 1044 If two decades ago leprosy afflicted the 
lives over 10 million people, as of today, the disease considered as eliminated. 1045 
However, due to India's large size, it suffers from high numbers of new cases of 
leprosy every year. 1046 Since the year 2000, Novartis has donated drugs for leprosy 
worldwide through auspices of the World Health Organisation, a donation of US$60 
million which helped curing over 4.5 million patients.1047 In respect to Novartis, it is 
important to mention its initiated program in 2006 to allow a free from charge use of 
its drugs to 34 million disadvantaged patients across the developing world which was 
estimated in US$755 million donation.1048  
 
Although today's tough economic times to the pharmaceutical industry, Richard T. 
Clark, Chairman, President and CEO of Merck & Co, Inc said that: "At Merck, 
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however, we believe that good corporate citizenship and good governance have never 
been more important. Doing the right thing – even when times are tough – makes 
good business sense."1049 In its 2008 Global Corporate Responsibility Report, Merck's 
continued work with international groups to facilitate drugs accessibility to the 
world's poorest countries was widely covered. 1050  In specific Concern to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, it was also reported that as of the end of 2008, 653,867 patients 
and 111,471 of whom are children were treated partly with one of Merck’s 
antiretroviral drugs free of charge. 1051 
 
In different publication Merck's collaboration with Qiagen N V 1052  a 
pharmaceutical firm from Netherlands (home –based) to fight cervical cancer in the 
developing world, was announced in September 23 of this year (2009). Merck 
announced that it would provide up to five million doses of the drug Gardasil and 
QIAGEN announced that it intends to donate US$1 million worth test donation 
program to screen 500,000 women for the disease.1053 According to G McGlynn, 
president, Merck Vaccines and Infectious Diseases every passing minute another 
woman is being diagnose with cervical cancer, which their majority is sourced in 
developing countries. 1054  Needless to say contributions as described above can 
minimise the hurt and suffering of millions of women in the developing world.   
 
The Wellcome Trust and Merck & Co, Inc announced in 17 September this year 
(2009) of the creation of the MSD Wellcome Trust Hilleman Laboratories, the first 
research and development joint venture with not-for-profit organisation to assist 
developing countries accessibility to needed medicine.1055 In addition to developing 
new vaccines, Hilleman Laboratories announced that it will focus on better 
accessibility to existing ones. According to the statement the venture will take place in 
                                               
1049
 See Merck & Co, Inc Publishes 2008 Global Corporate Responsibility Report, Merck Says Good 
Corporate Citizenshup and Governance Have Never Been More Important www.merck.com (accessed 
1 October 2009). 
1050
 Ibid.  
1051
 Ibid.  
1052
 See Qiagen N V www.qiagen.com (acceded 17 October 2009). 
1053
 See Merck and QIAGEN Collaborate to Accelerate Access to Cervical Cancer Vaccination and 
Screening in Developing Countries www.merck.com (accessed 1 October 2009). 
1054
 Ibid.  
1055
 See Wellcome Trust and Merck Launch First of Its Kind Joint Venture to Develop Affordable 
Vaccines for Low-Income Countries www.merck.com (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 170 
India to broaden partnerships with vast experts in vaccine research and enlarge 
manufacturing and mature the firm's products pipeline. 1056   
 
Acknowledging the right of the pharmaceutical industry to prevent counterfeiting 
and return its investment in drugs research and development, Resnik conditioned the 
pharmaceutical industry social and moral responsibilities with patent enforcement. 
Resnik based his view on rather pragmatic ground. Once pharmaceutical firms would 
be exposed to generic counterfeiting, there would not be any profit to return back to 
society. There would not be any possibility for firms to assist with low cost drugs or 
health programs. 1057 There has to be reciprocal arrangement between large 
pharmaceutical firms and developing countries Governments.  
 
Implementing Resnik perspective, if India offers patent enforcement for 
incremental innovation and enlarges the prospect of revenues of pharmaceutical firms, 
and still these firms would not activate to answer India's need for assistance, India 
would have more legitimacy to enforce wider ranged of compulsory licensing. Given 
that the TRIPS Agreement does not consist with provisions to oblige developed 
countries to assist developing countries, assimilating this responsibility in a legislative 
frame is of great importance. On the other hand, if India will continue to deny 
protection from incremental innovation, than pharmaceutical multinationals should 
not be blamed for not answering to their moral obligations for they will not have 
enough capital to allocate to developing countries. It is in this respect noteworthy to 
stress that although the moral and social responsibilities of pharmaceutical 
multinationals is of great importance, there are complementary steps the developing 
world has to take to enable firms to answer these obligations.  
 
Drexel in comparison to Resnik does not see any harm for the pharmaceutical 
industry in marketing free from cost drugs to the developing world's markets. Given 
to the marginal loss pharmaceutical firms can suffer from not selling drugs in  
developing countries' markets, Drexel supported that the pharmaceutical industry can 
fully donate free from charge drugs to the developing world.1058 However one aspect 
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that Drexel did not answer to is the growing markets in countries such as India, Brazil 
and China which given to their large markets and growing purchasing power, 
donating free of charge drugs can cause the industry of greater loss than marginal.  
 
On a similar justification to Drexel's, different pricing of drugs based on a 
country's purchasing power, can be another way for the pharmaceutical industry to 
answer its moral obligation to the developing world's poor and sick population.1059 
Presuming that pharmaceutical multinationals can retain the research and 
development investment from sails in the developed world's markets,1060 firms would 
be able to partly subsidise drugs in developing countries,1061 especially when selling 
bulk drugs.1062 In practice there is a variety of drugs pricing differentiation policies 
practiced by different countries, poorer and richer, based on different economic 
variables consideraitos as purchasing power.1063  
 
Answering the moral obligation of the pharmaceutical industry towards 
developing countries need to access medicine is of a growing obligation as bounded 
by the United Nations. Although the TRIPS Agreement did not oblige developed 
countries to offer lower cost drugs to developing countries, the moral and social 
considerations do. The understanding of the importance of donating free of charge 
drugs and assisting the developing world in their tries to access affordable drugs has 
grown along the years, especially with wider expectations from these countries to 
enforce larger scope of patent protection on pharmaceutical innovation.  
 
Protecting incremental innovation in this respect is of a colossal demand from the 
developing world for it has a direct impact on the minimisation of the generic drugs 
pool and thus on accessing needed drugs in low cost. Although in time, the same 
protection on pharmaceutical incremental innovation would elevate the Indian 
                                               
1059
 See Abbott, above n 257, 417. See also WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
Differentiated Pricing of Patented Products (Working Paper No 63 Revised, New Delhi, 2001) 1,8. 
1060
 See Abbott, above n 257, 417. 
1061
 Ibid.  
1062
 Ibid, 418 - 419. Contrast to Jean Pierre Garnier, the CEO of Glaxosmithkline said that he is not a 
head of a chariteable institution and there should not be any similar excepctations to act as one. See 
Jean Pierre Garnier, Head of Glaxo, Special AIDS Report www.guardian.co.uk/aids. See also Yolanda 
Tayler (ed) "Battling HIV/AIDS: A Decision Maker’s Guide to the Procurement of Medicines and 
Related Supplies" (The World Bank, Washington DC, 2004) 1, 135. 
1063
 See generally Drexel, above n 77, 721, 725.   
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innovative pharmaceutical industry to offer lower cost drug market through patent 
enforcement, until that day comes, the Western pharmaceutical industry has to justify 
its expectations from the developing world by promising, at least, its population 
healthcare. In other words, homogenous patent enforcement by the international 
community cannot stand alone without supporting the weaker party in the process of 
its emergence, especially when the right that is in stake is the most sacred rights of all, 
the right of health.   
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VIII CONCLUSION 
 
Realising that patent does not only imbue the individual exclusivity rights in the 
marketplace but introduce new needed products to the public, highlights the 
importance of patent enforcement in developing countries. Patent protection can 
encourage more innovation, advanced technological products introduction to the 
marketplace and industrialise the developing world to become one with the economic 
developed region. This realisation is most relevant in a developing country such as 
India, with growing innovative skills, quality speaking English workforce and 
evolving economy which can be proven in the avenue of the pharmaceutical 
technology field.  
 
The link between patent and growth not only implies of the prospect of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry enjoyment from high extent of local innovation, it can imply 
of the possibility to establish an extended patent – based pharmaceutical marketplace, 
one which would be able to offer low cost patented drugs given to high competition 
levels. Given the prospectus rise from poverty, the growth of local purchasing power 
and thus the growth of the consumer marketplace, the opportunity of India to benefit 
from patent and utilise it to expand the competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace 
can be a reality. As long as the Indian industry would engage with innovation, grow 
and offer high quantity of new drugs, pioneer/incremental, the reality of reduced 
patented drug cost is near. In other words, the opportunity to change the common 
perspective on patent, as a dangerous mechanism to enforce on pharmaceutical 
innovations in developing countries is rising. It can therefore be said that patent's role 
as a barrier to drugs accessibility in developing countries is a breakable myth.  
 
It should be noted however that the thesis does not suggest of the abolishment of 
the generic industry in India or in any other developing country. The generic industry 
has a colossal contribution to the health care promotion in these countries through low 
cost drugs production. If a generic version of an HIV/AIDS drug can be offered in 
US$2 instead of US$17 in countries such as India with epidemic rates of HIV/AIDS 
and high poverty, there should not be a doubt of the vitality of the generic production 
to the population health care.  
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Nevertheless, and in respect to the generic production immense importance to 
drugs accessibility, it lacks to answer additional elements involves in the prospect of 
health care in the developing world. As a result of the generic industry's reliance on 
existing drugs, it can fail to offer drugs to the sick for it has to wait until the original 
drug is innovated. The generic industry does not advance the innovative skills of the 
pharmaceutical industry to enable it to conduct research on tropical diseases. Lastly, 
in a time ruled by intellectual property rights regime, the generic industry does not 
promise the economic benefits as Indian innovative based drugs can.  
 
India however, has chosen to prioritise the generic production as the only source 
to access drugs and ruled out the opportunity to achieve the same result through patent 
enforcement on pharmaceutical innovations. After all, India is still a low-middle 
income developing country which suffers from high rates of poverty, sickness and 
poor education. However India is soon to be an industrialised developed country, with 
one of the largest consumer economies in the world. These parameters can indicate of 
the growing possibilities for the Indian population to afford patented drugs under their 
original cost, especially incremental modified innovative drugs.  
 
Furthermore, the diversification the Indian pharmaceutical industry has 
accomplished by practicing in innovative research and development in parallel to 
generics can also indicate of the preparedness of the industry to engage with larger 
innovative activity. The revolutionised Indian economy and pharmaceutical industry 
can testify of the solid platform India has to offer low cost patented drug marketplace 
in the near future. However, without some alterations to the Indian Patent Act to 
encourage the local industry to introduce more innovative based drugs to the 
marketplace, ones which promote the patenting of pharmaceutical incremental 
innovation, establishing low cost patented drugs marketplace will stay an unfulfilled 
notion.  
  
Although India signed the TRIPS Agreement and obliged to patent pharmaceutical 
innovation, process and products, India has narrowed the eligibility of pharmaceutical 
substances for protection. In this step not only India ignored from the obligation under 
the TRIPS Agreement to offer patent protection to all fields of technology, it also 
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ignored from the generic incompetence and the alternative solution patent can offer to 
a better healthcare condition in the country.     
 
The equation as analysed in the fifth and sixth chapters is very clear. As patent 
was proven to be a key factor to induce foreign direct investment as well as to its 
encouragement of pharmaceutical innovation, it can promote excessive innovative 
based drugs competition. Nevertheless, in order to offer the use of patent mechanism 
as an alternative route of low cost drugs market, the entire industry needs to join the 
practice of innovation. It would not be enough to allocate only large sized firms to the 
practice. Foreign direct investment can offer that needed expansion. As shown in the 
fifth chapter, since India has signed the TRIPS Agreement and joined the World 
Trade Organisation, the pharmaceutical industry has enjoyed from numerous 
partnerships and collaborations with Western pharmaceutical firms. These 
collaborations not only have endowered the Indian industry with more capital for 
research and development processes, it also allocated needed education, management 
skills, contacts, which showed of the potential such investment has in the creation of 
large scaled Indian pharmaceutical industry. Theory also suggests the importance of 
foreign direct investment to encourage the formation of new firms in the host country 
which is of vital importance to widen the competition in the marketplace.  
 
As foreign direct investment, was proven to be strongly connected to patent 
enforcement in the host country, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, it can 
therefore be concluded of patent's contribution to establish access to drugs in the 
developing world and not otherwise. Pointing at the power patent has to induce 
investment to the Indian pharmaceutical industry and enlarge it, presents only one 
level of the advocated use of patent as an alternative vehicle to low cost drugs 
marketplace in India.   
 
Encouraging more Indian pharmaceutical firms to engage in innovation is not 
much a reality once the only protected innovation is new chemical entity drug. The 
Indian innovative pharmaceutical industry is in the beginning stage of its formation 
and it is far from having enough capital to conduct research solely on new chemical 
entity drugs. Furthermore, being a case of rarity, new chemical entity drugs cannot 
offer the competitive edge as incremental based drugs can. Offering various 
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equivalent drugs to answer one health condition can clearly increase the competition 
in the Indian pharmaceutical industry and create forceful competition to reduce drugs 
pricing. Not only it is within the frame of the Indian pharmaceutical industry capital 
capacity in small to large sized firms, it is also in the capacity of the industry 
scientific skills which can be fully completed by partnering with Western firms.  
 
Thus, excluding protection from the norm innovative based drugs not only 
subtracts the motivation of innovation, it also subtracts investment by pharmaceutical 
multinationals and destructs the fulfilment of offering low cost patented drug market 
in India. Without patent enforcement of incremental innovation, less investment 
would be directed to the Indian pharmaceutical industry, fewer firms would be 
formed, fewer drugs would be introduce to the market, the large based firms would 
focus their research activity to answer the richer markets needs and generic 
production would remain the only route to access drugs.  
 
It is however noteworthy to mention that realising a vast pharmaceutical 
competition in the Indian marketplace is of a long term creation. For this given 
reason, the thesis does not ignore the immediate need to access drugs and promotes 
the use of generics production in parallel to wider enforcement of patent. No one 
should be denied from needed essential drug use, regardless whether it is required by 
the richer population or the poorer. Health should not be a function of wealth and 
should never be interpreted as one. Thus, as long as the Indian Government would 
respect the Western pharmaceutical industry need, and to this matter, its own 
pharmaceutical industry need to enjoy from patent protection of pharmaceutical 
incremental innovation, the Government use of compulsory licensing should be more 
acceptable. Through the compulsory licensing mechanism, the patentee is being 
compensated and the poor and sick population is benefited from low cost generic 
versions of needed drugs. 
 
Notwithstanding the use of compulsory licensing as offered by the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Doha Declaration, the thesis does not encourage an extensive use 
of this mechanism. A prevalent use of compulsory licensing can contradict in result 
the obligation India would have to enforce wide scope of patent protection on 
pharmaceutical innovations. In this regards and in a try to reach a balance between 
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the need of the pharmaceutical industry to protect its costly innovations and the need 
of the Indian population to access drugs, the stronger party to this scale, the Western 
pharmaceutical industry, has to answer a moral-social obligation towards India's 
health needs. Although the legislative outline does not oblige the developed world to 
assist the poor economies in the world to access needed medicine, as the parable of 
the Good Samaritan suggests, the pharmaceutical industry in the developed world has 
to devote a relative share of its revenues to the ones which cannot enjoy from a 
minimal state of health and conduct quality lives.  
 
Health is a core factor in the cycle of life. Health is the source of human capital, 
education, productivity and further economic and social benefits. Health is not a right 
given to the richer population of the world. Health is a right given to all human 
beings. However, health is a costly product. Innovating drugs is a process which 
entails hundreds of millions of dollars and for that indisputable fact, patenting the 
costly invention is of an immense importance for the pharmaceutical industry. This 
truth cannot be applied only in developed countries, but also in developing countries.  
The latter however cannot find any comfort in this truth. Enforcing patent protection 
on pharmaceutical innovation substances increases the cost of health to an 
unaffordable cost in the developing world. Relying on generics to access drugs for 
such a long time, blinded the developing world from an alternative way to enjoy low 
cost drugs through patent.  
 
Narrowing the patent eligibility scope of pharmaceutical innovation can expend 
the generic drug pool. Generics production can offer low cost drugs and it can offer it 
today. However, generics do not answer the wide health spectrum in the developing 
world. Generics production cannot benefit the Indian pharmaceutical industry with 
innovative skills. Generics cannot invite collaboration with Western firms in the 
avenue of innovation, invite capital investment and thus it cannot answer the ultimate 
need in the developing world to find cures to tropical diseases. Not only wide patent 
enforcement scope can answer these needs, through their fulfilment, India would be 
able to offer better healthcare to its population in low cost. Through their fulfilment 
India would come to learn that patenting pharmaceutical innovation is not a threat to 
its population, but a promise of better health. It is time to acknowledge patent as an 
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elevating force of health, not only in richer countries, but in developing countries as 
well.  
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